I am writing a research funding proposal (due Dec. 16) and would welcome any suggestions on the analysis presented below. I'm particularly interested in hearing of any work that has been or is being done along similar lines. According to my rough calculations, using the B.C. pulp and paper industry as a case in point, the "ninth hour" of a hypothetical "annual working day" costs employers about 7.6% less than the "first hour", in spite of the legal requirement for overtime pay at time and a half. At an industry standard hourly rate of $23.50, the total cost to employers (including payroll taxes, benefit premiums and allowance for paid time off) is $36.60 for the ninth hour compared with $39.40 for the first hour. This is because most of the non-wage labour costs are loaded on the standard eight hour day and some are loaded on the first six or so hours of the day. The obvious implication of such a relationship is that employers will favour overtime over creating new employment because it is cheaper -- even at time and a half. In the late 1970s or early 1980s, U.S. Rep. John Conyers had a proposal to increase the overtime premium to double time as a way of offsetting the effects of non-wage labour costs. The argument against such a proposal was that it would actually lower total employment because the higher labour costs will result in loss of demand and the substitution of capital for labour. Similarly, proposals for shortening the workweek run into a cost wall. And this is not simply a question of "shorter hours at no loss in pay". When I recalculate the employer costs assuming a 32 hour week instead of a 40 hour week and assuming the same structure and level of benefits and payroll taxes, and keeping the hourly base rate constant, the cost of the first hour jumps to $42.25, while the cost of the first overtime hour (the "seventh hour" of a hypothetical annual working day) remains at about $36.70. In other words, the employer cost of the first overtime hour would become 15% less than the cost for the first reuglar hour (again because of loading of fixed and quasi-fixed non-wage labour costs on the regular hours). The perverse result of a legislated reduction in the standard workweek thus could be that average weekly hours worked would remain about the same and the average amount of overtime would increase by around 8 hours a week -- although scale and substitution effects should again lead to a _total_ reduction in hours worked, thus increasing, rather than decreasing, unemployment. The relationship between overtime costs and straight time costs is counter-intuitive and clearly contradicts the intent of employment standards legislation. The solution to the problem is, in theory, extremely simple: distribute non-wage labour cost proportionately over the working day. In practice, however, this would require that many well-established assumptions of social security finance, employment standards regulation and collective bargaining strategy would have to be reviewed for their effects on working hours, total employment and employment equity. It would be reckless to underestimate the intensity of political resistance to pro-rating non-wage labour costs over the entire working day, including all overtime hours. I suspect that many people would refuse to even look at the calculation that clearly shows that "one and one half" is less than "one". But I think this approach solves the dilemma of why the momentum for the reduction of the working time has been stalled since the end of world war two and, for many people, *reversed* in recent decades. Regards, Tom Walker ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ knoW Ware Communications | Vancouver, B.C., CANADA | "Only in mediocre art [EMAIL PROTECTED] | does life unfold as fate." (604) 669-3286 | ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ The TimeWork Web: http://mindlink.net/knowware/worksite.htm