Dear Charles,
 
Always worthwhile for me to read your comments.  I've interspersed some responses. Charles Rudder wrote:
Jim Pait, list,
 
Jim's comments on ethics and aesthetics brought to mind some things I have thought about but not thought through which include:
 
1.  Is anything like Rousseau's pre-social human existence possible, which, for reasons, among others, like Lester Frank Ward sets out in his objection to Laissez Faire theories of social movement, I doubt.
 
 
RESPONSE:  I, also, doubt the possibility of pre-social human existence.  But I fear that such an argument would be difficult to distinguish between an argument over what one presupposes to be the nature of social verses what one presupposes to be the nature of humanity.  In other words can the nature of what it is to be human be separated from the nature of what it is to be social.  I think social is part of what it is to be human (and probably other species as well).    The constructs would have to be conceptually independent to properly ask whether one could exist without the other. Then supposing they were independent conceptually one could ask if human existence were dependent upon the existence of the social.   I haven't said this well.  What I'm trying to say is that we need to distinguish between the question of whether being social is part of being human human and  the question of whether existing as a human depends upon the support of society.  Still not quite right but the best I can do just now.  END
 
 
 
2.  Is it possible for individual members of social groups to act as if we have no freedom of choice--that human conduct includes no nonmechanical consequences of selecting one among two or more available options?
 
RESPONSE:  I like the way you have inverted the way the question is typically posed, Charles.  You rascal.  END
 
3.  If it is impossible for individual members of social groups to act as if we have no freedom of choice, is it possible for us to act as if no choices lie on a continuum between worst and best?  Is it possible for members of social groups to avoid acting as if we must make ethical decisions about what is and doing what is right or best?
 
RESONSE:   I'd say the answer to #3 above is:  No it is not possible to act in good faith and at the same time avoid considering the ethical consequences of anything we do.  I believe that all our actions have ethical consequences. 
 
I think in general your questions above encompass two big issues that almost always  arise in discussions of ethics: (1) Can there be ethical choices without so-called free will. (2) How ought concerns for the individual be balanced against concerns for the society -- given that the survival of each is interdependent.   Despite the enormous value all societies (not just some societies)  place on individual life and liberty, no society (not just some societies) allows its individual members to have totally free reign nor places more value on the life of an individual than upon the life of the society.  But it is interesting to see the degree in which some individual's lives are more highly valued than other individuals  -- again, probably in all societies.  I'm talking about comprehensive societies (such as tribes or nations) that address the overall needs of their members  -- not such limited social groups or institutions that address only one aspect of life.
 
Just Wondering,
 
RESPONSE: Me too, and thanks for the doing so.
 
Jim Piat
---
Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com

Reply via email to