THE USTASHA GENOCIDE By Marko Attila Hoare
The Ustasha genocide of Serbs, Jews and Gypsies in the territory of the so-called 'Independent State of Croatia' in the period 1941-1945 is a subject about which historians in the West have to date had little to say. English-language accounts by journalists and others have often been as empty of serious analysis as they are full of gory descriptions of atrocities. There exists a large body of scholarly literature written by historians in the former Yugoslavia about the Ustashas and their genocidal policy, as well as compilations of documents, eyewitness accounts and other data, yet we still lack a satisfactory analysis in any language of why the genocide occurred and how it was implemented - of the kind which, for example, exists for the Nazi Holocaust. This deficit can only be made good when monographic studies by competent historians unhindered by ideological preconceptions begin to be published in greater number. In this text, we seek merely to outline some parameters that might contribute to a better general understanding. The Axis invasion of Yugoslavia, that began on 6 April 1941 and was completed eleven days later, created an entirely new political order in the occupied Yugoslav lands. The 'Independent State of Croatia' (NDH) was proclaimed on 10 April by Slavko Kvaternik, acting on the orders of SS Colonel Edmund Veesenmayer, and in the name of Ustasha leader Ante Pavelic as Poglavnik (Fuhrer). Hitler had supported a unified Yugoslavia as his favoured partner in the western Balkans up until March 1941, and had coerced the Yugoslav government into joining his Tripartite Pact. Yet the military coup of that month, by a group of Serbian army officers acting in concert with British intelligence, was wrongly interpreted by Hitler as directed against the German-Yugoslav alliance, despite the coup leaders' stated willingness to maintain collaboration with Germany. Hitler thereupon reversed his policy and established a Croatian puppet-state under the Ustashas, a fascist-terrorist group with virtually no popular support among the Croatian people, bypassing both the popular Croat politicians of the Croat Peasant Party (HSS) as well as the representatives of the Serbs, Muslims and other non-Croats. This radical, arbitrary move was equivalent to placing the Ku Klux Klan in power in the USA. Still more arbitrary, if that were possible, was the outcome of the German-Italian negotiations at the Vienna Conference of 21-22 April, which placed Bosnia-Hercegovina entirely within the NDH, whose eastern border would coincide with the historic Bosnian border. The division of Yugoslavia into German and Italian zones of occupation was finalised on 23 April and established a border that ran right through the NDH. Following the Rome Agreement of 18 May between Italy and the NDH, the territories incorporated within the latter were most of Croatia proper (including East Srijem which was under German military control), southern and north-eastern Dalmatia with the islands of Brac and Hvar, and all Bosnia-Hercegovina. The population of the puppet state was calculated by the Germany Ministry of Foreign Affairs at this time to be approximately 6,285,000 of which 3,300,000 were Croats, 1,925,000 were Serbs, 700,000 were Muslims, 150,000 Germans, 65,000 Czechs and Slovaks, 40,000 Jews and 30,000 Slovenes. This meant that Croats comprised just slightly over half the NDH's population; even if the Muslims were treated as Croats the Croat share of the population was less than two-thirds. The Ustashas were thus a minority faction with minimal popular support among a nationality that itself comprised only a bare majority of the multinational population of the 'state'. This was incompatible with the Ustashas' belief in Croatia as an exclusively Croat land and was at one level the basic cause of the Ustasha genocide against the Serb, Jewish and Gypsy inhabitants of the NDH. The Ustasha extermination of the Jews and Gypsies was part and parcel of the Nazi Holocaust that took place across German-occupied Europe with the assistance of native collaborators. On 30 April the Jews were deprived of citizenship of the NDH; subsequent legislation deprived them of freedom of movement and residency. From 23 May all Jews were forced to wear yellow identification tags. These moves were based on the Nazi Nuremberg Laws and other Nazi legislation and practice. Jews were arrested on an individual basis along with other undesirables from the first days of the NDH's existence, but their mass arrest began following the German attack on the USSR. On 26 June Pavelic issued a decree placing collective responsibility on the Jews for anti-state activities and ordering their internment