HTTP://WWW.STOPNATO.ORG.UK
---------------------------


ChroniclesExtra
http://www.chroniclesmagazine.org/News/Trifkovic/NewsST090502.html
http://www.chroniclesmagazine.org/News/Trifkovic/News&Views.htm
September 5, 2002

                     IRAQ AND THE NEOCONS' PSEUDO-REALITY
                                     by Srdja Trifkovic

"Ideology" is a bad word in the English-speaking world. It evokes
Jacobin fanatics, inquisitors, goose-stepping storm troopers,
commissars, and cultural revolutionaries. Adherents of an ideology are
assumed to be brainwashed, imbued with mind-altering dogmas, and steeped
in pseudo-reality -- "a system of interested deceit" -- so unlike the
rest of us pragmatic empiricists who are blessed to rely on our common
sense to guide us through the world as it really is. We live culturally,
they live in ideology. To paraphrase Sartre, ideology is other people.

In today's America some of the most highly motivated of those "other
people" inhabit the academia and the mainstream media. Others pretend to
be the executors of our collective will, reside in Washington, and run
the foreign policy of the United States. They fall into two categories.
Some are inspired by the ideology of "idealistic" globalism, constructed
upon the notion of America's exceptionalism: the United States is a
proposition nation, founded upon the values of equality, human rights,
tolerance, etc, etc; it is therefore unique, it is the "indispensable
nation," a light to the world, whether the world wants it or not.
"Humanitarian bombing" was those people's trademark, the Balkans their
favorite playing field, and they thrived under Bill Clinton. They saw
America as the ultimate arbitrator of domestic evolutions all over the
world; to them foreign policy equated social policy on a global scale,
and "nation-building" abroad was the equivalent of busing and
affirmative action at home.

Under President George W. Bush the "other people" in the foreign policy
establishment are guided by globalism's twin brother: by the
neoconservative ideology that seeks and justifies unabashed American
hegemony. Both strains strikingly analogous to their doctrinaire Marxist
roots, and both are deeply inimical to the traditions and values of the
American Republic. Their relentless pursuit of an American Empire
overseas is coupled by their deliberate domestic transformation of the
United States' federal government into a Leviathan unbound by
constitutional restraints.

Their mendacity apparent in the misrepresentation of the Iraqi crisis to
the American people only confirms what we have known about the species
and the mindset for a long time. The nation has been pushed into the
virtual-reality world of Sunday morning non-debates -- the contentious
issue is how to wage war and who to install in its aftermath, not
whether and why -- of fact-free opinion columns, and briefings in which
facts are converted into fiction, and even the fictions give up all
pretense to credibility. The ruling elite in Washington has acquired an
ideological paradigm on the question of Iraq that goes beyond any one
piece of deliberate policy, and which falls outside the parameters of
rational debate. They have confused U.S. interests and prestige with
those of the warring factions in the Middle East, to the point where, in
Iraq, they insist on a war that, if successful, will do little to
advance American interests -- we'd be saddled with yet another Muslim
protectorate, unstable and resentful -- and that, if unsuccessful, will
be hugely detrimental to those interests.

Before proceeding let me make my personal position clear. In the final
years of the Soviet Union, as glasnost broadened the scope of
permissible public debate, it was nevertheless advisable to precede any
expression of controversial views with a little disclaimer, e.g. "While
I hold no brief for the Islamic dushmans terrorizing the people of
Afghanistan, I think we should withdraw from that country"; or, "While
rejecting the notion that Western-style capitalism provides the best
model for good life, I think that we should abandon central planning and
collectivized agriculture in favor of free-market reforms." 

It is a sign of these unpleasant times that one feels compelled to do
the same, here and today, when discussing Iraq, but I am a realist and
so be it: I think, unreservedly, that Saddam Hussein is a nasty piece of
work. In fact I wish he were dead and gone, and someone very different
in power in Baghdad. (Admittedly, hardly any leader in the Arab world is
very different from Saddam: to bully, cheat, and lie abroad, and to
oppress and rob at home, is the rule rather than exception in that
political culture.) The Iraqi dictator has brought nothing but misery to
his own people, as well as chronic instability to the region. His
military adventures -- including two disastrous wars -- ended in
fiascos, and yes, he did "gas his own people" (actually the Kurds, whom
he sees as anything but "his own," but who had had the misfortune of
living under his sway). If he could make them or buy them, Saddam would
undoubtedly love to have all kinds of "weapons of mass destruction,"
and, in extremis, he would probably use them against a foe unable to
retaliate in kind. (Nevertheless, he would not use them against a foe
armed with nuclear weapons: brutal dictators are realists, and therefore
devoid of suicidal tendencies.) 

