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06.09.2011 The 10 Reasons We Know Iran Wants the Bomb - Bruno Tertrais On September 4, Tehran announced that the Bushehr power plant was connected to the grid. Bushehr is the peaceful façade of Irans nuclear program. Meanwhile, as the latest IAEA report of September 2 establishes, Iran continues to make progress toward obtaining a nuclear weapon capability. Noteworthy in this report is the Agencys stated increasing concern about the possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed military nuclear activities including those related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile. [1] How do we know that Iran wants the Bomb? There is no single smoking gun (nor could there ever be one absent a nuclear test), but rather a multitude of smoldering guns. Most come from the work of the IAEA. Taken together, they lead to the inescapable conclusion that Iran wants at least a nuclear weapon option, and probably the Bomb. 1. Iran has sought to hide its activities and installations from the IAEA In 2003, the magnitude of Irans efforts became public. Iran had concealed the construction of an enrichment plant at Natanz and of a research reactor at Arak, the fabrication of centrifuges, the existence of a laser enrichment program, and a number of sensitive experiments. [2] Iran then prevented the IAEA from a full inspection of the Lavisan-Shian and Parchin sites, suspected of hosting nuclear activities. It later failed to declare in advance the construction of the Fordow enrichment plant. 2. Irans most sensitive activities are controlled by the Ministry of Defense While Irans program is officially under the control of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), the IAEA has established that many hidden nuclear-related activities were in fact conducted under the auspices of the Ministry of Defense. [3] 3. Irans enrichment program has no economic logic Irans gas reserves would allow the country to be self-sufficient regarding electricity generation for several decades. Tehrans investment in a costly enrichment program, allegedly to make fuel for nuclear power plants, has no economic rationale. Natanz has limited capability: if completed, it could fuel only one reactor for a year. No country has ever operated an enrichment facility for just one plant it is much cheaper, in such a case, to buy fuel on the market. 4. Irans enrichment program is inconsistent with its stated goals Iran claims that it needs 3% enriched uranium for its nuclear power plants. But Russia provides the fuel for Bushehr and it would be impossible for Iran to operate it with its own fuel. If the plan was to fuel a hypothetical future reactor, there is no reason why Tehran would have started enrichment as early as 2006. Iran is now building a second enrichment plant at Fordow, but this installation is much smaller than Natanz. Its size is consistent with a military purpose. In 2010, Iran has started to produce 20% enriched uranium, allegedly to re-fuel the Tehran research reactor. But there is no evidence that Iran has the know-how needed to make fuel rods for this particular reactor. 5. Iran possesses a document explaining how to cast uranium into hemispheres The IAEA has determined that Iran possesses a document which explains how to cast uranium metal into hemispheres that is, how to make a nuclear weapon core. [4] This document was given by the Khan network. 6. Iran is building a heavy-water reactor without a clear scientific purpose Iran is building at Arak a new research reactor. Its characteristics a 40 MW reactor using natural uranium and heavy water would make it well-suited for producing weapon-grade plutonium. In fact, it suspiciously resembles reactors used by other countries to produce such plutonium. It is noteworthy, in this regard, that Iran has conducted experiments of plutonium separation in hot cells. [5] 7. Iran has conducted weaponization-related experiments and studies Iran has produced polonium, which can be used for neutron initiation. [6] It has also conducted studies on neutron initiation using uranium deuteride (a Chinese method). [7] Organizations reporting to the Ministry of Defense have studied and tested the mechanics of nuclear weapon explosion (simultaneous detonation of high explosives around a spherical core). [8] Tehran has acknowledged experimenting with simultaneous detonations but claims that this is for non-nuclear purposes. [9] However, documents in the possession of the IAEA show that Iranian requirements are only consistent with a nuclear weapon design. [10] It is not known whether Iran is still conducting such activities. Perhaps its tests have been sufficiently conclusive as to give Tehran the ability to build a functional device (especially if, as is suspected, Iran has received warhead designs from the Khan network). In 2009, the IAEA reportedly concluded thatIran has sufficient information to be able to design and produce a workable implosion device. [11] Iran also has made plans for a future