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Spanish Lessons for Israel
by Nicholas D. Kristof
New York Times | July 23, 2006

In 1982, many friends of Israel vigorously supported its invasion of
Lebanon, arguing that it was only assuring its own security.

In retrospect, though, that assault undermined the long-term security of
Israel. The invasion spawned Hezbollah, whose perceived success in driving
Israel out of Lebanon encouraged Hamas and other Palestinian groups to
adopt more violent tactics.

Today again, Israel believes that it is improving its long-term security
by attacking Lebanon. And once again, I believe, that will prove
counterproductive.

Israel is likely to kill enough Lebanese to outrage the world, increase
anti-Israeli and anti-American attitudes, nurture a new generation of
anti-Israeli guerrillas, and help hard-liners throughout the region and
beyond. (Sudan’s cynical rulers, for example, will manipulate Arab outrage
to gain cover to continue their genocide in Darfur.) But Israel is
unlikely to kill more terrorists than it creates.

More broadly, one reason this bombardment — like the invasion in 1982 — is
against Israel’s own long-term interest has to do with the way terrorism
is likely to change over the next couple of decades.

In the past, terror attacks spilled blood and spread fear, but they did
not challenge the survival of Israel itself. At some point, though,
militant groups will recruit teams of scientists and give them a couple of
years and a $300,000 research budget, and the result will be attacks with
nerve gas, anthrax, or “dirty bombs” that render areas uninhabitable for
years.

All this suggests that the only way for Israel to achieve security is to
reach a final peace agreement, involving the establishment of a
Palestinian state (because states can be deterred more easily than
independent groups like Hamas). Such an agreement is not feasible now, but
it might be five or 15 years from now. Israel’s self-interest lies in
doing everything it can to make such a deal more likely — not in using
force in ways that strengthen militants and make an agreement less likely.

It’s certainly true that if America were raided by a terror group next
door, we would respond just as Israel has. When Pancho Villa attacked a
New Mexico town in 1916, we sent troops into Mexico. But that expedition
was a failure (just as our invasion of Iraq has been, at least so far).

On the other hand, there are two democracies that endured constant and
brutal terrorism and eventually defeated it. Neither Spain nor Britain was
in a situation quite like Israel’s (Palestinian terrorists have been more
brutal in attacking civilians), but they still offer useful lessons. And
both the Northern Ireland and Basque problems were often considered
insoluble a couple of decades ago, perhaps even more than those in the
Middle East today.

Spain could have responded to terror attacks by sending troops into the
Basque country, or by bombing the sanctuaries that ETA guerrillas used
just across the border in France. (France was blasé about being used as a
terrorist base.) Instead, Spain gave autonomy to the Basque country and
restrained itself through gritted teeth, over the objections of those who
thought this was appeasement.

Likewise, Britain endured constant bombings by the I.R.A., which enjoyed
support in both Ireland and the U.S. and obtained weapons and Semtex
plastic explosive from Libya.

Yet Margaret Thatcher didn’t bomb Dublin (or Boston), nor even the offices
of the I.R.A.’s political wing in Northern Ireland. When she saw that
Britain’s harsh tactics were strengthening support for the I.R.A., the
Iron Lady moderated her approach and negotiated the landmark Anglo-Irish
agreement of 1985. At the time, that agreement was widely denounced as
rewarding terrorists and showing weakness.

Frankly, neither British nor Spanish restraint was a huge or immediate
success. Spain had hoped that democracy would end Basque terrorism;
instead, it increased. And Mrs. Thatcher acknowledges in her memoirs that
her results were “disappointing.”

Yet in retrospect, the softer approach gave London and Madrid the moral
high ground and slowly — far too slowly — isolated terrorists and made a
negotiated outcome more feasible. That’s why Britain and Spain are today
peaceful, against all odds.

That admirable restraint should be the model for Israel, with the aim of
making a comprehensive peace agreement more likely — in 2010 or 2020 if
not in 2007. The record of Spain and Britain suggests that restraint and
conciliation can seem maddeningly ineffective — but they are still the
last, best hope for peace.

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