<http://www.electricpolitics.com/2010/09/serbia_surrenders_to_the_eu.html> 
http://www.electricpolitics.com/2010/09/serbia_surrenders_to_the_eu.html
 
also on:  <http://www.counterpunch.com/johnstone09172010.html> 
http://www.counterpunch.com/johnstone09172010.html
 
Weekend Edition
September 17 - 19, 2010

 

Nothing to Gain, More to Lose


Serbia Surrenders Kosovo to the EU
By DIANA JOHNSTONE

 

On September 10, at the UN General Assembly, Serbia abruptly surrendered its 
claim to the breakaway province of Kosovo to the European Union.  Serbian 
leaders described this surrender as a “compromise”. But for Serbia, it was all 
give and no take.

In its dealings with the Western powers, recent Serbian diplomacy has displayed 
all the perspicacity of a rabbit cornered by a rattlesnake.  After some 
helpless spasms of movement, the poor creature lets itself be eaten.

The surrender has been implicit all along in President Boris Tadic’s two 
proclaimed foreign policy goals: deny Kosovo’s independence and join the 
European Union.  These two were always mutually incompatible. Recognition of 
Kosovo’s independence is clearly one of the many conditions – and the most 
crucial – set by the Euroclub for Serbia to be considered for membership.  
Sacrificing Kosovo for “Europe” has always been the obvious outcome of this 
contradictory policy.

However, his government, and notably his foreign minister Vuk Jeremic, have 
tried to conceal this reality from the Serbian public by gestures meant to make 
it seem that they were doing everything possible to retain Kosovo.

Thus in October 2008, six months after U.S.-backed Kosovo leaders unilaterally 
declared that the province was an independent State, Serbia persuaded the UN 
General Assembly to submit the following question to the International Court of 
Justice for an (unbinding) advisory opinion: “Is the unilateral declaration of 
independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in 
accordance with international law?’”

This was risky at best, because Serbia had more to lose by an unfavorable 
opinion than it had to gain by a favorable one.  After all, most of the UN 
member states were already refusing to recognize Kosovo’s independence, for 
perfectly solid reasons of legality and self-interest.  At best, a favorable 
ICJ opinion would merely confirm this, but would not in itself lead to any 
positive action.  Serbia could only hope to use such a favorable opinion to ask 
to open genuine negotiations on the status of the province, but the Kosovo 
Albanian separatists and their United States backers could not be forced to do 
so.

One must stop here to point out that there are two major issues involved in all 
this: one is the status and future of Kosovo, and the other is the larger issue 
of national sovereignty and self-determination within the context of 
international law.  If so many UN member states supported Serbia, it was 
certainly not because of Kosovo itself but because of the larger implications. 
Nobody objected to the splitting of Czechoslovakia, because the Czechs and the 
Slovaks negotiated the terms of separation. The issue is the method.  There are 
literally hundreds, perhaps thousands, of potential ethnic secessionist 
movements within existing countries around the world.  Kosovo sets an ominous 
precedent.  An armed separatist movement, with heavy support from the United 
States, where an ethnic Albanian lobby had secured important political backing, 
notably from former Senator and Republican Presidential candidate Bob Dole, 
carried out a campaign of assassinations in 1998 in order to trigger a 
repression which it could then describe as “ethnic cleansing” and “genocide” as 
a pretext for NATO intervention.

This worked, because US leaders saw “saving the Kosovars” as the easy way to 
save NATO from obsolescence by transforming it into a “humanitarian” global 
intervention force.  Bombing Serbia for two and a half months to “stop 
genocide” was a spectacle for public opinion.  The only people killed were 
Yugoslav citizens out of sight on the ground.  It was the lovely little war 
designed to rehabilitate military aggression as the proper way to settle 
conflicts.

The reality of this cynical manipulation has been assiduously hidden from 
Americans and most Europeans, but elsewhere, and in certain European countries 
such as Spain, Greece, Cyprus and Slovakia, the point has not been missed.  
Separatist movements are dangerous, and whenever the United States wants to 
subvert an unfriendly government, it has only to incite mass media to portray 
the internal problems of the targeted government as potential “genocide” and 
all hell may break loose.

So Serbia did not really have to work very hard to convince other countries to 
support its position on Kosovo. They had their own motivations – which were 
perhaps stronger than those of the Serbian government  itself.

 

What did Serb leaders want?