in concentration camps. In Sarajevo, already on the day after their arrival in the city (16 April), the Germans looted and destroyed the four synagogues. However, the mass arrest of Jews began in Bosnia-Hercegovina somewhat later than in Croatia proper. In August those living in small towns were arrested first, followed by the Sarajevo Jews at the end of the month in an operation that was effectively completed in November. By early 1942, of Sarajevo's pre-war Jewish population of 10,000 only a few hundred remained. Of the 36-40,000 Jewish inhabitants of the NDH at least 30,000 or over 80% were exterminated, principally by the Nazis and Ustashas (smaller numbers were victims of the Chetniks, Muslim SS troops, Italian forces and others). Of 14,000 Bosnian Jews almost 12,000 were exterminated, nearly 11,000 in concentration camps within the NDH. In this way the fourth-largest Bosnian ethnic group was effectively removed from the Bosnian political landscape within the first year of the War and virtually annihilated. The Jews who survived the Nazi-Ustasha roundup became one of the most staunchly pro-Partisan groups in Yugoslavia: 4,572 Jews fought as Partisans of whom 1,318 were killed. Most of these were natives of the NDH. As with the Jews, the NDH's Gypsy population, numbering 25-40,000 in 1941, was almost wholly exterminated by the Nazis and Ustashas, in particular during 1942, with the Ustashas even more merciless in their persecution than the Nazis. The Ustasha genocide of the Croatian and Bosnian Serbs, in contrast to the genocide of the Jews and Gypsies, was a project whose origins were primarily domestic. The Ustashas were a fringe movement of extremists with whom the mainstream Croat national movement under Vlatko Macek and the HSS cannot be equated. The Ustasha attempt to exterminate, expel or forcibly assimilate all Serbs on Croatian territory was a reversal of the policy pursued by Stjepan Radic and Macek from 1927 to 1941, of maintaining a firm alliance with the Independent Democratic Party as representative of Croatian Serbs loyal to Croatia. The Ustasha genocide of the Serbs was not the ideologically predetermined outcome of Croat national aspirations, nor the accidental by-product of Axis rule; rather the increasingly bitter political conflicts of interwar Yugoslavia, both at the national and at the local level and particularly in its final years, created the conditions that made genocide possible in the exceptional circumstances created by the Axis invasion. It is open to question whether the Ustasha leaders intended from the outset to carry out genocide, or whether their system of rule on the one hand, and Serb resistance to it on the other, gave rise to a dynamic that led inexorably to genocide. Nevertheless, the abnormality of an extreme-nationalist but militarily weak regime attempting to establish its rule over a disparate collection of territories populated by a nationally mixed and generally hostile population was one that was bound to generate massive violence and bloodshed. So far as longer term causality is concerned, it appears that the genocide was ideologically motivated; that in the two principal areas where the Ustasha movement enjoyed a degree of popular support (Lika and Western Hercegovina) and to a lesser extent elsewhere, popular participation in the genocide fed off the bitterness generated among the Croat population by the oppression it had experienced in the interwar Yugoslav state; and that the Ustashas' genocidal proclivities were greatly encouraged by the resistance among Serbs to the establishment of the new 'state'. A somewhat different dynamic was at work in Bosnia-Hercegovina, where conditions continued to be dominated by the traditional Serb-Muslim dichotomy. Here the new conflict created by the establishment of the NDH superimposed itself on the older, lingering conflict over land that dated back to Ottoman times and whose supposed resolution after 1921 had merely generated further mutual resentment. The persecution of the Serbs began immediately following the Ustasha seizure of power and on 25 April the Cyrillic script was banned in the NDH. The Ustashas massacred 184 Serb peasants at Gudovac near Bjelovar on 27-28 April and 250 at Blagaj in Kordun. On 11-12 May the Ustashas massacred 300 Serbs at Glina; in early June 140 Serbs at Ljubinje in Hercegovina and 180 at Korita near Gacko. On 15 June 60 Serbs were rounded up at Knin and subsequently massacred. This pattern of massacres was repeated across the NDH, in particular in the Serb-inhabited territories of Croatia proper and in Hercegovina, areas from which the Ustashas drew their strongest support. On 20 June a group of prominent Serbs from the NDH, in expectation