I accidentally hit the send button and I apologize for the incompleteness of my
previous post.
In response to the question about the definition of nominalism, I must admit
that I have always been fascinated by Peirce’s discussion of the difference
between nominalism and realism.
Max H. Fisch writes the following about nominalism and realism in Published
Works I: Electric Edition: Part Three. 1901-1908. The following is from pages
xxviii-xxvix of the introduction. I use the blue coloring to focus Fisch's
text, as opposed to his footnotes.
Now for the hairsplitting. The Berkeley review is much more emphatic than the
cognition series on the distinction between the
[7
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For details see Max H. Fisch, "Peirce's Progress from
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Nominalism
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toward Realism," Monist 51(1967):159–78, at 160–65.]
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For details see Max H. Fisch, "Peirce's General Theory of Signs," in Sight,
Sound, and Sense, edited by Thomas A. Sebeok (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1978), pp. 31–70 at 33–38 and, for Berkeley, pp. 57,63,65. For Peirce's
early
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nominalism
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and its probable derivation from Whately, see also pp. 60–63. (It is worth
adding here that Boole in An Investigation of the Laws of Thought after an
introductory first chapter begins the investigation with Chapter II "Of Signs
in General, and of the Signs appropriate to the science of Logic in particular;
also of the Laws to which that class of signs are Subject"; and that Chapter
III is headed "Derivation of the Laws of the Symbols of Logic from the Laws of
the Operations of the Human Mind.”)]
― xxviii ―
forward and the backward reference of the term "reality" and the identification
of
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nominalism
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with the backward and of realism with the forward reference. Which amounts
to a semeiotic resolution of the controversy. Of the three central categories,
quality is monadic, relation dyadic, and representation irreducibly triadic.
The sign represents an object to or for an interpretant. But we may focus on
the sign-object or on the sign-interpretant. If the question is whether there
are real universals, the nominalists turn backward to the sign-object and do
not find them; the realists turn forward to the sign-interpretant and find them
(pp. 467 ff. below). That is primarily because the backward reference to the
object is more individualistic, and the forward reference to the interpretant
is more social. So realism goes with what has been called the social theory of
logic, or "logical socialism."9
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If we were selecting key sentences from the Peirce texts in the present
volume, they might well include these two: (1) "Thus, the very origin of the
conception of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the
notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and capable of an indefinite
increase of knowledge" (p. 239). (2) "Whether men really have anything in
common, so that the community is to be considered as an end in itself, and if
so, what the relative value of the two factors is, is the most fundamental
practical question in regard to every public institution the constitution of
which we have it in our power to influence" (p. 487).
The question about whether there are real universals can be answered via
nominalism or realism, as explained above. Peirce grappled with the terms. He
moved from being a nominalist to a realist during his life. See his review of
Berkeley’s Collected Works where he explains his move from nominalism to
realism.
Another place where Peirce discusses the term is in “A Description of a
Notation for the Logic of Relatives.” I find that fascinating and can quote
from it later.
Overall, I hope we can put the Peirce-L into the 21st century.
Best,
Mary Libertin
>
> List,
>
> I agree with Edwina’s points. I hope Peirce’s comments will focus us on the
> matter at hand.
>
> 87 (20 August 1908) 164-165: Thought and Things: A Study of the Development
> and Meaning of Thought, or Genetic Logic. Vol. II.
> On 20 August 1908, Peirce published a review of James Baldwin’s Experimental
> Logic, or Genetic Theory of Thought.
> In it he writes,
> "The main motive of logic has always been to get possession of a method for
> determining the values of arguments. Now, it is obvious that whatever bearing
> the truth of one thought may have upon the truth of another will depend
> exclusively upon what the states of things are which the two thoughts
> represent to be real, and not at all upon the psychical or linguistic forms
> in which they are dressed, nor upon the psychical processes by which that
> dress is given to them. Whether we say that among sea-animals will be found
> some that give milk to their young or whether we say that among animals that
> give milk to their young will be found some that inhabit the sea, is for all
> purposes of argumentation quite indifferent; and the equivalence is here so
> evident that the school of "exact," or mathematical, logicians are almost
> unanimous in adopting, as their standard, or canonical, form of expressing
> the same fact, substantially this: "There is an aquatic mammal." Newton's
> great discovery is usually stated in elementary books, and is thought of by
> ordinary people in the form that each separate body in the solar system has
> an instantaneous component acceleration toward every other proportional to
> the mass of that other and inversely proportioned to the square of the
> distance between them, but is otherwise constant for all and at all times.