All of the above, while obviously necessary to the argument that the
United States must topple Saddam by force, is not sufficient to make the
argument stick. Since different members of the Bush Administration and
the War Party have used different tools to support the basic argument,
we need to examine them one by one and so introduce much-needed clarity
into the debate.

In the immediate aftermath of September 11 the proponents of war against
Iraq immediately claimed that it should be dealt with "once and for all"
because it was in cohorts with Al-Qaeda. This turned out to be untrue.
Saddam is a secular dictator with pan-Arabic, nationalist, rather than
Islamic, delusions of grandeur. Accordingly his regime tends to support
non-Islamic radicals, notably the PLO dissidents -- including Abu Nidal,
who was found murdered in his Baghdad lodgings recently -- and he fears
Muslim fundamentalist groups such as al-Qaeda. Bin Laden, for his part,
regards the Iraqi dictator as a "bad Muslim" and wants him out of power.
Widely circulated claim that Muhammad Atta, the mastermind of the
September 11 attacks, had met an Iraqi intelligence agent in Prague
months before the hijackings, was discarded in April 2002, when the top
Czech spymaster and federal law-enforcement officials both said an
extensive investigation had found no evidence that the meeting ever took
place. The war enthusiasts nevertheless do not give up, resorting to
desperate ploys: on August 22, William Safire even claimed in the New
York Times that "a score of terrorists" were captured by the U.S.
Special Forces in Northern Iraq, including a Saddam agent and an Qaeda
operative; there's even a "Qaeda-Saddam joint venture" to produce "a
form of cyanide cream that kills on contact." This was all
unsubstantiated rubbish.

Anticipating the absence of a smoking gun, within weeks of 9-11 the
proponents of bombing Baghdad immediately declared that the absence of a
clear link did not matter: we were waging a "war on terror," Iraq
supported terrorists, ergo it was a legitimate target. The ruins of the
Towers were still smoldering when Paul Wolfowitz declared that the time
had come to settle the score with Saddam once and for all, and his old
buddy Richard Perle -- George W.'s part-Rasputin, part-Svengali --
echoed the line ever since. A mere week after the attacks, in an open
letter to Bush, Bill Kristol and two-dozen neocon leading lights
(including Perle, Kagan, Krauthammer, Martin Peretz, and Norman
Podhoretz), argued that "even if evidence does not link Iraq directly to
the attack, any strategy aiming at the eradication of terrorism and its
sponsors must include a determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from
power." Almost a year later Saffire repeated the line with his claim
that "terror's most dangerous supporter can be found in Baghdad."

This is the neocons' dulaist pseudo-reality. In the real world there is
evidence that Saddam has provided support to a variety of groups that
oppose his regional adversaries -- including the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq
dissidents fighting the government of Iran, Kurdish rebels fighting
Turkey, and, since the Palestinian uprising began in 2000, various
Palestinian groups attacking Israel. None of those groups have targeted
America. His mischief in this respect is no worse than Pakistan's
support for the Kashmiri separatists who routinely resort to terror
against India, or Georgia's benevolent tolerance of Chechen terrorists
on its territory. Saddam's sins with respect to supporting terrorism
pale compared to the Clinton Administration's warm embrace of the KLA, a
terrorist cabal if there ever was one, composed of homicidal
dope-dealers and pimps who now run Kosovo -- compliments of the U.S. Air
Force -- having murdered or ethnically cleansed every non-Albanian they
could lay their hands on. Yes, Saddam probably also does channel money
to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers, but in doing that he is
only following the example of that "reliable ally" of the United States,
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Unless Messrs. Musharraf, Shevardnadze,
Clinton, and Abdallah are judged by the same yardstick, Saddam's
"support for terrorism" is not a serious argument.

