Ben, List, Well, I hope we are now both mea culpa-ed out.
Just a couple of points as your message was overall quite clear. You wrote: BU: I find it quite difficult to think of phanerscopic issues without applying ideas as principles such as universality from logical quantification, difficult because the logical structure of such ideas seems pertinent to me. It's one thing to think that all phenomena are such-and-such, it's another to address generality, 'all-ness' etc., as a phenomenon. I suppose this sort of thing--not a do-over--is what I was earlier suggesting, and I recall Kees suggesting something similar for mathematics, namely, that concepts, ideas, principles *will be* discussed by mathematicians; the same is the case for phenomenologists, as well as for theoretical estheticians and theoretical ethicists (if there are such folk). It's not so much that these pre-logical sciences are built upon such principles as you mentioned (although I think that's a bit of a thorny issue, for example when considering the history of the growth of these sciences), but that it's quite the ordinary thing for men and women to discuss aspects of the sciences with which they are involved, especially if they are purposefully intending to contribute to the growth of them. On the matter of the presuppositions of reasoning and my question as to what you meant by this "clarified at or near his logic's start" you wrote: BU: In the Carnegie application (1902), he discusses [the presuppositions of reasoning] at or near the start of his memoirs on logic. THEN he gets into stechiology (a.k.a. speculative grammar, signs, objects, interpretants, and their classifications). So it's quite as if logic begins on a general level, covering presuppositions, belief, doubt, etc., then gets into the three subdivisions of logic. Then in 1911 instead of stechiology or speculative grammar, he puts a division called 'analytic' first in logic, and it covers topics such as belief and doubt. Does this include classification of signs? Who knows. I would doubt that Peirce would drop the classification of signs from logic's first branch whether he calls it stechiology or analytic or speculative grammar. Yet this is at best only hinted at in the 1911 quotation you offered to the effect that the purpose of this first branch is to examine "the nature of thought, not psychologically," but logically. Still, that his examples of the definitions upon which critic is to be based, viz., doubt, belief, learning, etc. doesn't include or make reference to the classification of signs does seem peculiar. So, since he'd done so very much work on the classification of signs, and even late in life, it's difficult for me to imagine that that which figured so prominently in earlier descriptions of the first branch of logic wouldn't still factor, and in a significant way. Well, the quotation is from a letter, not a formal essay or paper, and what one chooses to include in a letter can be pretty arbitrary in the interest of making a few particular points to the *audience of one* that you're addressing. Finally, in passing (but considering that the present chapter discussion concerns pragmatism which Peirce places in methodeutic), I found it interesting that the quotation you gave concluded: Methodeutic, which shows how to conduct an inquiry . . . is what the greater part of my life has been devoted to. . . (CSP) So, this is the branch of logic as semeiotic, not speculative grammar, which Peirce suggests has been his central interest; and that makes sense to me. Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Thu, Apr 24, 2014 at 9:57 AM, Benjamin Udell <bud...@nyc.rr.com> wrote: > Gary R., list, > > This seems to be error-confession month. I've a few new ones of my own now > to mention. > > As regards _*logica utens*_ and _*logica docens*_, I confused things a > bit, for example by asking whether mathematical reasoning IS one or IS the > other, rather than asking, on which of them does mathematical reasoning > rely. > > I also mischaracterized the dependence on _*logica utens*_ in special > sciences by attributing it to unfamiliarity with Peirce. There's quite a > bit of methodological theory that addresses scientific method, and > idioscopic scientists are not entirely unfamiliar with it. Some of it is in > statistics (design of experiments, etc.) Really, we all swim in a sea of > _*logica > utens*_ and occasionally apply (or, more rarely, originate) some _ > *logica-docens*_ crystallization and enrichment of some of it. I suspect > that Peirce's methodeutic will gain increased attention, partly because of > the Internet. > > As regards Kees's view of Peirce's view of pragamatism's classificational > place (in methodeutic