[peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List

[Benjamin Udell]

Jim,   >[Jim Willgoose:] I am playing at trying to reject it. ("poss.Bs & poss.~Bs")  I have accepted it more often than not.   Now you tell me.   >[Jim] I also understand the difference between discussing formal properties that hold between propositions (modal or non-modal) and forming a "1st order" proposition out of the discussion of contingent propositions and the formal properties. This could be made clearer by noting the following:   >[Jim] "P" is a contingent proposition   >[Jim] "P" & "-P" are feasible.   >[Jim] "&" and "feasible" are part of the metalanguage used to discuss contingent propositions.   >[Jim] "feas. P" & "feas.-P" are ill-formed.    >[Jim] Explanation: "Feasibility" is a 2nd order predicate used to discuss....   It does appear that you understand the difference, though the example could be misleading. We often do not have distinct words for the object and the sign, and, even in the case of the word "true" where we can distinguish "true" (corresponding to the real, to the genuine, etc.) from "real," "genuine," etc., nevertheless the word "true" does double duty and we do use the word "true" about objects in order to call them genuine, real, authentic, rather than in order to call them signs corresponding to the real. In the cases of "possible," "feasible," etc., we're not always going to have enough words to make the distinction easily. Thus saying that some proposition "Hs" is feasible could be taken to mean that "Hs" is something which is feasible as a proposition. Thus formal logic has functors and ordinary English has adverbs which grammatically modify the whole clause. Some of the functors are too powerful for 1st-order logic, and whether or not we formalize them as modifying (describing) the proposition or as altering the attribution of a modification to a substance or re-routing the denotative force (e.g., to "another than x" or to "inverted order of xyz"), the basic difference is that, in attributing a modification to a substance, we do not change which modification or which substance we're discussing. On the other hand, in "modifying" a modification or its attribution, by negation or modalizing, etc., we _are_ changing and even reversing what it is that we're attributing to the substance. In rerouting the denotative force, we're changing which objects we're characterizing as such-&-such. I mean, for instance, "another thing than this stove" is not a kind of this stove, and that "red dog" is a kind of dog, but "nonred dog" is not a kind of red dog and "non-canine" is not a kind of canine, "possibly canine" is not a kind of canine, etc. One may feel more comfortable by thinking in terms of a sign which can be described as not corresponding to a given obect, or as possibly corresponding to given object, so that one is dealing with various kinds of the same sign. In the construction of deductive formalisms, it's often better to avoid the syntactical complication of formalizing adverbs as functors. But the point in philosophy is not rephrasability, but instead to understand the result and end of such procedures, in which the description of signs is a _means_ to _transformations_ of extension and intension, transformations which themselves are a means to represent real relationships. The research interest of smoothing and smoothly "encoding" cognitions into common convenient keys or modes guides deductive maths of propositions, predicates, etc.; but does not guide philosophy, which is more interested in the corresponding "decoding." Philosophy applies deductive formalisms but is no more merely applied deductive theory of logic than statistical theory were merely applied probability theory. _Contra_ many of the linguistic analysis school, philosophy is no more merely _criticism_ of arguments, arguments whereof deductive theory of logic is the _theory_, than statistical theory is merely _criticism_ of probability propositions whereof probability theory is the _theory_. There is such a thing as "applied probability theory" but it is not statistical theory, and a statistical theorist who merely devised possibly applicable probability formalisms but left the task of statistical inference to others would be no statistical theorist.   >[Jim] This looks strangely similar to where we started in terms of rephrasing "she is possibly pregnant" as 'it is possible that "she is pregnant"' or ':she is pregnant" is possible.'  But then, 2nd order assertions obey the theory of NLC cognition except we talk of feasibility, optimality, possibility and even assertibility. "Assertibility" would be an even higher-order predicate. Wasn't your initial concern with certain epistemic predicates that qualify "1st order" predicates?   To the contrary, my initial concern was with the categories {substance, accident, whetherhood, and object(s)-to-object(s) relations (e.g. mappings)}.   As I've said, the point is that the mind must be able to treat things in terms of alternatives to the actuality with which it is presented, and all the normal minds of which we actually know do this, even that tribe http://service.spiegel.de/cache/international/spiegel/0,1518,414291,00.html whose language was recently found to contain none of the grammatical conjunctions which enable the _expression_ of complex structures of such thoughts. But they do say, just as we sometimes do, "You go there, you see it" in the sense of "If/when you go there, you'll see it." Living among polyglot immigrants, I hear that kind of talk all the time. Anyway, meaning and implication are in terms of alternatives to that which is.  Saying that we can and should treat such matters in terms of descriptions of signs is like saying that philosophy needs a mirrorish shield in order to keep from looking directly at some Hydra-like real which would petrify philosophy. Saying that the NLC 'theory' of cognition (which seems to me no more a cognition theory than Peircean truth theory is an inquiry theory even though it references inquiry) is sufficient except when we talk about possibility, feasibility, etc., is -- especially if that list includes negation (you don't say) -- to deny that there is an issue of cognizing in terms of alternatives to the actual and apparent, etc., even though then logical conceptions of meaning and implication become unattainable. Moreover, there is still no way to conceive of cognition of things _as_ truly, observably, and experimentably referencing other things, etc., since, even if the conception of meaning were available, it provides only purports and intensions, which in some mysterious combination with reaction and quality is supposed to suffice for an establishmental experience.    Best, Ben Udell http://tetrast.blogspot.com/ --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com