> But in writings on celestial mechanics (as in Equation 15 on p. 175 of Dr.
> Moulton's admirable little "Introduction" to the science), the form in which
> the same fact is often stated and intended to be thought is that the sum of
> the vires vivæ (or their halves, according to the old definition) of all the
> bodies of the system subtracted from the sum of the reciprocals of the
> distances between the several bodies, each reciprocal being multiplied by the
> product of the masses of the pair of bodies concerned and these masses being
> expressed in terms of a gravitational unit, remains unchanged. Since these
> two statements represent, and would in all conceivable cases represent
> precisely the same state of things, they are for all purposes of reasoning
> interchangeable. It follows that for logic they are equivalent, although,
> since this equivalence is not self-evident, they cannot strictly he called
> identical. From such considerations it follows that, in general, logic has
> nothing to do with different dresses of thought which cannot possibly
> represent different states of things; or at most has no more to do with them
> than to demonstrate
> ― 299 ―
>
>
> that whatever state of things is represented by the one is equally
> represented by the other. That this principle, suitably modified for modals,
> ought to determine what is and what is not relevant to logic has been
> practically or virtually acknowledged in every system of logic excepting some
> of those which have arisen since the bankruptcy of Hegelianism, with the
> consequent de facto supremacy of psychology in current philosophy. But none
> of those which deny that application of the principle have improved reasoning
> in the smallest particular.”
>
> This bears repeating:
>
> "Since these two statements represent, and would in all conceivable cases
> represent precisely the same state of things, they are for all purposes of
> reasoning interchangeable. It follows that for logic they are equivalent,
> although, since this equivalence is not self-evident, they cannot strictly he
> called identical. From such considerations it follows that, in general, logic
> has nothing to do with different dresses of thought which cannot possibly
> represent different states of things…"
>
>
>> On Apr 13, 2024, at 2:13 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> Edwina, List,
>>
>> I would prefer not to get into a back and forth with you on this matter. I
>> will comment briefly, and if you care to respond, I will give you the last
>> word.
>>
>> We disagree on the matter of the use of different terms for the same
>> situation. I would argue that Peirce held that to do so fosters confusion,
>> that within a scientific community that a shared shared terminology is a
>> desideratum which affords clarity in discussions of specific subject matter
>> if and when such a shared terminology is adopted. Of course such a
>> desideratum is a kind of ideal for a given scientific discipline, for any
>> scientific community, one that is not always possible, but desirable where
>> and when it is possible.
>>
>> My point today would be that if Peirce's work in semeiotic, etc. is as
>> important as, for example, Jon and John (and I and many others) claim that
>> it is for possible future advances in a host of sciences, and if there is no
>> already established terminology in a given one, that in the interest of
>> introducing Peirce's often breakthrough work to ever more scientists, that
>> it behooves us to do so whenever and wherever possible; that is, when it is
>> feasible to use his terminology. For example, this is precisely what Claudio
>> Guerri is doing in the semiotics of urban ecology, art, architecture and
>> design.
>>
>> It is true that, in what I consider one of the darkest periods of Peirce-L,
>> there was a heated exchange of off List emails in May 2021 involving several
>> forum members including both of us, Jon and John, and several others.
>> Unpleasant things were said, not always intended to be seen by others (and
>> yet some inadvertently or purposefully were). I will admit that during that
>> intense exchange I did indeed use such words as "pseudo-Peircean" to
>> describe you, but that I promptly apologized, and that you accepted my
>> apology. [I will not comment here on the unpleasant expressions which were
>> directed at me (and others) by you (and others) in that fusilade of off List
>> exchanges since I would hope that the List is well on its way to putting
>> that difficult period behind us. In any event, I am truly sorry for anything
>> I said then that was offensive.]
