David Schwartz wrote:
Arguably, you shouldn't do it even once, because it's extremely easy
to fall into the pattern of "one key and one key only" in the systems
design or implementation. I can't remember who coined the phrase, but
it's not "good crypto hygeine".
I have argued many times that not including the creation date in every private
key data format was a *huge* mistake.
Furthermore --
How do you know what time it is? How do I know you know what time
it is? Do I trust you to put the correct time, or even a monotically
increasing sequence, into such a structure? See? It's utterly
useless, even as a thought experiment. As soon as you need reliance
on the truth value of an assertion (validity of a timestamp), you're
already in TRUST territory.
Might as well let the CA decide not to reissue/resign a cert with an
existing pubkey.
- Michael
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