 

The question put to the ICJ did not spell out what Serb leaders wanted.  But it 
had implications.  If the Kosovo declaration of independence was illegal, what 
was challenged was not so much independence itself as the procedure, the 
unilateral declaration.  And indeed, there is no reason to suppose that Serb 
leaders thought they could reintegrate the whole of Kosovo into Serbia.  It is 
even unlikely that they wanted to do so.

There are very mixed feelings about Kosovo within the Serb population.  It is 
hard to know how widespread is the sense of concern, or guilt, regarding the 
beleaguered Serb population still living there, vulnerable to attacks from 
racist Albanians eager to drive them out.  The sentimental attachment to “the 
cradle of the Serb nation” is very strong, but few Serbs would choose to go 
live there, even if the province were returned to them.  In former Yugoslavia, 
the province was a black hole that absorbed huge sums of development aid, and 
would certainly be a heavy economic burden to impoverished Serbia today.  
Economically, Serbia is probably better off without Kosovo.  Nearly twenty 
years ago, the leading Serb author and patriot Dobrica Cosic was arguing in 
favor of dividing Kosovo along ethnic and historic lines with Albania.  
Otherwise, he foresaw that the attempt to live with a hostile Albanian 
population would destroy Serbia itself.

Few would admit this, but the proposals of Cosic, echoed by some others, at 
least suggest that in a world with benevolent mediators, a compromise might 
have been worked out acceptable to most of the people directly involved.  But 
what made such a compromise impossible was precisely the US and NATO 
intervention on behalf of armed Albanian rebels.  Once the Albanian 
nationalists knew they had such support, they had no reason to agree to any 
compromise. And for the Serbs, the brutal method by which Kosovo was stolen by 
NATO was adding insult to injury – a humiliation that could not be accepted.

By taking the question to the UN General Assembly and the ICJ, Serbia sought 
endorsement of a reopening of negotiations that could lead to the sort of 
compromise that might have settled the issue had it been taken up in a world 
with benevolent mediators.

International Court of No Justice
On July 22, the ICJ issued its advisory opinion, concluding that Kosovo’s 
“declaration of independence was not illegal”. In some 21,600 words it evaded 
the main issues, refusing to state that the declaration meant that Kosovo was 
in fact properly independent.  The gist was simply that, well, anybody can 
declare anything, can’t they?

Of course, this was widely interpreted by Western governments and media, and 
most of all by the Kosovo Albanians, as endorsement of Kosovo’s independence, 
which it was not. 

Nevertheless, it was a shameful cop-out on the part of the ICJ, whichmarked 
further deterioration of the post-World War II efforts to establish some sort 
of international legal order.  Perhaps the most flagrant bit of sophistry in 
the lengthy opinion was the argument (in paragraphs 80 and 81) that the 
declaration was not a violation of the “territorial integrity” of Serbia, 
because “the illegality attached to [certain past] declarations of independence 
… stemmed not from the unilateral character of these declarations as such, but 
from the fact that they were, or would have been, connected with the unlawful 
use of force or other egregious violations of norms of general international 
law…”

In short, the ICJ pretended to believe that there has been no illegal 
international military force used to detach Kosovo from Serbia, although this 
is precisely what happened as a result of the totally illegal NATO bombing 
campaign against Serbia.  Since then, the province has been occupied by foreign 
military forces, under NATO command, which both violated the international 
agreement under which they entered Kosovo and looked the other way as Albanian 
fanatics terrorized and drove out Serbs and Roma, occasionally murdering rival 
Albanians.

The ICJ judges who endorsed this scandalous opinion came from Japan, Jordan, 
the United States, Germany, France, New Zealand, Mexico, Brazil, Somalia and 
the United Kingdom.  The dissenters came from Slovakia, Sierra Leone, Morocco 
and Russia.  The lineup shows that the cards were stacked against Serbia from 
the start, unless one actually believes that the judges leave behind their 
national mind-set when they join the international court.

 

Digging Itself Deeper Into a Hole

Probably, the Tadic government had expected something better, and had planned 
to follow up a favorable ICJ opinion with an appeal to the General Assembly to 
endorse renewed negotiations over the status of Kosovo, perhaps enabling Serbia 
to recover at least the northern part of Kosovo whose population is solidly 
Serb. 