>>
>> If your use of "purist" was meant to describe Jon, I would say that he does
>> indeed consider himself a "textualist" and, especially regarding Peirce's
>> terminology, a "literalist"; and he has said as much on the List. As for my
>> referencing his accomplishments in structural engineering, it was meant
>> primarily to show that he has not just been discussing theory "in the
>> seminar room" (as you occasionally phrase it), but that he has also put
>> Peirce's ideas into practical applications. I'm sure I embarrassed him with
>> those accolades as he has never so much as hinted at his accomplishments in
>> structural engineering on the List.
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Apr 13, 2024 at 7:29 AM Edwina Taborsky <edwina.tabor...@gmail.com
>> <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>> Gary R, List
>>>
>>> 1] Yes - I am aware of Peirce’s insistence on accurate terminology. I am
>>> also aware of the many different terms he used for the same thing. I am
>>> also aware of the many different terms that other scholars use to refer to
>>> the same situations as Peirce describes. My point is that we cannot
>>> isolate scholars and research from each other by insisting that use only
>>> the terms that specific scholar used. We should, rather, understand that
>>> these different scholars were trying to examine the same situations - and
>>> should be open to using these different terms for the SAME situation.
>>>
>>> 2] Yes - I am indeed suggesting that the focus on terminology - and the
>>> insistence that one can use only Peirce’s terminology - because, for some
>>> reason, the meaning of Peirce’s terms cannot be considered as similar to
>>> the meanings yet with different terms used by others - - is a reduction
>>> into nominalism. And by nominalism - I mean a focus rejecting commonality -
>>> aka universals, such that one rejects the fact that, despite the different
>>> terms, there can be a commonality of existence….This can also be known as
>>> conceptualism.
>>>
>>> Of course - different terminology can mean different meanings….but that’s
>>> not my point, is it?
>>>
>>> 3] You yourself referred to me as ‘pseudo-Peircean. As well as ‘dogmatic,
>>> idiosyncratic- and your claim that my work ‘has ‘long been discredited’.
>>>
>>> 4] A ‘purist’ in my view is someone who is unwilling to acknowledge that
>>> the work of some scholar can be similar in its analysis to the work of
>>> another scholar - but - that the terms used are different. ..and above all
>>> - it is perfectly acceptable to , for example, examine the work of Peirce
>>> using the terms used by other scholars.
>>>
>>> 5] I’m not sure what your point is with your outline that JAS is an
>>> ‘accomplished andn distinguished structural engineer’ - and has given
>>> conference papers and published papers on Peirce. The same accolades can
>>> be made about most others on this List - and, apart from it being an
>>> example of the logical fallacy of 'appeal to authority’ to which you have
>>> made reference, - such doesn’t make his comments any more valid than those
>>> of other people on the list.
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>>
>>>> On Apr 12, 2024, at 11:21 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com
>>>> <mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Edwina, List,
>>>>
>>>> This is in response to your message to the List today as well as your
>>>> addendum to that message. For now I mainly have just a few questions:
>>>>
>>>> You are no doubt aware of Peirce's insistence on a rigorous ethics of
>>>> terminology. Are you suggesting that he is incorrect in his insistence
>>>> that terminology matters, and can matter significantly -- that is, that it
>>>> can constitute a difference which makes a difference? If you disagree
>>>> (which you appear to), why?
>>>>
>>>> And are you suggesting that scholars and scientists who may occasionally
>>>> focus on terminology -- recently, on the List, John Sowa, Jon Alan
>>>> Schmidt, and myself -- are slipping into nominalism? I myself cannot see
>>>> how a rigorous insistence on the importance of terminology has anything to
>>>> do with nominalism. Please explain how it does. And please also include
>>>> your definition of nominalism.
>>>>
>>>> And do you disagree that using different terminology can correlate with
>>>> having different concepts?