of an imminent massacre, petitioned the quisling Serbian government in Belgrade to seek German intervention on behalf of the NDH's Serb population. The Ustashas killed their victims in a bestial manner. Thus, the 173 Serbs rounded up in the Hercegovinian town of Nevesinje and its surroundings during late May and June were horribly tortured before being killed: they were set upon with hammers, picks, rifle butts and knives; the had their ears, noses, sexual organs and fingers cut off; their eyes gouged out; their hair, beards and eyebrows ripped out and stuffed in their mouths. While in an Ustasha prison, Durda Golijanin was forced to watch her son and husband being tortured. After her husband had been killed, her son, a young child, gasped and choked and begged for water, whereupon an Ustasha shot him in the head. A group of Ustashas arrested a Serb innkeeper and his wife, Vaso and Magdalena Lambic, and their two young sons in the Hercegovinian town of Konjic in late July or early August. The headless corpse of Magdalena Lambic was found in the River Neretva several days later; her husband and sons were likewise murdered. The Ustashas raped and murdered the women of the Serb villages of Dabro and Tukbobija in Bosanska Krajina; according to two eyewitnesses: "They cut open the breasts of women and girls and thrust their hands inside. They burned the hair on women's heads and impaled young children on stakes." The genocide of the Serbs escalated during the summer for a number of reasons related to international developments. Pavelic's surrender of northern Dalmatia to Italy in May acted as a catalyst to the Ustashas' anti-Serb policies in Bosnia-Hercegovina. According to Eugen Dido Kvaternik, former Ustasha secret police chief and himself one of the architects of the genocide, the loss of Dalmatia led Pavelic, as an Axis puppet, to channel Croat nationalism in an anti-Serb direction to prevent it being directed against the Italians. The Nazis, meanwhile, began their own genocidal programme against the Slovene population of German-annexed Slovenia, involving mass expulsions. They consequently put pressure on the Ustasha regime to accept the settlement of Slovene refugees in the NDH, something that provided an additional impetus to Ustasha efforts to expel the Serb population of the NDH en masse to Serbia. On 7 June Hitler met with Pavelic at Berchtesgaden and advised him to pursue a policy of "national intolerance" for the subsequent fifty years. The deportation of the Slovenes and the deportation of the Serbs were to be coordinated. By the start of the Serb uprising in the NDH in late July over 10,000 Slovenes had been deported to the NDH, just under half to Bosnia-Hercegovina, while a much larger number of Serbs (approximately 180,000) was expelled from the NDH to Serbia. Finally, the Axis attack on the USSR on 22 June brought an escalation of Ustasha terror against all perceived enemies of the state - Communists, Jews, Serbs and others. On 22 July Hitler received Slavko Kvaternik and advised him to use the most brutal methods in dealing with the NDH's internal enemies. On 24-25 July the Ustashas massacred 1,200 people at Grabovac near Petrinja and at the end of the month perhaps as many as 2,000 at Glina. In Bosnia-Hercegovina the largest massacres occurred following the outbreak of the full-scale uprising on 27 July, following which tens of thousands were massacred in the western part of Bosanska Krajina. In mid-July use of the term 'Serb Orthodox religion' was banned and replaced by 'Greek Eastern religion'. The total number of Serb victims of the Ustasha genocide is, unlike the number of Jewish victims, the subject of fierce debate, particularly between Serb and Croat nationalists. Available figures are not entirely satisfactory from a scholarly perspective but may serve as an indication of the extent of the tragedy. The Atlas of Ustasha Genocide published by the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1994 gives a figure of 246,025, of which 145,490 were in Bosnia-Hercegovina and 100,535 in Croatia, which seems to include the victims of German massacres but not those killed in the Jasenovac and Stara Gradiska concentration camps. 