Jim Devine wrote:
this is an excellent statement of the game-theoretic way of thinking, seen in its starkest way in the kind of paranoia that characterized John Nash. It also points to the often-unnoted psychic costs of thinking that way.
The delusional aspect concerns a great deal more than paranoid delusions about the intentions of others e.g. the conception of self and others as calculating machines, the complete inability to take account of and understand cultural distinctiveness, etc., etc.
Isn't it true that, outside of economics, the main support for the development of game theory has come from the US military? This produces the more obvious Strangelove aspect, Herman Kahn etc. Markowitz is himself a Cowles, Rand person, isn't he? His company seems mostly to be involved with war gaming simulations for the military.
Stephen Cambone appears to be connected to this Strangelove aspect.
From an article by Savitri Hensman:
In October 2001, when asked whether the use of tactical nuclear weapons against the caves where the Taliban were sheltering, suggested by Congressman Steve Buyer, was ruled out, Rumsfeld said, 'I don't rule out anything, but my answer very simply is, we are not having a problem in dealing with those tunnels in terms of the ordinance.' 83 This marked the major shift that was taking place in US policy from regarding nuclear weapons as a deterrent to nuclear attack by another state, hopefully never to be used, to treating them as one of a range of alternatives to be considered for battlefield use.
Rumsfeld had for some time been a supporter of the Center for Security Policy, which strongly advocated investing in the development of a National Missile Defense (NMD) system (widely known as 'Star Wars'), when he was appointed by Congress to chair a Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States. By applying a worst case scenario, for instance the transfer of a complete ballistic missile to a nation such as North Korea by China, he reached the conclusion in 1998 that such an attack could happen in the next few years, a possibility previously ruled out by US intelligence. 84 NMD is part of a 'New Triad' to the development of which the Pentagon is now committed - offensive strike weapons (nuclear and non-nuclear), strategic defenses and a revitalised defence infrastructure. Billions of dollars are being spent on the research, production and infrastructure involved.
The Center for Security Policy was set up in 1988, and received funding from wealthy rightwingers such as the Coors family and Richard M Scaife as well as corporate donors such as Boeing, General Atomics, General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman and other weapons contractors. The election of George W Bush meant that the policies it had advocated now had a substantial chance of being put into practice. Over twenty of its close associates or advisory council members now held government positions, including Feith; JD Crouch, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Policy; Robert Joseph, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs for Proliferation Strategy, Counter-Proliferation and Homeland Defense; Perle; Roche; and Zakheim. Several members of the Center's advisory council or board of directors were also on the board of directors of the National Institute of Public Policy. Its Chief Executive Officer, Keith Payne, had in 1980 co-authored with Colin S Gray an article entitled 'Victory is Possible', which urged the US military to make plans for fighting and winning a nuclear war: 'The West needs to devise ways in which it can employ strategic nuclear forces coercively , while minimizing the potentially paralyzing impact of self-deterrence.' In January 2001, the National Institute for Public Policy published a report, Rationale and Requirements for US Nuclear Forces and Arms Control, prepared by a study group including Stephen Cambone, now a special assistant to Rumsfeld; Stephen Hadley, Deputy National Security Adviser, and Joseph. Several members, in government after Bush came to power, were involved in conducting a Nuclear Posture Review. 85
Its secret report, presented to Congress in January 2002, said that the Pentagon should be prepared to use nuclear weapons against China, Russia, Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Libya and Syria; . Such weapons could be used in three types of situations: against targets able to sustain non-nuclear attack; in retaliation for attack with nuclear, biological or chemical weapons; or 'in the event of surprising military developments'. War between Arab nations and Israel or between China and Taiwan were among the scenarios where the USA should be prepared to launch a nuclear attack. While conventional nuclear weapons caused destruction on such a large scale that they were 'self-deterring', potential enemies of the USA would be more likely to believe that smaller, tactical nuclear weapons could be used against them 86 (sometimes known as 'mini-nukes'). http://www.anglocatholicsocialism.org/hensman.html
Ted