>>>>
>>>> Further, if my memory isn't too diminished, I don't recall anyone on the
>>>> List referring to you as a "pseudo-Peircean," something which would indeed
>>>> constitute unacceptable 'name calling' on Peirce-L. However, today you
>>>> suggested that some on this list are "Purists" which, had that expression
>>>> been directed at particular List participants would indeed constitute a
>>>> mild kind of 'name calling' depending on the context. However, I have no
>>>> idea what you mean by alleging that some here are 'purists' -- please
>>>> explain what you mean by this.
>>>>
>>>> It seems to be that there are many rooms in the houses of Peircean
>>>> semeiotic, of Peircean pragmaticism -- more generally, of semiotic and
>>>> pragmatism -- and that they are not mutually exclusive, that a
>>>> scholar/scientist can be interested both in theory and practice (and
>>>> although Peirce once denied it, he himself accomplished much in both
>>>> theory and practice).
>>>>
>>>> So it would be quite helpful if you would clarify your comments today.
>>>>
>>>> And I will add, although he might prefer that I not, that Jon Alan
>>>> Schmidt, not infrequently accused by some here as being a sort of Peircean
>>>> theoretical 'purist' simply because, as he wrote yesterday, his "own
>>>> priority is accurately understanding, helpfully explaining, and fruitfully
>>>> building on Peirce's views by carefully studying and adhering to his
>>>> words," is an accomplished and distinguished structural engineer, often
>>>> invited to speak at conventions and other gatherings because of his
>>>> expertise.
>>>>
>>>> And among the 44 papers of his cited on Google Scholar one will find,
>>>> along with the specifically Peircean ones, some papers in which Peircean
>>>> thought is applied in various ways, including engineering reasoning and
>>>> ethics.
>>>> https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=EfQhY7cAAAAJ&hl=en
>>>>
>>>> Best,
>>>>
>>>> Gary
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Fri, Apr 12, 2024 at 10:38 AM Edwina Taborsky
>>>> <edwina.tabor...@gmail.com <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>>> List
>>>>>
>>>>> As an addendum - I wonder if this tortured focus on ‘ which term is the
>>>>> correct one’ has shades of nominalism in it…ie, that focus on the
>>>>> particular, the individual, [ ie the exact term] and an difference to
>>>>> ‘what is real’. [ ie the meaning and function].
>>>>>
>>>>> Edwina
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Apr 12, 2024, at 9:32 AM, Edwina Taborsky <edwina.tabor...@gmail.com
>>>>>> <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Robert- I agree with you about examining how the ‘relations of
>>>>>> embodiment’ of the triadic sign actually function - but this recent
>>>>>> debate - and it’s a debate not a discussion’[ i.e., it’s focused on Who
>>>>>> Wins ]- rejects a more basic requirement of analysis; namely - what is
>>>>>> the operative function of the triad which is using those terms; it is
>>>>>> instead focused solely on ‘which term to use’ - and the focus is on
>>>>>> ‘purity vs functionality’. .
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Therefore , as you point out, we get a focus on ‘which word did Peirce
>>>>>> prefer’ with the result as you point out that “imaginary distinctions
>>>>>> are often drawn between beliefs which differ only in their mode of
>>>>>> expression - the wrangling which ensues is real enough, however”
>>>>>> 5.398…But, equally according to Peirce - these are ‘false
>>>>>> distinctions’….
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Is it so impossible to state that one prefers the use of x-term [ which
>>>>>> Peirce used] to Y-term [ which Peirce used] because, according to your
>>>>>> analysis, it better explains the operative function of what is
>>>>>> semiotically taking place - without the heavens opening up with a
>>>>>> downpour of rejection???