246,025 may therefore be taken as the maximum number of Serb victims outside of Jasenovac and Stara Gradiska. Concerning the latter, the oft-cited figure of 600,000 Serb deaths at Jasenovac must be discounted as wholly unrealistic. Such a figure would suggest that every third Bosnian and Croatian Serb was killed at Jasenovac, implying an orderly and systematic programme of deportation to the camp by the Ustashas that would have affected every Serb family in the NDH. There is simply no evidence for such systematic deportations among the copious body of published eyewitness accounts of Ustasha crimes, which suggest instead that a much greater number of Serbs was killed either in on-site massacres by Ustasha bands or in prisons in their respective native localities or areas. This would be in keeping with the lawless and disorganised character of the Ustasha state. Titoist Yugoslavia's two leading experts on Jasenovac, Antun Miletic and Milan Bulajic, uphold the conclusion of the official investigation into Ustasha crimes at Jasenovac and Stara Gradiska, undertaken under the Communist regime immediately after the war, which put the number of dead at these camps at 5-600,000. More recently, the Serb historian Gojko Skoro, writing under the pseudonym Gojo Riste Dakina, has broadly upheld this figure. Yet none of these historians offers any statistical breakdown to explain how this figure was arrived at; nor do the authors of the original investigation. The Bosniak Institute in Zurich published in 1998 a list of all registered victims of the two concentration camps on the basis of data drawn from the Office for Statistics in Belgrade. This gives a figure of 59,188 known deaths at Jasenovac and Stara Gradiska, of which 33,944 were Serbs, 9,044 Jews, 6,546 Croats, 1,471 Gypsies, 949 Muslims and the rest mostly nationally undetermined. Given that this figure includes only the known and registered victims, it should be taken as a minimum: the Croatian demographer Vladimir Zerjavic also speaks of 59,000 known victims but says the real figure is probably 25-30% higher. Taken together, these sources suggest that the total number of Serb victims of Ustasha genocide may have been approximately 290,000 (approximately 246,000 outside Jasenovac and Stara Gradiska and 44,000 inside). This is similar to an estimate made by the German Embassy in Zagreb, in a letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin on 21 February 1942, of approximately 300,000 Serb dead at Ustasha hands. Partisan resistance, German and Italian pressure on the Ustashas and the consequent moderation of Ustasha policy meant that the genocide was of a lower intensity after the spring of 1942, although there were some extremely bloody episodes, in particular the German-Ustasha offensive at Kozara of June-July 1942 which claimed the lives of 24,480 Serbs. Unlike in the massacres of 1941, the greater part of these were exterminated in concentration camps. The above figures may be compared to the two most recent demographic studies of Yugoslav losses during World War II by the Serb Bogoljub Kocovic and the Croat Zerjavic, which place the total number of Croatian and Bosnian Serb war-losses (including battlefield deaths and civilian victims of the Chetniks, Partisans, Germans, Italians and others) at 307,000 according to Zerjavic or 334,000 according to Kocovic (of these 170,000 Bosnian and 137,000 Croatian Serb dead according to Zerjavic or 209,000 and 125,000 respectively according to Kocovic). The 1948 census gives a figure of 1,678,942 for the Serb population of Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina combined in that year as against a Serb population of about 1,900,000 for the NDH in 1941. The Ustasha genocide is often compared to the Holocaust, and indeed there are structural connections between the two, given Hitler's initial encouragement of Pavelic's anti-Serb policy and Pavelic's role in the extermination of the NDH's Jews. Ustasha persecution of the Serbs resembled in some respects Nazi persecution of the Jews. The Ustasha authorities in Pozega issued an order on 12 May decreeing that all Orthodox inhabitants of the municipality were to wear a white band bearing the letter 'P' for pravoslavac (Orthodox) - clearly reminiscent of the Nazis' use of the yellow star to label Jews. The Ustasha authorities issued various orders to deport Jews and Serbs to concentration camps, treating both groups as a single category for the practical purposes of the administration of genocide. Nevertheless, it is not the case, as Jonathan Steinberg suggests, that the Ustasha genocide was essentially similar to the Holocaust, differing only in its "emotional" motivation. Steinberg claims that the "sole distinction" between the Ustasha genocide and the Holocaust was that "Croatians hated Serbs and so they killed them", while it is "the absence of hatred which makes Nazi genocide stand out in the long annals of human bestiality". In fact, there are several other important distinctions. The Ustashas defined Serbs on a national rather than a racial basis and were therefore ready to accept that a proportion of the NDH's Serb population remain in the state, provided that it be forcibly assimilated and become 'Croat'. This