a.k.a. speculative rhetoric), you and he have well > covered it now in other posts. > > You wrote, > > [GR] > It is my sense that this "methodeutically based enrichment of the > presuppostional conception" suggests the way in which once logica docens, > and especially methodeutic, is on a solid footing, that there is good > reason to go back to what was early presupposed, to go back also to the > sciences preceding logic as semeiotic, etc. and now consider them from the > standpoint of the findings and the methods of a developed and purified > formal logic in Peirce's broad sense. Should the pre-logical sciences never > benefit from the advances of formal logic? Of course they should! > > In the sense in which you probably mean that, yes. I don't think that they > get a 'do-over' in the Peircean system. They get applied in examples in > ways that help flesh them out. Phaneroscopy can't take principles from > probability theory or mathematical logic, but only from pure maths, e.g., > measure theory and order theory. I find it quite difficult to think of > phanerscopic issues without applying ideas as principles such as > universality from logical quantification, difficult because the logical > structure of such ideas seems pertinent to me. It's one thing to think that > all phenomena are such-and-such, it's another to address generality, > 'all-ness' etc., as a phenomenon. > > [GR] > [...] I'm not certain what you mean by "clarified at or near his > logic's start" in what immediately follows in your post. Do you mean in > logical grammar? [....] > > [BU] >> [....] But the presupposition of truth as the predestinate end of > sufficient inquiry, as clarified at or near his logic's start [....] > > He discusses the presuppositions of reasoning in various places. In the > Carnegie application (1902), he discusses it at or near the start of his > memoirs on logic. THEN he gets into stechiology (a.k.a. speculative > grammar, signs, objects, interpretants, and their classifications). So it's > quite as if logic begins on a general level, covering presuppositions, > belief, doubt, etc., then gets into the three subdivisions of logic. Then > in 1911 instead of stechiology or speculative grammar, he puts a division > called 'analytic' first in logic, and it covers topics such as belief and > doubt. Does this include classification of signs? Who knows. The passage is > in a 1911 letter (draft or not, I don't know) to J. H. Kehler, printed in _The > New Elements of Mathematics_ v.3, p. 207. Peirce wrote the following > which I found at the _Commens Dictionary of Peirce's Terms_ under > "Analytic" http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/analytic.html : > > [CSP] I have now sketched my doctrine of Logical Critic, skipping a good > deal. I recognize two other parts of Logic. One which may be called > Analytic examines the nature of thought, not psychologically but simply to > define what it is to doubt, to believe, to learn, etc., and then to base > critic on these definitions is my real method, though in this letter I have > taken the third branch of logic, Methodeutic, which shows how to conduct an > inquiry. This is what the greater part of my life has been devoted to, > though I base it upon Critic. > > Best, Ben > > On 4/23/2014 5:47 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > Ben, list, > > I am tending to agree with much that you wrote, Ben, but would like you to > clarify a point or two if possible. > > You wrote: > > In practice, this _*logica utens*_ aspect occurs not only prior to > formal logic but afterward, in the special sciences too, since such > scientists tend not to be too familiar with Peirce's formal methodeutic > theory > > No doubt it is the case that many working in the special sciences aren't > familiar with Peirce's methodeutic and use a logica utens in their work. > But I think the point for Peirce would be that they ought to familiarize > themselves better with logic, with logica docens, and apply it so that > errors might be avoided,, just as he intended logic as semeiotic to clarify > concepts in the interest of avoiding serious errors in metaphysics. > > You continued, regarding Peirce's methodeutic that this "is where > pragmatism and it[s] maxim belong (I think). In the Carnegie application, > Peirce places pragmatism even further along in methodeutic than I would > have thought." > > I'll have to take a look at the Carnegie application again soon. As > mentioned earlier, Kees' would seem to place the PM in theoretical grammar, > and offers an interesting semiosic analogy to make his point. While I'm > still reflecting on all of this, at the moment you and I seem to agree that > the PM is best placed late in methodeutic. Still, Kees' argument