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I recall the equal horror of some members of this list when I use the
>>>>>> terms ‘input’ and ‘output’ to refer to the incoming data from the
>>>>>> Dynamic object and the resultant output Interpretant meaning of the
>>>>>> semiosic mediation….[Peirce never used those words!! You’re a
>>>>>> pseudo-Peircean; you are…” . But without such modernization and
>>>>>> explanation of the function of semiosis, and the insistence by ’The
>>>>>> Purists’ on using only Peircean terms - and above all, his ‘favourite
>>>>>> terms’ - , we will never be able to move the real analytic power of
>>>>>> Peircean semiosis into the modern world. And that - - is where I
>>>>>> believe the focus should be.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Edwina
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Apr 12, 2024, at 6:29 AM, robert marty <robert.mart...@gmail.com
>>>>>>> <mailto:robert.mart...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> List,
>>>>>>> I contribute to the debate with this note that I posted on Academia.edu
>>>>>>> a few years ago ... at my peril ... I have not yet looked at tone/mark,
>>>>>>> but the same methodology should make it possible to conclude that each
>>>>>>> of the six types of token involves a tone/mark of a particular kind.
>>>>>>> https://www.academia.edu/61335079/Note_on_Signs_Types_and_Tokens
>>>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>>> Robert Marty
>>>>>>> Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
>>>>>>> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
>>>>>>> <https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty>
>>>>>>> https://martyrobert.academia.edu/
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Le ven. 12 avr. 2024 à 05:04, Jon Alan Schmidt
>>>>>>> <jonalanschm...@gmail.com <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> a écrit :
>>>>>>>> John, List:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> JFS: As words, there is no logical difference between the words 'mark'
>>>>>>>> and 'tone' as a term for a possible mark.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Again, the key difference is between Peirce's definition of "mark" in
>>>>>>>> Baldwin's dictionary and his definition of "tone"--as well as "tuone,"
>>>>>>>> "tinge," and "potisign"--in various other places.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> JFS: But some words, such as potisign are rather unusual and may even
>>>>>>>> be considered ugly. They are certainly not memorable.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Peirce famously preferred an ugly word for his version of pragmatism
>>>>>>>> so that it would be "safe from kidnappers." If being memorable is a
>>>>>>>> criterion, then "tone" is superior to "mark" due to its alliteration
>>>>>>>> with "token" and "type"; as Gary said, someone suggested to him "that
>>>>>>>> the three all starting with the letter 't' perhaps constituted a kind
>>>>>>>> of mnemonic device."
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> JFS: Jon made the claim that Peirce used the word 'tone' more often,
>>>>>>>> mainly in obscure MSS. That is not a ringing endorsement.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It is not a mere claim that I made, it is an indisputable fact--"tone"
>>>>>>>> is the only word that Peirce used in multiple places and at multiple
>>>>>>>> times between 1906 and 1908 for the possible counterpart of existent
>>>>>>>> "token" and necessitant "type." It is also the only one that was
>>>>>>>> published during his lifetime (CP 4.537, 1906)--the others appear in
>>>>>>>> Logic Notebook entries and the December 1908 letters to Lady Welby,
>>>>>>>> with "mark" and "potisign" found solely in the latter, although she
>>>>>>>> subsequently endorsed "tone." As someone once said, "She had a solid
>>>>>>>> intuitive way of explaining principles that he tended to explain in
>>>>>>>> ways that were more abstract and difficult to understand. Her
>>>>>>>> influence enabled him to find simpler and more convincing explanations
>>>>>>>> for his abstract ideas"
>>>>>>>> (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00096.html).
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> JFS: That is not a scientific survey, but I could not find a single
>>>>>>>> non-Peircean scholar who would even consider the word 'tone'. If
>>>>>>>> anybody else has any further evidence (or just a personal preference)
>>>>>>>> one way or the other, please let us know.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Gary already provided anecdotal evidence to the contrary and expressed
>>>>>>>> his personal preference for "tone." As always, my own priority is
>>>>>>>> accurately understanding, helpfully explaining, and fruitfully
>>>>>>>> building on Peirce's views by carefully studying and adhering to his
>>>>>>>> words.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>>>>>>> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
>>>>>>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
>>>>>>>> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> /
>>>>>>>> twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
>>>>>>>> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 6:10 PM John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net
>>>>>>>> <mailto:s...@bestweb.net>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>> Gary, Jon, List,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> My note crossed in the mail with Gary's. I responded to the previous
>>>>>>>>> notes by Jon and Gary (q.v.).
