At 08:05 AM 12/17/98 -0800, Brad deLong wrote: >"Countries" aren't conscious beings with objectives that "allow"--such >patterns of thought have been a principal cause of a lot of atrocities in >this century, as people who should know better believe that by killing >civilians in large numbers they are teaching a lesson to something called >"Iraq" or "Germany" or "North Vietnam." There are factions within the U.S. >government and within U.S. political society that take democracy, human >rights, and economic development very, very seriously indeed. I reply (WS): True, countries are not conscious beings in the way humans are, but they form environment that profoundly affects human consciousness. My view of the motives of politcians and agents of the state is grounded in the model of human behaviour that portrays humans not as rational, but as rationalizing beings. That is, their decisions are for the most part driven by the circumstances and situations, rather than apriori intelelctual committments. Later on, however, the actors manufacture hindsight rationalizations about their "motives" to engage in that particular course of action. For that reason I do not put too much weight in memoirs of decision makers - they are most likely rationalizations that obscure rather than elucidate the actual dynamics of decision making. Moreover, I think that the dynamics set in motion by a particular country's political environment exerts a powerful influence on the thinking of policy makers -- regardless of their prior ideolgical committments. That is, if a country is amids imperialist expansion, internal or extrnal conflict, etc. that situation pretty much determines the range of actions that can be taken - an any politician will make a decision that fall within that range. Even the variablity within that range does not have to be a result of his/her aprior intellectual/ideolgical committment. A good case in point is the position of the German Left which, at the outbreak of the 1st World War, reversed its prior position and endorsed the German war effort (instead of taking advantage of the situation and bring the junker/capitalist rule down). Only few courageous individuals, such as Rosa Luxemburg or Karl Liebknecht, remained loyal to their convictions, and paid dearly for that committment. In that case, the dynamics of war profoundly changed the thinking of an entire social movement. On the other hand, the political dynamics set in motion can prevent individuals from realistic assessment of the situation. US policy toward Cuba is a good example. Cuba is no longer a threat to the US interests, and its mildly autocratic regime does not pose any significant threat to human rights, etc. Yet, the US policy toward that country is absolutely hysterical and disproportional to the circumstances - a typica example of cold war thinking. To summarize, I do not agree with the position you seemingly take that treats the views policy makers express prior to after leaving their offices as indicators of the course of policy they pursue (or are trying to) while in the office. Methink, what they do in the offcie is drivent for the most part by the situational logic, or the "country parameter" if you will. So yes, "countries" are not counscious beings, but their influence on the behavior and thinking of the conscious beings is more profound than some want to admit. >But World War II--destroying Adolf Hitler and Japanese militarism? I reply (WS): I am not a historian, but was not the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour a response to the US militarism in the region, specifically the threat of cutting off the Japanese oil supply lines? A decsion to destroy the US navy was was a logical defensive movement on the part of Japan's military. That, of course, should not be construed as exoneration of Japanese militarism and imperialism. But let's face it, the fact that Japanese were the "bad guys" does not automatically make the US "good guys." I think that the war in the Pacific can be more accurately compared to the war between two drug kingpins - both are "bad guys" fighting for turf. >Korea--saving forty million people from the benevolent rule of the Great >Leader? I reply (WS): Again, I do not think that the US intervetion in Korea was motivated by benevolence. By the same token, neither was the Russian support for the North. As I said before, this conflict is more like a turf battele between two drug kingpins, than a Manichaen struggle between Light and Darkness. Taiwan--using the seventh fleet to save a few more people from the >Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution? I reply (WS): I think you got your dates mixed up a bit. The Cultural Revolution started in 1968 and was mostly an internal power struggle rather than attempt to swallow Taiwan, so the 7th fleet could not do much in that situation, regardless of how badly one wanted to use it. As far as the Great Leap is concerned, did not Taiwan have one of her own that resulted in the land reform and virtual extermination of the landlord class? >NATO--it seems to me that >western Europe has been a much more pleasant place to live than eastern >Europe since WWII, and that NATO has had something to do with it. I reply (WS): Perhaps, but I do not think that NATO had much to do with it. I think it had to do more with "relative economic backwardness" of many Eastern and Central European nations than with the supposedly beneficial effects of the NATO. I do not want to open this can of worms again, but I think Soviet-imposed central planning had very much different effects on different CEE countries. It was definitely a draw back for East Germany that not was stripped of its industry as "war reparation" (although I hardly blame Russians for that), but also thrown back to the organization of economy from 50 years before (Russian central planning was in essence an emulation of the Bismarck model). I am less sure about Chechoslovakia, whose Czech part was already industrialised. But for countries with more backward and agrarian economies, such as Poland -- I think that central planning brought by the Russian rule was a blessing, the best thing that happened in that part of the world since the 16th century. Central planning made the transition from the premodern/agrarian to modern industrial economy much smoother than it would have been under the "market conditions." The reasons are quite simple and have more to do with economics than with any military alliance, be it the Warsaw Pact or the NATO. First is the strong inflationary pressures created by rapid industrialization. Demand for industrial labor diverts people from labour intensive agriculture - so food production goes down while demand for food (in the cities) goes up. Under the market condition, that would push food prices through the roof, and the ineficient agriculture would get a huge windfall, consuming resources intended for financing the industrial project. The same applies to the suppliers of raw materials. Central planning averted that situation by administrative control of prices. Moreover, it had the added benefit of introducing the economies of large scale and reducing transaction costs. So it was an extremely beneficial solution at that point in history. Second, economic cooperation with x-USSR & satellites did provide a vast market for low-tech goods manufactured in countries like GDR, Hungary or Poland. I do not think that those countries' industries could effectively compete with more advanced Western nations. Economic decline suffred by those countries immediatly after 1989 has more to do with the collapse of the Russian market rather than misguided advices of Western 'experts.' Can you imagine what would have happened, had these economies been weened of that market, say, some 20 years earlier? Of course, you will disagree with my assessment, if you treat central planning as the "final solution" - something intended to stay permanently. I, however, do not make that assumption - I view central planning as a temporary solution intended only to accelerate economic development. In that respect, it was like a strict regiment prescribed by a doctor to a sick patient, unpleasant but overall beneficial, and avove all, temporary until the patients gets well. > >It seems to me that any evaluation has to conclude on net that the >projection of U.S. military power in the twentieth century has been a >positive force--unless the person doing the evaluation sees positive >aspects to Hitler, Stalin, and Mao that I do not see. I reply (WS): As I already said, the dark sides of the adversaries dos not automatically make the US a "good guy." I see it more in terms of drug kingpins fighting a turf battle than a Manichaen struggle between Light and Darkness. Moreover, i'd be rather reluctant to put Stalin, Hitler and Mao into one basket. Stalin's policies may be deplorable for a number of reasons, but at least he did not embark on the project of total annihilation of entire nations. Hitler did. regards wojtek