initially involved forced conversions of the Serbs to Catholicism and subsequently the establishment of a 'Croatian Orthodox Church'. The Ustashas' 'Legal Decree on Racial Belonging' and 'Legal decree on the defence of the Aryan blood and honour of the Croat nation' of 30 April were directed against Jews and Gypsies and made no mention of Serbs, who were potentially considered assimilable. Throughout the NDH's short history, ethnic Serbs served in its bureaucracy, army and even in the Ustasha militia itself. The Ustasha militia in the Bosanska Gradiska region recruited both Serbs and Communists. The NDH's Department of Public Security complained in August 1942 that the Italians and Chetniks were obstructing the enrolment of Orthodox youth in the Domobrans. The NDH's District Superintendent for Bileca in the winter of 1942-43 was an ethnic Serb. The NDH's 'parliament', which ceased meeting in December 1942, had two ethnic Serb members, Savo Besarovic and Svetislav Sumanovic. Besarovic, a personal friend of Pavelic's, was subsequently named minister without portfolio. Some Serbs who had served as officers in the Austro-Hungarian Army were allowed to serve as officers in the NDH's armed forces. Serbs who 'became Croat' or converted to Catholicism were still frequently murdered, but not always: the Ustashas had no intention of killing all Serbs. The Ustasha commander in Jajce in November 1941 suggested to his superiors the recognition of "complete civic equality in the villages and municipalities with an Orthodox majority" and "protection for Orthodox property", and informed them that "I have already taken measures to ensure the protection of that part of the Orthodox population that is not encompassed by the rebel detachments, as well as of their property"; an SS commander would never have conceived of such an offer to the Jews, even insincerely. In this context, it is worth citing Mile Budak's infamous statement of 22 July 1941: "We shall kill one part of the Serbs, we shall transport another, and the rest of them will be forced to embrace the Roman Catholic religion. This last part will be absorbed by the Croatian elements." Such a statement would have been unthinkable for Hitler with regard to the Jews; the Final Solution aimed at their total extermination, not at their expulsion and certainly not at their assimilation. There are other reasons why the Ustasha genocide was not equivalent to the Holocaust. The NDH was never a totalitarian state equivalent to Nazi Germany, and there were various instances of the Ustashas at the local level being forced, under pressure from the Muslim and Croat populace, to abandon particular anti-Serb actions or release Serbs from captivity. So far as the NDH's Jews were concerned, the Ustashas allowed some of them to be recognised as "honorary Aryans", a necessity given that several leading Ustashas had Jewish or part-Jewish wives, including Pavelif himself and Slavko Kvaternik, while the latter's son Eugen Dido Kvaternik was himself part Jewish. As is usually the case with dictatorships in South East Europe, in the NDH personal connections often counted for more than did ideology. Arrest by the NDH police was furthermore not necessarily a death sentence for a Serb, or even for a Jew. The trial in Sarajevo on 22 July 1941 of eleven suspected Communists resulted in two being immediately sentenced to death and executed; four being held pending further investigation and five being released. Drago Sobot, a Serb Communist from Drvar, was among those released, in his own words, "on account of insufficient evidence" against him. One of the others who was either acquitted or subsequently released was the Jewish Communist Estera Tina Romano. Finally, although it is untrue that the Serbs 'provoked' the genocide by armed resistance to the NDH, nevertheless the Ustasha genocide differed from the Holocaust in that it was the product of a genuine power struggle between two nationalities competing for control of the same space. The birth of the NDH was one episode in this power-struggle; armed clashes between the Ustashas on the one hand and Yugoslav and Serb forces on the other began during the April War, claiming the life of members of both sides including Slavko Kvaternik's own brother, and continued thereafter. The Ustasha genocide was thus an extreme solution to a territorial conflict between rival nationalisms. In all these respects the position of the Serbs in the NDH and the Ustashas' view of them was simply not equivalent to the position of the Jews in the Third Reich and the perception of them by the Nazis; the Ustasha genocide was more similar to the Armenian genocide of 1915 than to the Holocaust. Put differently: it is impossible to imagine a Jewish rebellion spearheading a revolutionary overthrow of the Nazis; the Serbs, unlike the Jews, were never simply defenceless victims. FOOTNOTES: 1) Nikola Milovanovic, Vojni puc i 27. mart, Prosveta, Belgrade, 1960, pp. 134-135. 