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> My conclusion: As words, there is no logical difference between the
>>>>>>>>> words 'mark' and 'tone' as a term for a possible mark. In fact, any
>>>>>>>>> word pulled out of thin air could be chosen as a term for a possible
>>>>>>>>> mark. But some words, such as potisign are rather unusual and may
>>>>>>>>> even be considered ugly. They are certainly not memorable.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Peirce at one point suggested the word 'mark' as a word for 'possible
>>>>>>>>> mark'. That shows he was not fully convinced that 'tone' was the
>>>>>>>>> best word for the future. Jon made the claim that Peirce used the
>>>>>>>>> word 'tone' more often, mainly in obscure MSS. That is not a ringing
>>>>>>>>> endorsement.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> But we must remember that Tony Jappy also chose the word 'mark' for
>>>>>>>>> the triad (mark token type). And he has devoted years of research
>>>>>>>>> to the issues. As I pointed out, authorities are not infallible, but
>>>>>>>>> they are more likely to be authorities than T. C. Mits (The Common
>>>>>>>>> Man in the street).
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> And I myself have been cited as an authority for quite a few issues
>>>>>>>>> in logic, including Peirce's logic. See https://jfsowa.com/pubs/ for
>>>>>>>>> publications. There are even more lecture slides. (Copies upon
>>>>>>>>> request.)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> But the ultimate judges for the vocabulary are the speakers of the
>>>>>>>>> future. The overwhelming majority of knowledgeable logicians,
>>>>>>>>> linguists, and philosophers who know the pair (token type) but not
>>>>>>>>> the first term, find mark far more congenial and memorable than tone.
>>>>>>>>> I discovered that point while talking to them. That is not a
>>>>>>>>> scientific survey, but I could not find a single non-Peircean scholar
>>>>>>>>> who would even consider the word 'tone'.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> If anybody else has any further evidence (or just a personal
>>>>>>>>> preference) one way or the other, please let us know.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> John
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> From: "Gary Richmond" <gary.richm...@gmail.com
>>>>>>>>> <mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>>
>>>>>>>>> List,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> While at first I was sceptical of Jon's keeping this discussion going
>>>>>>>>> as it has continued for some time now, yet this most recent post of
>>>>>>>>> his reminded me that the principal issue being considered has not
>>>>>>>>> been resolved unless you want to accept John's word that it has been
>>>>>>>>> and, by the way, completely along the lines of his analysis. In other
>>>>>>>>> words, the 'tone' v. 'mark' question has been settled because John
>>>>>>>>> says it has and, so, there's no need for further discussion.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I have followed this exchange very closely and find that Jon's
>>>>>>>>> argumentation is bolstered by textual and other support. For example,
>>>>>>>>> contra John, he has repeatedly demonstrated -- again, with more than
>>>>>>>>> sufficient textual support - that any use of 'mark' consistent with
>>>>>>>>> Peirce's Baldwin Dictionary definition is contrary to Peirce's
>>>>>>>>> discussion of 'tone' (and related terms, such as. 'potisign'). For
>>>>>>>>> 'mark' is viewed by Peirce as a kind of term and, so, decidedly not a
>>>>>>>>> possible sign. Indeed, the very image that comes to my mind for
>>>>>>>>> 'mark' is always an existential one, say a mark on a blackboard, or a
>>>>>>>>> beauty mark.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Conversely, as Jon has repeatedly shown, all of Peirce's definitions
>>>>>>>>> of a possible sign include the idea that its being is a significant
>>>>>>>>> "quality of feeling," a "Vague Quality," a sign that while "merely
>>>>>>>>> possible, [is] felt to be positively possible."