Oddly, despite the bad omen of the ICJ opinion, the Tadic government went right 
ahead with plans to introduce a resolution before the UN General Assembly.   
The draft resolution asked the General Assembly to state the following:

Aware that an agreement has not been reached between the sides on the 
consequences of the unilaterally proclaimed independence of Kosovo from Serbia,

Taking into account the fact that one-sided secession cannot be an accepted way 
for resolving territorial issues,

1. Acknowledges the Advisory opinion of the ICJ passed on 22 July 2010 on 
whether the unilaterally proclaimed independence of Kosovo is in line with 
international law,

2. Calls on the sides to find a mutually acceptable solution for all disputed 
issues through peaceful dialogue, with the aim of achieving peace, security and 
cooperation in the region.

3. Decides to include in the interim agenda of the 66th session an item namely: 
"Further activities following the passing of the advisory opinion of the ICJ on 
whether the unilaterally proclaimed independence of Kosovo is in line with 
international law.”

The key statement here was “the fact that one-sided secession cannot be an 
accepted way for resolving territorial issues”. This was the point on which the 
greatest agreement could be attained. The United States made it known that it 
was totally unacceptable for the General Assembly to hold a debate on such a 
resolution.  The main Belgrade daily Politika published an interview with Ted 
Carpenter of the Cato Institute in Washington saying that the Serbian draft 
resolution on Kosovo was "irritating America and the EU's leading countries".  
American diplomats were “working overtime” to thwart the resolution, he said.  
Carpenter said that the Serbian resolution was seen in Washington as an 
unfriendly act that would lead to a further deterioration in relations, and 
that as a result of its Kosovo policy, Serbia’s EU ambition could suffer 
setbacks that would have negative consequences for the Serbian government "and 
the Serb people".

Carpenter conceded that this time around, the country would not be threatened 
militarily, but noted that the United States was influential enough to "make 
life very difficult" for any country that stood up against its policies. He 
concluded that Serbia would "have to accept the reality of an independent 
Kosovo", and that Washington would thereupon leave it to Brussels to deal with 
the remaining problems.

The American stick was accompanied by a dangling EU carrot. Carpenter expressed 
his hope that the EU would consider various measures, "including adjustment of 
borders, regarding Kosovo, and the rest of Serbia", but also, he noted, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, suggesting that Serbs could be satisfied if a loss of 
Kosovo were compensated by a unification with Bosnia's Serb entity, the 
Republika Srpska. Giving his own opinion, Carpenter said such a solution would 
at least be much better than the current U.S. and EU policy, “which seems to be 
that everyone in the region of the former Yugoslavia, except Serbs, has a right 
to secede”.

Carpenter, who was a sharp critic of the 1999 NATO bombing of Serbia, and who 
warned that secessionist movements around the world could use the Kosovo 
precedent for their own purposes, said that such a solution was possible “in 
the coming decades”… a fairly distant prospect.

The decisive arm twisting was perhaps administered by German foreign minister 
Guido Westerwelle on a visit to Belgrade.  Whatever threats or promises he made 
were not disclosed, but on the eve of the scheduled UN General Assembly debate, 
the Tadic government caved in entirely and allowed the EU to rewrite the 
resolution.

The resolution dictated by the EU made no mention of Kosovo other than to “take 
note” of the ICJ advisory opinion, and concluded by welcoming “the readiness of 
the EU to facilitate the process of dialogue between the parties.”

According to this text of the resolution, which UN General Assembly adopted by 
consensus; “The process of dialogue by itself would be a factor of peace, 
security and stability in the region. This dialogue would be aimed to promote 
cooperation, make progress on the path towards the EU and improve people's 
lives.”

By accepting this text, the Serbian government abandoned all effort to gain 
international support from the many nations hostile to unilateral secession, 
and threw itself on the mercy of the European Union. 

 

Still More to Lose

 

In a TV interview, I was asked by Russia Today, “What does Serbia stand to 
gain?”  My immediate answer was, “nothing”.  Serbia implicitly abandoned its 
claim to Kosovo in return for nothing but vague suggestions of “dialogue”. 

A usual aim of all policy is to keep options open, but Serbia has now put all 
its eggs in the EU basket, in effect rebuffing all the member states of the UN 
General Assembly which were ready to support Belgrade as a matter of principle 
on the issue of unnegotiated unilateral secession.