The proponents of the war next resurrected the old claim that Iraq had
to be attacked because it could be acquiring "weapons of mass
destruction" (WMDs) and was refusing to allow the U.N. weapons
inspectors to find out if this were so. There was no proof of Saddam
actually developing his arsenal; but that objection was discounted by
Donald Rumsfeld in a turn of phrase worthy of Torquemada: "the absence
of evidence does not mean the evidence of absence."

There is both more and less than meets the eye in the weapons saga. The
Senate hearings two weeks ago were something of an eye-opener, when
former UN arms inspector Scott Ritter -- a Marine veteran, Bush voter,
card-carrying Republican -- blandly stated that in his considered
opinion the Bush administration did not want renewed inspections of
Iraq, because they would make war more difficult to justify. "A handful
of ideologues have hijacked the national security policy of the United
States for their own ambitions," Ritter said, insisting that Iraq was
stripped of its WMDs, and the capacity to make them. Saddam is not a
threat, not because he does not want to be but because he has been
successfully declawed. All else is speculation and rhetoric entirely
divorced from fact.

Ritter's former boss, Rolf Ekeus, head of United Nations weapons
inspections in Iraq from 1991-97, supports this view and questions the
stated reasons for withdrawing inspectors in the first place. He has
accused the US of manipulating the UN inspections teams for their own
political ends, and attempted to increase its influence over the
inspections: "As time went on, some countries, especially the US, wanted
to learn more about other parts of Iraq's capacity." It tried to find
information about the whereabouts of Saddam Hussein, and pressed the
teams to inspect sensitive areas, such as Iraq's ministry of defense,
when it was politically favorable for them to create a crisis --
"inspections which were controversial from the Iraqis' view, and thereby
created a blockage that could be used as a justification for a direct
military action." In December 1998, one such fabricated crisis enabled
Bill Clinton -- then in the midst of the Lewinsky affair -- to order
UNSCOM inspectors out of Iraq two days before renewing bombing. As it
happened, most of the targets bombed were derived from the unique access
the UN inspectors had enjoyed in Iraq, and had more to do with the
security of Saddam than weapons of mass destruction.

In reality the current war fever is totally unconnected to weapons
inspections. John Bolton, the arms control supremo, declared that the US
"insists on regime change in Baghdad and that policy will not be
altered, whether inspectors go in or not." Bolton is probably aware that
it would be audacious for a boldly unilateralist Administration to
invoke Saddam's violations of "the will of the international community"
as casus belli. That's the Clintonistas' line; the Bush team has no
qualms about abrogating nuclear arms control treaties, biological
weapons conventions, torpedoing the International Criminal Court, not
signing global warming protocols, and taking a hard line on the legality
of those Guantanamo cages. Most of those conventions and documents
admittedly deserve to be ignored or torn, but from the purely legal
point of view, the readiness to attack Iraq without a Security Council
mandate represents a violation of international law of the highest
order.

More worrying is the fact that the forthcoming war is also a violation
of the Constitution of the United States. President Bush may have been
told by his unnamed "top legal advisers" that he does not need to secure
the prior approval of Congress before launching a full-scale war on
Iraq, but their claim is based on the assertion that the original
Security Council resolution that paved the way for the Gulf War back in
1991 remains in full legal force -- but that claim is not accepted by
the Security Council itself! It is additionally galling that the least
UN-friendly president in US history deems it necessary to protect his
warlike designs from the Congress by pretending that he is legally
justified, and bound, by the UN Security Council resolutions.

When the War Party encounters legal and rational obstacles it cannot
answer, it resorts to the old reductio ad Hitlerum, to dehumanization
and demonization: Saddam is evil, so evil in fact that no arguments are
needed, and whoever insists on getting them is no better than he. Yes,
Saddam is Hitler
-- forget Milosevic and Noriega (and
let's please forget the unapprehended Ossama!) -- and if we don't act
decisively now . . . Munich . . . much higher price later . . . blah,
blah. But this trick has been played once too often, and Condoleeza
Rice's "moral case" for attacking Iraq has misfired. Even the neocons
realize that it would be potentially tricky to insist on the
Wilsonian-"moralist" line, in view of the distinctly unsavory nature of
so many regimes whose support they regard as essential to the
neoimperial project. Turkey, Pakistan, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and,
yes, Israel, with countless skeletons in their cupboards, only show
that, to an ideologue, "morality" is no longer treated as a function of
actual behavior. It is situational, it reflects the place of the actor
within the ideological system: if Iraq kills Kurds, it gets bombed; if
Turkey kills Kurds, it is OK, or at least we'll keep quiet about it. If
Saddam violates human rights, he is a monster; if the Islamo-fascist
freak regime in Riyaadh does so, endemically and relentlessly, it is a
topic unfit to broach when its Ambassador comes to the President's Texas
ranch.