for > placing in in grammar is thought-provoking and needs serious consideration, > in my opinion. > > You continued with a discussion of the presuppositional conception of > truth. > > Peirce holds in various writings that reasoning presupposes certain > things about truth and the real. But the reasoner at that stage hardly > needs to know the THEORY of pragmatism, three grades of clearness, etc. > However, the pragmatic clarification of truth does seem to involve some > methodeutically based enrichment of the presuppositional conception, so one > can speak of a 'pragmatic conception of truth'. > > It is my sense that this "methodeutically based enrichment of the > presuppostional conception" suggests the way in which once logica docens, > and especially methodeutic, is on a solid footing, that there is good > reason to go back to what was early presupposed, to go back also to the > sciences preceding logic as semeiotic, etc. and now consider them from the > standpoint of the findings and the methods of a developed and purified > formal logic in Peirce's broad sense. Should the pre-logical sciences never > benefit from the advances of formal logic? Of course they should! > > You continued: > > And even with reality defined presuppositionally, well before > methodeutic, it is not in methodeutic or logic at all, but afterward in > metaphysics, that Peirce treats of just what reality so defined amounts to; > his theory of truth and reality leads to modal realism and the nontrivial > consequence of the reality of indeterminacy in the universe. > > Indeed, Peirce's theory of truth and reality eventually lead him to an > *extreme* modal realism and tychism. But as you go on to say, his > metaphysics of reality can be see as pragmatistic, and I would think > exactly because presuppositional notions of truth and reality *will* be > clarified by employing the PM. I think we're in agreement here, but I'm not > certain what you mean by "clarified at or near his logic's start" in what > immediately follows in your post. Do you mean in logical grammar? It would > be helpful if you would clarify or expand upon the following: > > Pragmatism has metaphysical consequences, in Peirce's system, and one > can call his metaphysics of reality 'pragmatistic'. But the presupposition > of truth as the predestinate end of sufficient inquiry, as clarified at or > near his logic's start, is something of which pragmatism - a theory of the > clarification of ideas - is itself a theoretical application. > > At the moment I'm not at all clear as to what you're saying in the passage > above. You continued: > > As regards _*logica utens*_ in phaneroscopy, in Peirce's > classification there's nothing to stop _*logica utens*_, including an > informal version of pragmatism, an eye to conceivable practical > implications, from being involved. > > Of course I agree. This was a point I occasionally tried to make with Joe > Ransdell, but I don't think with much success. It seemed to me then and > seems to me now that formal semeiotic is not at first necessary--nor at > first even possible, not at least in the fullest, most developed sense--for > the sciences preceding it. I would only add now, as I mentioned above, that > there is no reason why, once logic as semeiotic, and most especially, > methodeutic, is developed, it would not be possible to apply its findings > and methods to those earlier sciences. I take it that we're in agreement on > this. > > You concluded: > > But if mathematical reasoning is _*deductiva logica utens*_, then _*logica > utens*_ is not always vague and informal in every sense. If on the other > hand mathematical reasoning is not _*logica utens*_, but still not _*logica > docens*_ (which Peirce places as later, in philosophy), then what is it? > > Good question. Is there in the logic of mathematics--that is, in that > quite small and 'simple' part of theoretical mathematics--anything > suggesting that deduction is so rationally fundamental (or simple) as to > require no formal logical support? Of course there is also that part of > mathematics which requires a kind of abductiva logica utens as well, and > this last involves an insight of Peirce's which broadened and deepened his > father's definition of mathematics as "the science which draws necessary > conclusions." And further,as Kees might add, working mathematicians > *will*talk about, for the purposes of clarifying, conceptions involved > in/associate with their work. > > Best, > > Gary > > > > > *Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York * > > On Wed, Apr 23, 2014 at 3:14 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm. > > > > > >
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