Rather than gain anything, the Tadic government has apparently chosen to try to 
avoid losing still more than it has lost already.  After the violent breakup of 
Yugoslavia along ethnic lines, Serbia remains the most multiethnic state in the 
region, which means that it includes minorities which can be incited to demand 
further secessions.  There is a secession movement in the ethnically very mixed 
northern province of Voivodina, which could be more or less covertly encouraged 
by neighboring Hungary, an increasingly nationalist EU member attentive to the 
Hungarian minority in Voivodina.  There is another, more rabid separatist 
movement in the southwestern region of Raska/Sanjak led by Muslims with links 
to Bosnian Islamists.  Surrounded by NATO members and wide open to NATO agents, 
Serbia risks being destabilized by the rise of such secession movements, which 
Western media, firmly attached to the stereotypes established in the 1990s, 
could easily present as persecuted victims of potential Serb genocide.

Moreover, no matter how the Serbs vote, the US and UK embassies dictate the 
policies.  This has been demonstrated several times.  Little Serbia is actually 
in a position very like the Pétain government in 1940 to 1942, when it governed 
a part of France not yet occupied but totally surrounded by the conquering 
Nazis. 

It would take political genius to steer little Serbia through this geopolitical 
swamp, infested with snakes and crocodiles, and political genius is rare these 
days, in Serbia as elsewhere.

 

EU to the rescue?

 

Under these grim circumstances, the Tadic government has in effect abandoned 
all attempt at independence and entrusted the future of Serbia to the European 
Union.  Serb patriots quite naturally decry this as a sell-out.  Indeed it is, 
but Russia and China are far away, and could not be counted on to do anything 
for Serbia that would seriously annoy Washington.  The fact is that much of the 
younger generation of Serbs is alienated from the past and dreams only of being 
in the EU, which means being treated as “normal”.

 

How will the EU reward these expectations?

 

Up to now, the EU has responded to each new Serb concession by asking for more 
and giving very little in return.  At a time when many in the core EU countries 
feel that accepting Rumania and Bulgaria has brought more trouble than it was 
worth, enlargement to include Serbia, with its unfairly bad reputation, looks 
remote indeed. 

In reality, the most Belgrade can hope for from the EU is that it will muster 
the courage to take its own policy line on the Balkans, separate from that of 
the United States.

Given the subservience of current EU leaders to Washington, this is a long 
shot.  But it has a certain basis in reality.

United States policy toward the region has been heavily influenced by ethnic 
lobbies that have pledged allegiance to Washington in return for unconditional 
support of their nationalist aims.  This is particularly the case of the 
rag-tag Albanian lobby in the United States, an odd mixture of dull-witted 
politicians and gun-running pizza parlor owners who flattered the Clinton 
administration into promising them their own statelet carved out of historic 
Serbia.  The result has been “independent” Kosovo, in reality occupied by a 
major US military base, Camp Bondsteel, NATO-commanded pacifiers and an EU 
mission theoretically trying to introduce a modicum of legal order into what 
amounts to a failing state run by clans and living off various criminal 
activities.  Since Camp Bondsteel is untouchable, and the grateful hoodlums 
have erected a giant statue to their hero, Bill Clinton, in their capital, 
Pristina, Washington is content with this situation.

But many in Europe are not.  It is Europe, not the United States, that has to 
deal with violent Kosovo gangsters peddling dope and women in its cities.  It 
is Europe, not the United States, that has this mess on its doorstep.

The media continue to peddle the 1999 fairy tale in which heroic NATO rescued 
the defenseless “Kosovars” from a hypothetical “genocide” (which never took 
place and never would have taken place), but European governments are in a 
position to know better.

As evidence of this is a letter written to German Chancellor Angela Merkel on 
October 26, 2007 by Dietmar Hartwig, who had been head of the EU (then EC) 
mission in Kosovo just prior to the NATO bombing in March 1999, when the 
mission was withdrawn. In describing the situation in Kosovo at a time when the 
NATO aggression was being prepared on the pretext of “saving the Kosovars”, 
Hartwig wrote:

“Not a single report submitted in the period from late November 1998 up to the 
evacuation on the eve of the war mentioned that Serbs had committed any major 
or systematic crimes against Albanians, nor there was a single case referring 
to genocide or genocide-like incidents or crimes. Quite the opposite, in my 
reports I have repeatedly informed that, considering the increasingly more 
frequent KLA attacks against the Serbian executive, their law enforcement 
demonstrated remarkable restraint and discipline. The clear and often cited 
goal of the Serbian administration was to observe the Milosevic-Holbrooke 
Agreement to the letter so not to provide any excuse to the international 
community to intervene. … There were huge ‘discrepancies in perception’ between 
what the missions in Kosovo have been reporting to their respective governments 
and capitals, and what the latter thereafter released to the media and the 
public. This discrepancy can only be viewed as input to long-term preparation 
for war against Yugoslavia. Until the time I left Kosovo, there never happened 
what the media and, with no less intensity the politicians, were relentlessly 
claiming. Accordingly, until 20 March 1999 there was no reason for military 
intervention, which renders illegitimate measures undertaken thereafter by the 
international community. The collective behavior of EU Member States prior to, 
and after the war broke out, gives rise to serious concerns, because the truth 
was killed, and the EU lost reliability.”

