In my opinion, judging a relay based on exit policy is a slippery slope we don't want to go down. We never claim to make using Tor alone safer than using the Internet at large. Whether the creep is at Starbucks sniffing the wifi or running a relay is irrelevant to me. Encouraging people to use encrypted communications, the https everywhere firefox extension, and learn to be more secure online are some of our goals. The Tor Browser Bundle, while still a work in progress, is the best way to protect novice users and get them safer than they are without Tor.
I personally run encrypted services on unencrypted ports, like 25, 80, 143, 110, etc. It's just a port number and only convention says port 80 has to be for http only. If people start doing deep packet inspection to enforce 80 is really http or running filters in some misguided attempt to block "bad things" through Tor, then those are reasons to 'badexit' relays. There are some obvious ways we can detect traffic manipulation through Tor relays. Today, we do detect them and badexit those relays. If we're going to start censoring Tor exits based on impressions, we might as well start blocking Tor relays that are rumoured to be run by national intelligence agencies, criminal organizations, martians, and other people we might not like. In fact, we might as well go back to the original model of "every Tor relay operator has met and gained Roger's trust". I want a diverse set of Tor relays. If people don't want to trust relays based on whatever heuristics they want to use, great, use ExcludeNodes in your torrc. Don't punish everyone based on rumors and impressions. -- Andrew pgp 0x74ED336B *********************************************************************** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majord...@torproject.org with unsubscribe or-talk in the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/