nuclear test: it has studied the architecture of a test site (planning for a 400-meter deep underground detonation), and has designed special equipment for long-distance firing. [12] 8. Iran has tested a nuclear-capable missile In 2004, Iran tested a Shahab-3 missile with a new re-entry vehicle of a baby-bottle (tri-conic) design, ideally suited for a nuclear weapon. This test was seen on television. This is consistent with the IAEAs finding that Tehran has worked on how to place a spherical payload under the Shahab-3s nose. [13] The fact that Iran also simulated the explosion of a missile payload at an altitude of 600 meters which only makes sense if the payload is nuclear should leave no doubt on Irans intentions. [14] 9. Iran refuses to implement transparency measures Iran refuses to declare in advance any new nuclear facility it builds or plans to build: in 2007, it suspended its implementation of modified code 3.1, an IAEA regulation to which it had subscribed to in 2003. Iran also refuses to implement the IAEAs Additional Protocol (despite having signed it in 2003), which the Agency states is the only way it can ensure the verification of non-diversion of nuclear material. Irans refusal also severely limits the IAEAs ability to discover possible other illegal activities. If Tehran had only peaceful intentions and was eager to prove its good faith, why would it refuse increased transparency? 10. Iran rejects proposals for a resumption of the negotiations Iran has rejected the IAEA and the P5+1s proposals designed to allow for the resumption of negotiations (Double Time Out in 2007, Freeze for Freeze in 2008). It has not responded positively to the Obama administration overtures. It has rejected a 2009 proposal meant as a confidence-building measure to transfer most of its 3% enriched uranium stockpile in a foreign country in return for the provision of 20% enriched uranium fuel rods for the Tehran reactor. Iran is showing no sign of being interested in any kind of grand bargain. If Tehran had only peaceful intentions and was eager to prove its good faith, why would it reject such proposals? * In sum, Irans nuclear program is inconsistent with its alleged civilian purpose, but consistent with a military purpose. Some suppose that Tehran just wants a nuclear weapon option and will refrain from crossing the threshold. This might be wishful thinking. There is no example in history where, absent regime change (e.g. Brazil in the 1980s), a country which has gone so far and invested so much in a nuclear weapon program has stayed under the threshold. [15] The February 2011 appointment of Fereydoun Abbassi Davani, one of the main architects of the military program, as vice-president of the Islamic Republic and head of the AEOI, is an ominous sign. _____ cid:part1.08070908.05040507@yahoo.comDr. Bruno Tertrais Dr. Bruno Tertrais is a Senior Research Fellow at the FONDATION POUR LA RECHERCHE STRATEGIQUE (FRS). He formerly was Special Assistant to the Director of Strategic Affairs at the French Ministry of Defense. Dr. Tertrais graduated from the Institut d'Etudes Politiques (IEP) de Paris. He also holds a Master's degree in Public law and a DEA in Comparative Politics from the University of Paris, as well as a Doctorate in Political Science from the IEP Paris. His fields of expertise include international relations, strategic and military affairs, nuclear issues (proliferation, deterrence, disarmament), US strategy and transatlantic relations. Dr. Tertrais has published several books and studies on these questions. References [1] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), GOV/2011/54, 2 September 2011. [2] IAEA, GOV/2003/75, 10 November 2003. [3] IAEA, GOV/2004/11, 24 February 2004; Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), Briefing Notes from February 2008 IAEA meeting regarding Irans nuclear program, 11 April 2008 [4] IAEA, GOV/2005/87, 18 November 2005. [5] IAEA, GOV/2003/75, 10 November 2003. [6] IAEA, GOV/2004/11, 24 February 2004. [7] IAEA, GOV/2011/29, 24 May 2011. [8] IAEA, GOV/2008/15, 26 May 2008; Ibid., GOV/2008/4, 22 February 2008. [9] IAEA, GOV/2008/15, 26 May 2008. [10] ISIS, Briefing notes , op. cit. [11] ISIS, Excerpts from Internal IAEA Document on Alleged Iranian Nuclear Weaponization, 2 October 2009. [12] IAEA, GOV/2008/15, 26 May 2008. [13] IAEA, GOV/2008/15, 26 May 2008. [14] ISIS, Briefing notes , op. cit. [15] The comparison sometimes made with Japan is inappropriate: there is no evidence that Tokyo has a nuclear weapon option. Japan has sound economic and technical rationales for uranium enrichment. All its installations are fully open to the IAEA. The Agency has never found or been made aware of any illegal or suspicious nuclear activity in Japan. <http://www.realite-eu.org/site/apps/nlnet/content3.aspx?c=9dJBLLNkGiF&b=231 5291&ct=11206139> [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] ------------------------------------ -------------------------- Want to discuss this topic? 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