Jim wrote:
> However, I think it's a mistake to assert that "Everything in the world
(and
> also in human society and in human thought) is composed of dialectical
> contradictions." In view of the idea that dialectical thinking is more of a
> set of questions than a set of pre-digested answers, we should instead look
> for contradictions in empirical reality to see if they exist.
>
What most of us Marxist-Leninists call the laws of dialectics are neither "a
set of questions" nor "a set of pre-digested answers" (depending upon what
that phrase might actually be meant to mean). Instead, like scientific laws
in general, they are abstractions and generalizations from nature, society,
and human thought. That is, it seems to us that virtually everywhere we look,
we see particular illustrations of these laws.
Strictly speaking, however, what we have here are massive inductions of a
sort. It is like seeing lots and lots of black crows and concluding that "all
crows are black". Since there might be a few albino crows, this may actually
be a slight exaggeration. On the other hand, it seems like a damned good rule
of thumb about the color of crows.
I don't think anyone can possibly PROVE that "every single thing" in the
world has within it an array of dialectical contradictions, but after being
trained to look at things this way, and always finding such contradictions
when I look for them, I think it is reasonable to conclude that this too is a
damned good rule of thumb. I suppose the laws of dialectics, and maybe even a
lot of less general scientific laws, are just that--damned good rules of
thumb. But good abstract and generalized rules of thumb are hard to find, and
when you do find them it is wise to make good use of them.
The usual problem with dialectical laws, like all scientific laws, is knowing
precisely how to apply them. Does the dialectical law that change happens
through qualitative leaps mean that there is no such thing as gradual
evolution, for example? Not necessarily! (But I'll avoid slipping back into a
discussion of evolution and punc-e for now.) This may have been what you were
getting at when you remarked that "we should instead look for contradictions
in empirical reality to see if they exist". But the way I would put it here
is: Don't jump to simple-minded conclusions! The world is more complicated
than you imagine. There are indeed contradictions in (virtually) everything,
but they might not be precisely the ones that you first postulate!
So at least as a close first approximation, I stick to the claim that there
are dialectical contradictions in everything.
> Alternatively, we could follow Mao (not one of my favorites) to distinguish
> between antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions. The kind that
> Scott sees everywhere seem to be mostly the latter. The former would be
> class contradictions and the like.
Mao's "On Contradiction" is indeed a good place to start in trying to
understand dialectics and the dialectical method. Probably the very best
place to start.
However I said nothing about antagonistic and non-antagonistic
contradictions. I was only talking about contradictions in general.
The meaning of the word 'antagonism' in discussions of dialectical
contradictions is often somewhat unclear. Mao, for example, does not define
'antagonism' so you have to deduce his meaning from his examples of
antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions (as in "contradictions among
the people").
My dictionary [Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 10th ed.] gives the
first meaning of 'antagonism' as simply opposition ("opposition of a
conflicting force, tendency, or principle"). But ALL dialectical
contradictions involve opposition, and not all contradictions involve
antagonism--so that is not the sense being used here. The second of the two
relevant senses given is "actively expressed opposition or hostility". This
seems closer to the mark, especially the word HOSTILITY.
Of course hostility is a human concept (like antagonism in its everyday
uses), so it doesn't apply to the genuine dialectical antagonism between
mountain building forces and the forces of erosion, for example. That is to
say, we often seem to be getting at something different than just hostility
when we talk about antagonism in dialectics.
What I think we are often trying to get at when we use the word 'antagonism'
in dialectic logic is the fact that in those cases there is a fight to the
finish going on, i.e., that one pole or aspect of the contradiction must
ultimately overpower the other. But this won't quite do either, since for
contradictions among the people (for example) we want to say that the
proletarian viewpoint will eventually overpower that of other allied classes
(such as the peasantry in China)--but that there STILL is no necessary
antagonism involved. This suggests that antagonism is not about what happens
in the end, but rather the manner in which the end is achieved.
So we are back to hostility or something like it. It is hard to find a
completely satisfactory gloss for the word 'antagonism' in this sense. I
guess you have to just come to appreciate that it is a technical word that
you have to learn to understand by seeing it in many contexts. (Like so many
words.)
I don't see dialectical antagonism EVERYWHERE, but I do see it as being very
widespread. Often it is hidden for long periods, but push has a way of
eventually coming to shove.
--Scott
In a message dated 7/7/02 5:11:18 PM Pacific Daylight Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
writes:
> Scott Harrison writes: >I haven't read "The Dialectical Biologist", but if
> these three points fairly represent Levins & Lewontin's views, then they
> have left out the single most important thing about dialectics and the
> dialectical method (although perhaps point (3) hints at it). Since the 3
> points they do raise are also valid and set the basis for what is left out,
> this additional point should perhaps be numbered "(4)". It goes something
> like this:
>
> >(4) Everything in the world (and also in human society and in human
> thought) is composed of dialectical contradictions. (These are not logical
> contradictions, the assertion and denial of the exact same proposition, but
> rather "oppositions", or the unity of opposing forces within the thing. We
> are stuck with the misleading name "contradictions" here for historical
> reasons. Blame Hegel.) Development or change of any kind is in essence the
> result of struggle between these internal opposing forces (which are,
> however, often triggered by outside factors). Thus an acorn develops into
an
> oak tree primarily because of its own internal nature, and the opposing
> forces pent-up within it--though it also requires soil, rain and sunshine
> from the outside. To seek to understand HOW an acorn develops into an oak,
> that is, to use the dialectical method here, is therefore mostly to seek
out
> and try to understand these internal contradictions within the acorn. <
>
> This is what I was groping for when I said that L&L's conception of
> dialectical inquiry lacked "structure." It would indeed be better to have a
> fourth bit about the role of contradictions (or the unity of opposites).
>
> However, I think it's a mistake to assert that "Everything in the world
(and
> also in human society and in human thought) is composed of dialectical
> contradictions." In view of the idea that dialectical thinking is more of a
> set of questions than a set of pre-digested answers, we should instead look
> for contradictions in empirical reality to see if they exist.
>
> Alternatively, we could follow Mao (not one of my favorites) to distinguish
> between antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions. The kind that
> Scott sees everywhere seem to be mostly the latter. The former would be
> class contradictions and the like.
>
> ...
>
> JD
>
