----- Original Message -----
> >I don't recall this incident, but it suggests a US connection.  Any
> >comments?

In Zim's main weekly, the Financial Gazette, I used to have a column, and
this is what I wrote on this story on 29 January 1993:

 How Rhodesia poisoned SA

 The South African Defense Force and South African Police are capable of
untold horrors, and, via the independent press and the Goldstone Commission,
scandals emerge nearly every week which otherwise should, in a humane
society, lead to the government's resignation.  Yet the origins of the most
contemptible covert operations aimed at civilians or opposition political
groups may never be known, if President FW de Klerk's current plans for a
no-strings-attached amnesty plan are eventually consummated.
 So it is up to insiders to reveal occasional secrets, and to gutsy
researchers to put these into some form of coherent story.  Thus it is
useful to look at fresh allegations about Rhodesian-era contributions to
modern-day South African roguery by Mr Jeremy Brickhill.
 Currently an Oxford doctoral student and filmmaker, Mr Brickhill fought for
ZAPU in the 1970s and in 1987 nearly lost his life when aspiring assassins
carbombed him at the Avondale shopping centre.  His analysis of the role of
Rhodesian chemical and biological experiments in South Africa can be found
in the Winter 1993 issue of the American magazine Covert Action Quarterly,
in an article entitled "Zimbabwe's Poisoned Legacy:  Secret War in Southern
Africa."
 For years rumours have circulated about nefarious Rhodesian Special Forces
experiments, including former CIO director Ken Flower's own admission that
poisoned uniforms were planted for ZANU's use, leading to the deaths of
hundreds of cadres.  One case of likely biological warfare, reports Dr Meryl
Nass of the University of Massachusetts in the same magazine, was an
extraordinary outbreak of anthrax in 1978-80:  "It affected large areas,
killed thousands of head of livestock, and produced the largest number of
human anthrax cases in one disease outbreak ever reported in the world.  It
caused extensive economic hardship in areas with a predominantly black
population, while leaving white areas unscathed."
 Mr Brickhill reviews a range of evidence of chemical and biological warfare
conducted against ZANU and ZAPU guerrillas in the late 1970s by the CIO and
Selous Scouts.  He discusses the means by which the Rhodesians' "Operation
Favour" manipulated Bishop Abel Muzorewa and Mr Ndabaningi Sithole to
recruit 5 000 pro-government guerrillas "notorious for their undisciplined
and murderous behaviour."  And he suggests how, subsequently, "Operation
Winter" transferred the Rhodesian lessons and military "assets" directly to
South Africa under the nose of British transition team and US authorities.
 Mr Brickhill maintains that had the major Western players been so inclined,
much could have been done to halt the migration of trained killers and their
wares down South:  "Field testing of chemical and biological weapons by the
Rhodesians must have been of great interest to many other countries.  With
their extensive penetration of the Rhodesian military and intelligence
services, the British intelligence service MI-6 could hardly have failed to
learn the details of the poison war.  Ken Flower himself confirms the close
liaison he maintained with the CIA, MI-6 and other Western intelligence
agencies."
 By the time the Lancaster House deal was negotiated, Mr Brickhill says, the
future of the Rhodesian military was decided:  "The South Africans were to
be the principal beneficiaries of the Rhodesian [covert military] assets;
they, after all, had to carry on the fight [against the ANC].  The Rhodesian
assets were happy enough to go to South Africa.  The British and Americans,
while not displeased with the arrangement, were concerned with potential
political and diplomatic repercussions.  Hence the stipulation that the
transfer of the Rhodesian assets should appear to be informal and
unorganised."
 Even Mozambican FRELIMO officials were drawn into the "web of deception" by
the British, Mr Brickhill insists.  "They were told that if they agreed to
help keep ZANU guerrillas under control and committed to the election
process, the MNR would be disbanded."  Mozambique's former Security Minister
Sergio Vierra later told Mr Brickhill:  "We were naive.  We were very
naive."
 At the time independence was being celebrated in Zimbabwe, the Rhodesian
Special Forces were already being assimilated into the SADF.  The Recce
Commandos welcomed the Selous Scouts and SAS, and the poisons technology was
incorporated for future use.  Mr Brickhill alleges that the shadowy Civil
Co-operation Bureau of the SADF ─ acknowledged to be the centre of 1980s
death squad activity ─ was originally set up to encourage Rhodesian "dirty
tricks operators, and many of the CCB operators were Rhodesians."  The SADF
also established the Directorate of Special Tasks with the Rhodesians, which
organised the RENAMO takeover.
 These were no ordinary soldiers.  Mr Brickhill quotes an interview with Mr
Henrik Ellert, formerly with the Rhodesian CIO:  "Not everyone can go out
and kill.  It's very few people who can go and kill in cold blood like this.
The business of dealing in poisons, killing by stealth, by booby-trap bombs
and so on, is by its very nature a very dirty business."
 The Rhodesians "produced such people in quantity," Mr Brickhill comments.
"Such were the assets handed on to South Africa from Rhodesia's dirty war
through the connivance of Western powers in 1980.  The question today is
what will happen to these assets now?"
 Mr Brickhill's article appears on the heels of revelations by the Goldstone
Commission that a "Third Force" has been working hard to infiltrate and
disrupt the ANC.  Renewed Angolan civil war has generated charges of SA
intervention, and more than a hundred SA-based mercenaries recently left for
Zaire to prop up the Mobutu Sese Seko government.  Moreover, while there has
been no recent evidence of South Africa engaging in chemical and biological
warfare on the scale that many rural Zimbabweans encountered, the SADF
Military Forensic Department has come under extensive scrutiny for providing
poison to CCB death squads.
 In the late 1970s the SADF financed Rhodesia's Selous Scouts and, according
to Mr Brickhill, had Forensic Department experts and intelligence operatives
present in Rhodesian camps "where the poison war was developed."  Perhaps
the most famous victim of SA toxins was Rev. Frank Chikane, General
Secretary of the South African Council of Churches.  While visiting the US
in 1989, Rev. Chikane was diagnosed and treated for organophosphate
poisoning, which, notes Mr Brickhill, was "the principal chemical weapon
used by the Rhodesians."
 Rev. Chikane was treated in time to prevent permanent damage, but other
victims of late 1980s poisonings have not been so lucky.  Mr Klaas de Jonge,
a Dutch citizen who worked with the ANC, put on a poisoned jacket left in
his hotel cupboard and lost his eyesight.  And in the past few weeks there
has been renewed controversy around the fate of the ANC military leader in
Swaziland, Mr Thami Zulu, who died of poison (there is a fierce dispute
about Mr Zulu's allegiance and who did the poisoning).
 Mr de Klerk's proposed unconditional amnesty would indemnify all state
personnel who committed such crimes.  In a surprise vote last October, the
proposed amnesty was rejected by Parliament due to opposition by the
coloured Labour Party.  But the ANC have agreed that once interim government
is in place an amnesty will be granted.
 However, the ANC want full disclosure of covert actions, in part because,
in the words of Mr Brickhill:  "Many of the themes of secret war ─
`contra-type' armies, psychological war, poison war and so-called
`black-on-black' violence ─ which today continue to take their toll in the
region were first developed in Rhodesia.  The story of this legacy is still
largely untold and shrouded in secrecy.  If Southern Africa is not to limp
into the twenty-first century bloodied and broken, the secret war and its
legacies must be seriously addressed."


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