2) Enver Redzic, Bosna i Hercegovina u Drugom svjetskom ratu, Sarajevo, OKO, 1998, pp. 22-25; Ljubo Boban, Hrvatske granice od 1918. do 1993. godine, Skolska knjiga, Zagreb, 1995, p. 47. 3) Fikreta Jelic-Butic, Ustase i Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska 1941-1945, Sveucilisna Naklada Liber, Zagreb, 1978, p. 106. 4) Roy Gutman (ed.) Encyclopedia of the Holocaust, MacMillan, New York, 1990, pp. 323-328; Zdenko Levntal (ed.), Zlocini fasistickih okupatora i njihovih pomagaca protiv jevreja u Jugoslaviji, Belgrade, 1952, pp. 64, 70; Narcisa Lengel-Krizman, "A contribution to the study of terror in the so-called 'Independent State of Croatia': Concentration camps for women in 1941-1942", Yad Vashem Studies, 20, 1990, pp. 1-5. 5) Jozo Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: Occupation and Collaboration, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2001, p. 605. 6) Jelic-Butic, Ustase i NDH, p. 182; Tomasevich, Occupation and Collaboration, pp. 608-610. Tomasevich estimates that the official figure of 40,000 Gypsies in the NDH in 1941 is too high and that the number was closer to 25,000. 7) Jelic-Butic, Ustase i NDH, pp. 164-167. 8) Archive of the Military-Historical Institute, Belgrade, Nedic Collection, box 1, facs. 1, doc. 3 (1942 - 3rd part). 8) Milan Bulajic (ed.), Ustaski zlocini genocida i sudenje Andriji Artukovicu 1986. godine, vol. 1, Rad, Belgrade, 1988, p. 457. 9) Vladimir Dedijer and Antun Miletic, Proterivanje Srba sa ognjista 1941-1944: Svedocanstva, Prosveta, Belgrade, 1990, pp. 274-275. 10) Ibid., pp. 445-446. 11) Eugen Dido Kvaternik, Sjecanja: Zapazanja 1925-1945 - Prilozi za hrvatski povijest, Zagreb, 1995, p. 134. 12) Rafael Brcic, "O iseljavanju Slovenaca u Bosni 1941. godine", Prilozi, 1973, no. 9/1, pp. 303-309; Philippe Burrin, Hitler and the Jews: the Genesis of the Holocaust, Edward Arnold, London, 1994, p. 139; Jelic-Butic, Ustase i NDH, pp. 167-170. 13) Strahinja Kurdulija, Atlas of the Ustasha genocide of the Serbs 1941-1945, Istorijski institut SANU, Belgrade, 1994, p. 82. 14) Antun Miletic, Koncentracioni logor Jasenovac 1941-1945, vol. 1, Narodna knjiga, Belgrade, 1986, pp. 36-38; Bulajic, Ustaski zlocini genocida, vol. 4, 1989, pp. 868-887; Gojo Riste Dakina, Genocida nad Srbima u Nezavisnoj Drzavi Hrvatskoj - Budi katolik ili umri, Institut za Savremenu Istoriju, Belgrade, 1995, pp. 190-193. 15) Jasenovac - Zrtve rata prema podacima statistickog zavoda Jugoslavije, Bosnjacki Institut, Zurich and Sarajevo, 1998, p. iv. 16) "85,000 Serbs, Jews, Croats and Romanies killed in Jasenovac", Croatia weekly, Zagreb, 10 June 1999. 17) The Jasenovac Exhibition, held in Belgrade in April-May 2000. 18) Branko Bokan, Genocid nad Srbima Bosanske Krajine 1941-1945, Evropsko slovo, Belgrade, 1996, p. 63. 19) Vladimir Zerjavic, Gubici stanovnistva Jugoslavije u drugom svjetskom ratu, Jugoslavensko viktimolosko drustvo, Zagreb, 1989, pp. 61-63; Bogoljub Kocovic, Zrtve drugog svetskog rata u Jugoslaviji, Veritas Foundation Press, London, 1985, pp. 65-70. 20) Petar Kasavenda and Nikola Zivkovic, Srbi u Nezavisnoj Drzavi Hrvatskoj: Izabrani dokumenta, Institut za Savremenu Istoriju, Belgrade, 1998, p. 99. 21) Ibid., pp. 166-167, 235-236. 22) Jonathan Steinberg, "Types of genocide ? Croatians, Serbs and Jews, 1941-5", in David Cesarani (ed.), The Final Solution: Origins and implementation, Routledge, London and New York, 1994, pp. 190-191. 23) Kasavenda and Zivkovic, Srbi u NDH, pp. 87-90. 24) Archive of Yugoslavia, Belgrade, Collection 516, doc. MG 1415. 25) Historical Museum of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Sarajevo, Collection 'UNS', box 2, doc. 466. 26) Historical Museum of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Collection 'UNS', box 3, doc. 709. 27) Tomasevich, Occupation and Collaboration, pp. 380-381. 28) Historical Museum of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Collection 'UNS', box 1, doc. 63. 29) Edmond Paris, Genocide in satellite Croatia, 1941-1945: A record of racial and religious persecutions and massacres, American Institute for Balkan Affairs, Chicago, n.d., p. 100. 30) Drago Sobot, "Pred ustaskim prijekim sudom", in Sarajevo u Revoluciji, vol. 2, Istorijski arhiv Sarajevo, Sarajevo, 1977, pp. 187-190; Nisim Albahari, "Od Aprilskog rata do ustanka", in Sarajevo u Revoluciji, vol. 2, p. 56. http://southslavjournal.com/mah.html Serbian News Network - SNN [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.antic.org/
