A United Germany Confronts Europe

By E. Wayne Merry
 
<http://r20.rs6.net/tn.jsp?llr=84krmrbab&et=1103744153212&s=4334&e=0018fwkhxHvpaHBp6rFL4KUR3UuI7b4nVNequIjXBComJGu3DnCm4cN5lkPc-aCKPfLnKSBLDAIRxhXhfi9VLtyLXf2lW6MCK7PKiNLKv1VDtuWLjJVGOc_9qKKnTy2rSDkT61WtFCCdnILTv_gPnRM3WC_7V1PllFSmbw_8Bm3C08=>
 International Herald Tribune
September 30, 2010

 

This Sunday marks 20 years since German unification. It also coincides with a 
low point in the commitment of post-war Germany to European unity. The two are 
directly related. 

Alone in Europe, the people of the former German Democratic Republic (East 
Germany) did not have to qualify for entry into the European Union. German 
unification made them automatically full-fledged members. 

Nothing was asked of East Germans for this extraordinary benefit. Nor were they 
educated about the European project and Germany’s unique role, based on its 
history, in building a common European home. 

All other former Soviet-bloc countries — Poland, Hungary, Latvia, etc. — had to 
work hard for E.U. membership, both in the complex formal qualifications and 
through years of learning to become “European” in a pragmatic sense. For these 
countries, entering “Europe” was a long-sought goal and finally a celebrated 
achievement. Eastern Germany never moved up this learning curve. 

The opening of the Berlin Wall confronted people in the east with huge economic 
dislocation and social stress. Most of their efforts over 20 years have been 
directed to achieving parity with western Germany, still unfulfilled. The 
equally important need to accept an identity as Germans within a broader Europe 
has lagged far behind. 

Eastern Germans needed more attention to their European obligations than their 
eastern neighbors did because the G.D.R. had taught its citizens — especially 
its young people — that they bore none of the burdens of Germany’s past; all 
the guilt supposedly lay with West Germany. 

Sad to say, this convenient doctrine was widely accepted. A German-speaking 
Polish tour guide in Warsaw in the late 1980s noted this attitude in the German 
student groups she escorted. Asked if they wanted to visit the site of the 
Warsaw Ghetto, the West German students always affirmed their need to do so, 
but the young East Germans invariably refused, saying “that has nothing to do 
with us.” 

This mindset, compounded by the prolonged physical and social isolation of East 
Germany, contrasted sharply with the openness toward Europe which had been the 
hallmark of western Germans since the war. Now, two decades on, eastern Germans 
are integrated into Germany but not into Europe. The E.U. was not something 
they chose, let alone worked for, so they do not identify with it. The sharing 
of obligations at the core of European integration remains alien to people who 
see “Europe” as a distant and expensive abstraction. 

A new generation across Germany has no personal memory of their country’s long 
struggle for acceptance as a responsible European state and has little 
understanding of the complex system of agreements that anchor Germany’s 
national identity into a broader European one. German politicians across the 
spectrum today openly sneer at the obligations of European unity in terms which 
no West German party would have employed a generation ago. 

This inward-looking mentality has its origins in the experience of national 
unification. The immense costs have soured Germans on the expenses of building 
Europe. Worse, the political mentality of the east is increasingly permeating 
public discourse across the country, an outlook that is provincial, 
anti-foreign and nationalist rather than patriotic. The reaction to the 
financial crisis in Greece revealed a new German parochialism both 
nationalistic and shortsighted. 

In fact, no society in Europe has gained more from European integration than 
has Germany, which would quickly lose its prosperity without European markets. 
A Germany at peace with all its neighbors and supportive of a common European 
home was the work of German leaders from Konrad Adenauer through Helmut Kohl, 
and enjoyed near consensual support from two generations of post-war Germans. 

Today, fewer and fewer Germans think Europe is worth the trouble, or even 
imagine that it is somehow standing in Germany’s way. This is dangerous, not 
because of any renewed German militarization, but because Germany remains the 
heart of Europe. 

On this anniversary, it is appropriate to remind the Germans that their 
national project can thrive only within a successful Europe. The unity of each 
is the essential buttress of the other. 

E. Wayne Merry served at the U.S. Embassy in East Berlin and is now a senior 
associate at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington. 

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