Other official European observers said the same at the time, and in 2000, 
retired German general Heinz Loquai wrote a whole book, based especially on 
OSCE documents, showing that accusations against Serbia were false propaganda.  
While the public was fooled, government leaders have access to the truth.

In short, EU governments lied then, for the sake of NATO solidarity, and have 
been lying ever since.

Now as then, there are insiders who complain that the situation in reality is 
very different from the official version. Voices are raised pointing out that 
Republika Srpska is the only part of Bosnia that is succeeding, while the 
Muslim leadership in Sarajevo continues to count on largesse due to its 
proclaimed victim status.  There seems to be a growing feeling in some 
leadership circles that in demonizing the Serbs, the EU has bet on the wrong 
horse.  But that does not mean they will have the courage to confront the 
United States.  In Kosovo itself, the most radical Albanian nationalists are 
ready to oppose the EU presence, by arms if necessary, while feeling confident 
of eternal support from their U.S. sponsors.

 

The Betrayal of Serbia


If the latest self-defeat at the UN General Assembly can be denounced as a 
betrayal, the betrayal began nearly ten years ago.  On October 5, 2000, the 
regular presidential election process in Yugoslavia was boisterously 
interrupted by what the West described as a “democratic revolution” against the 
“dictator”, president Slobodan Milosevic.  In reality, the “dictator” was about 
to enter the run-off round of the Yugoslav presidential election in which he 
seemed likely to lose to the main opposition candidate, Vojislav Kostunica.  
But the United States trained and incited the athletically inclined youth 
organization, Otpor (“resistance”), to take to the streets and set fire to the 
parliament in front of international television, to give the impression of a 
popular uprising.  Probably, the scenarists modeled this show on the equally 
stage-managed overthrow of the Ceaucescu couple in Rumania at Christmas 1989, 
which ended in their murder following one of the shortest kangaroo court trials 
in history. For the generally ignorant world at large, being overthrown would 
be proof that Milosevic was really a “dictator” like Ceaucescu, whereas being 
defeated in an election would have tended to prove the opposite.

Proclaimed president, Kostunica intervened to save Milosevic, but not having 
been allowed to actually win the election, his position was undermined from the 
start, and all power was given to the Serbian prime minister, Zoran Djindjic, a 
favorite of the West who was too unpopular to have won an election in Serbia.  
Shortly thereafter, Djindjic violated the Serbian constitution by turning 
Milosevic over to the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) in The Hague – for one of the longest kangaroo court trials in history.

Pro-Western politicians in Belgrade labored under the illusion that throwing 
Milosevic to the ICTY wolves would be enough to ensure the good graces of the 
“International Community”. But in reality, the prosecution of Milosevic was 
used to publicize the trumped up “joint criminal enterprise” theory which 
blamed every aspect of the breakup of Yugoslavia on an imaginary Serbian 
conspiracy.  The scapegoat turned out to be not just Milosevic, but Serbia 
itself.  Serbia’s guilt for everything that went wrong in the Balkans was the 
essential propaganda line used to justify the 1999 NATO aggression, and by 
going along with it, the “democratic” Serbian leaders undermined their own 
moral claim to Kosovo.

In June 1999, Milosevic gave in and allowed NATO to occupy Kosovo under threat 
of carpet bombing that would destroy Serbia entirely.  His successors fled from 
a less perilous battle – the battle to inform world public opinion of the 
complex truth of the Balkans.  Having abandoned all attempt to assert its moral 
advantage, Serbia is counting solely on the kindness of strangers.

 

Diana Johnstone is author of Fools’ Crusade: Yugoslavia, NATO and Western 
Delusions (Monthly Review Press). She can be reached  
<mailto:atdiana.jo...@yahoo.fr> at :  diana.jo...@yahoo.fr 

 

 

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