In the end we are left with the uncomfortable realization that the US
government wants to attack Iraq because it can do so, because it expects
to be able to do so with relative impunity, and because within the
Administration there are people who have vested interests and their own
geopolitical and emotional agendas that have nothing to do with the
national interest of the United States. The ultimate reason for
attacking Saddam is the same as Sir Edmund Hillary's reason for climbing
the Everest: because it's there. It is about more than Iraqi oil and
Israeli security; it is about the future of the world. Years before the
neocons came to power, back in 1996, Bill Kristol and Robert Kagan
gloated in what they called "benevolent global hegemony." They demanded
indefinite and massive military build-ups, unconnected to any
identifiable military threat, and for 'citizen involvement,' in effect,
militarization of the populace. Their vision of Pax Americana was
summarized in their exultation that we have never lived in a world more
conducive to [our] fundamental interests in a liberal international
order, the spread of freedom and democratic governance, [and] an
international economic system of free-market capitalism and free trade.
They did not tell us how the US would preserve the traditional moral
fabric, social structure and economic interests of its own people --
what most Americans still mean by 'national interests' -- because they
are ultimately in the business of altering minds and culture, not
preserving them. 

The same triumphalist spirit was in evidence when Vice-President Cheney,
addressing a VFW convention in Nashville at the end of August, vowed
that the Bush administration "won't look away and hope for the best,"
and predicted that Saddam's removal would be greeted with joy inside
Iraq, and would help the spread of democracy across the entire Arab
world. This is pure rhetoric, spiced with wishful thinking. There is no
strategic vision, no cost-benefit analysis, no consideration of risks,
and no definition of victory. This is frivolity on par with the behavior
of Europe's leading statesmen in July 1914. It remains unchallenged,
amidst the bipartisan War Party's near-monopoly on U.S. media
commentary, making America hardly more open to meaningful debate than
its chief adversary was during the Cold War. What had started, on
October 2001, as a legitimate (although not fully legal) military
response to the terrorist outrage of 9-11 has degenerated into a
hubristic power-play. Small wonder that only one foreign government in
the world fully supports what Bush, Rumsfeld, Cheney & Co want (and yes,
you have guessed which one it is).

There are other reasons for the war, in addition to the "passionate
attachment," all of them equally bad: to hide the fact that Afghanistan
is a costly failure, to keep the Administration's many arms industry
buddies busy in these lean economic times, but above all to satisfy the
hubristic longings of the neoconservative cabal that now possesses
Bush's ear, soul, heart, and tongue. They give the President ever more
menacing scripts to read, and then claim that we have to attack Iraq
because now we were painted into the corner, since the White House
rhetoric no longer allows for a "humiliating" retreat.

These puppet masters are America's true enemy. They are far greater
threat to the constitutional order, identity, and way of life of the
United States than Saddam will ever be. They are in pursuit of Power for
its own sake--thus sinning against God and man--and history teaches us
that, in the end, America will be destroyed if its rulers are allowed to
proceed with their mad quest. Given the choice, the people of this
country would never opt for it, but it is unclear how they can resist
it, in this age of 'managed mass democracy.' The War Party may even
prevail, for now, and enter Baghdad in triumph; but before long there
will be new excitement, new opportunities, a new Hitler. In the end the
misused power will inevitably generate countervailing powe--a grand
coalition containing many current "allies"--after the world has become a
poorer, nastier, less free, and far less populous place.

---------------------------
ANTI-NATO INFORMATION LIST

==^================================================================
This email was sent to: archive@jab.org

EASY UNSUBSCRIBE click here: http://topica.com/u/?a84x2u.bacIlu
Or send an email to: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

T O P I C A -- Register now to manage your mail!
http://www.topica.com/partner/tag02/register
==^================================================================

Reply via email to