I am appalled at the fact that one can confuse
these two aspects, it reveals a complete misunderstanding of Peirce's
categories.
You' are "appalled" at certain scholars' "complete misunderstanding of
Peirce's categories." That is to say, you have closed your mind to
anything but your own decidedly narrow way of looking at things==you
are completely right, anyone who thinks otherwise is completely wrong
("complete misunderstanding"). But at least we who don't see it your
way are in good company. Peirce himself you suggest writes truisms,
so
CP 1.537 Now in genuine Thirdness, the first,
the second, and the third are all three of the nature of thirds, or
thought, while in respect to one another they are first, second, and
third.
JO: this is almost a Lapalissade, what is Peirce saying here?
nothing more than that in a triadic relation, there are three things, a
first thing, a second thing and a third thing. (I'm using
non-capitalized words for ordinals and the capitalized words 'First',
'Second', 'Third' to denote classes of relations or categories)
So either Peirce is a fool or his critic is. Peirce is no fool
You don't seriously inquire but look for confirmation of your own set
in stone viewpoint (the complete opposite of Peirce's procedure which
was endlessly self-critical), and perhaps only an ament--this English
word has several meanings, but I'm using it in the sense of "one with
a short memory"--in this case of many places where your arguments were
proven weak or questionable by certain participants this forum (not
that you ever addressed any of that; how could you? it would
have suggested that you might not be "completely" right), I say only an
ament would act as you have in this recent discussion, forgetting that
inquiry & the growth of knowledge is a threaded cable as Peirce
said. I myself have nothing more to say to you here. If I am "appalled"
by anything, it is that chauvinism should again try to pass for
scholarship.
Jean-Marc Orliaguet wrote:
Bernard
Morand wrote:
Jean-Marc Orliaguet wrote:
Here is an article that I scanned some time ago, it was written by
Andre de Tienne:
http://www.medic.chalmers.se/~jmo/semiotic/Peirce_s_semiotic_monism.pdf
the first page is missing, but I think than anyone interested in signs
and in triadic relations should read it.
to summarize: being a 'first', 'second' or 'third' within a genuine
triadic relation (like in S, O, I) is a role, a function that the
elements have with respect to one another (i.e. being something, being
something else, being something that mediate between the other two
elements), it is not a property attached to the sign, the object or the
interpretant forever. The order of the elements (1, 2, 3) are like
ordinal labels: they can change roles, because their function changes
depending on how the relation is being analysed.
Yes I agree. May be the inverse argument makes things clearer: If the
functional role of each element is determined by some categorial
intrinsic quality of it, then the Categories (qua system) are nothing
but an ontology for objects. This is precisely what Peirces' semiotic
was struggling against, I think.
This is also the aim of my little game. If you take "Protected
Designation of Origin" (PDO) as a compound of elements each of which is
capable of an intrinsic categorial determination, we will get:
Origin = 1 because it bears the value of Firstness
Designation = 2 because it is a Reaction, an agent/patient pattern,
between something that is pointed at and its name
Protected = 3 because it mediates betwen the designation and the
origin.
But a relational analysis, that is to say the analysis of the roles of
each partial element INTO the whole sign (Let PDO to stand for such a
sign), shows:
- Designation for PDO remains a Second
while:
- Protected for PDO is a First
- Origin for PDO is a Third
Conclusion: The Origin is the interpretant of the Protection system for
its object, the Designation : Some place in the South West of France is
the interpretant of the AOC for Bordeaux.
The demonstration is quite complex because it involves a combination of
rules given by CSP in CP 2.235, 2.236, 2.237 and I skip it:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
235. We must distinguish between the First, Second, and Third Correlate
of any triadic relation.
The First Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as
of the simplest nature, being a mere possibility if any one of the
three is of that nature, and not being a law unless all three are of
that nature.
236. The Third Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as
of the most complex nature, being a law if any one of the three is a
law, and not being a mere possibility unless all three are of that
nature.
237. The Second Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as
of middling complexity, so that if any two are of the same nature, as
to being either mere possibilities, actual existences, or laws, then
the Second Correlate is of that same nature, while if the three are all
of different natures, the Second Correlate is an actual existence.
----------------------------------
The linguistic aspect of the game, and the syntactic habit in different
languages is worth noticing too. The necessary linear structure of the
linguistic chain can't mark easily such a triadic construction. So we
have virtually the ambiguity in every language: Protected (Designation
of Origin) / (Protected Designation) of Origin. However the syntactic
habit (inverse in French and in English) spares the complex calculus of
knowing which is S, O or I by constraining their position in the chain.
For example English puts the sign "Protected" at the head of the chain
while French puts it at the tail.
Bernard
exactly, one can note that the _expression_ used by Peirce is "the one of
the three which is regarded as ..." which makes it clear as you say
that the categories used in that context have no ontological bearings.
They are extremely weak categories, degenerate categories, relations of
reason, ...
basically take one thing (A), take another thing (B) and you have a
first (A) and a second (B), the firstness and the secondness here mean
nothing more than "A is such as it is" and "B is other than A", in the
context of the relation that is being considered.
however when Peirce writes "being a mere possibility, actual
existences, or laws" or "of that nature" he is referring to the
phenomenological nature of the elements in their ontological aspect.
I am appalled at the fact that one can confuse these two aspects, it
reveals a complete misunderstanding of Peirce's categories.
/JM
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