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> John says that when he uses 'mark' as having Peirce's meaning of a
>>>>>>>>> "Vague Quality" that his listeners, typically not schooled in
>>>>>>>>> Peircean thought, "find it quite congenial" and, so he uses it in all
>>>>>>>>> his talks and written work. I can only say that that has not been my
>>>>>>>>> experience over the years. For example, earlier this year I gave an
>>>>>>>>> invited talk at a session of the George Santayana Society at the
>>>>>>>>> Eastern APA on the trichotomic structure of Peirce's Classification
>>>>>>>>> of the Sciences where I found that in discussing tone, token, type
>>>>>>>>> that my interlocutors -- almost none of whom were familiar with
>>>>>>>>> Peirce's semeiotic -- found 'tone' to be most genial and, indeed, one
>>>>>>>>> suggested that the three all starting with the letter 't' perhaps
>>>>>>>>> constituted a kind of mnemonic device. Well, be that as it may, that
>>>>>>>>> notion is certainly trivial (pun intended).
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Again, it bears repeating that John's remark that, because Tony Jappy
>>>>>>>>> used the term 'mark' rather than 'tone', he has adopted it is nothing
>>>>>>>>> but the logical fallacy of an appeal to authority. I have had any
>>>>>>>>> number of discussions with Peirceans over the past several years,
>>>>>>>>> none of whom have faulted my use of 'tone' for that "merely possible"
>>>>>>>>> sign. Mark my words!
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Furthermore, I have found Jon more than willing to learn from his
>>>>>>>>> disagreements with others on the List. For example, in several of his
>>>>>>>>> papers he has expressed appreciation for the engagement with several
>>>>>>>>> Peirce-L members with whom he has 'contended' on the List, including
>>>>>>>>> John.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> And despite John's claim that having read Jon's post prior to this
>>>>>>>>> most recent one and finding "nothing new," Jon has clearly shown that
>>>>>>>>> he in fact did provide, and "for the first time," a list of all the
>>>>>>>>> passages where Peirce uses not only 'tone', but its variants (such as
>>>>>>>>> 'tuone' and 'potisgin'). John, on the other hand, has kept repeating
>>>>>>>>> his opinions with little textual support.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> So I ask each member of this forum who has an interest in this topic
>>>>>>>>> to honestly weigh the arguments presented by Jon and John and
>>>>>>>>> determine for themself who has made the stronger case, John for
>>>>>>>>> 'mark' or Jon for 'tone'. Perhaps then we can put the matter to rest
>>>>>>>>> (at least for a time).
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Best,
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Gary Richmond
>>>>>>>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
>>>>>>>> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at
>>>>>>>> https://cspeirce.com <https://cspeirce.com/> and, just as well, at
>>>>>>>> https://www.cspeirce.com <https://www.cspeirce.com/> . It'll take a
>>>>>>>> while to repair / update all the links!
>>>>>>>> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY
>>>>>>>> ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
>>>>>>>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> .
>>>>>>>> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to
>>>>>>>> l...@list.iupui.edu <mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu> with UNSUBSCRIBE
>>>>>>>> PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body.
>>>>>>>> More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
>>>>>>>> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond;
>>>>>>>> and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
>>>>>>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
>>>>>>> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at
>>>>>>> https://cspeirce.com <https://cspeirce.com/> and, just as well, at
>>>>>>> https://www.cspeirce.com <https://www.cspeirce.com/> . It'll take a
>>>>>>> while to repair / update all the links!
>>>>>>> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY
>>>>>>> ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
>>>>>>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> .
>>>>>>> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to
>>>>>>> l...@list.iupui.edu <mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu> with UNSUBSCRIBE
>>>>>>> PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body.
>>>>>>> More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
>>>>>>> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond;
>>>>>>> and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
>>>>> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at
>>>>> https://cspeirce.com <https://cspeirce.com/> and, just as well, at
>>>>> https://www.cspeirce.com <https://www.cspeirce.com/> . It'll take a
>>>>> while to repair / update all the links!
>>>>> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
>>>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
>>>>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> .
>>>>> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to
>>>>> l...@list.iupui.edu <mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu> with UNSUBSCRIBE
>>>>> PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body.
>>>>> More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
>>>>> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond;
>>>>> and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
>>>
>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
>> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at
>> https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at
>> https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the
>> links!
>> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu .
>> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu
>> with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in
>> the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
>> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and
>> co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
>

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at
https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at
https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links!
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu .
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the
body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
