On Fri, Dec 25, 2009 at 05:16:04PM -0500, John Francis scripsit: > On Fri, Dec 25, 2009 at 03:08:58PM -0500, Graydon wrote: > > On Fri, Dec 25, 2009 at 02:56:29PM -0500, John Francis scripsit: > > > I've personally encountered a Linux-based attack (at one of the > > > sites I use for hosting), valthough that's probably a softer > > > target than OS/X because the source code is widely available. > > > > It's not security until it works when the black hats know how it works. > > Oh, I agree. But I'm not the one claiming OS/X is secure :-) > > Fortunately for many of us the script kiddies et al. go for the > low-hanging fruit; they're not prepared to invest serious effort > (or even, in many cases, competent to do so).
True. Though I figure it's like the bear and the running shoes, more than low hanging fruit; you don't have to necessarily outrun the bear, just the next guy over. I think the increase in financial crime online is changing the "not competent" part; there's some very sophisticated stuff happening in terms of attacking credit card processors and such. I changed financial institutions due to worry about this last year; the original bunch are lovely people but thought announcing that they virus scan their servers daily would be reassuring. The current bunch are bumping up against being annoying (you have to re-authenticate from the long list of personal questions every time you change browser minor versions, for example) and I feel much less concerned. No one is going to run a secure system to do work on; they might try to run a secure network so they can do work on insecure systems in a semi-secure way. I'm running a slightly faster than the average hiker system (linux, SElinux on in enforcing, back of a router doing NAT) but I don't delude myself into thinking it's secure. -- Graydon, who will admit to wanting to recompile the GIMP in a secure sort of way with random menu label strings just to hear the screams. -- PDML Pentax-Discuss Mail List PDML@pdml.net http://pdml.net/mailman/listinfo/pdml_pdml.net to UNSUBSCRIBE from the PDML, please visit the link directly above and follow the directions.
