[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
My resistance is to an ideological curve in our history that bounces from crying crocodile tears over the alleged famine killing perhaps as many as 40 million people and all kinds of vilification of the revolution in China and the on going revolutionary process.
Which I haven't heard anyone do here, please correct me if I'm wrong.
But speaking of revolution, here's the (very) rough draft of a piece by Li Changping, former county head in China, who came to fame in China by writing a letter to then Premier Zhu Rongji about corruption and the desperate conditions in Hubei Province.
Prevent Rural Problems From Becoming Revolutionary
The main manifestation of rural problems
1. In central and western China, most rural households find it difficult to even maintain simple reproduction after paying taxes and fees on their agricultural income. Furthermore, the majority of migrant workers find it difficult to reproduce their labor power on their wages.
In 70% of the villages in central and western China, each family has about 8 mu of land. In average years, each mu of land produces about 1,500 jin of grain, and at .5 yuan/jin, this is about 750 yuan in gross revenue per mu. After subtracting about 200 yuan per mu in production and transaction costs, and 100 yuan in all sorts of visible and invisible taxes and fees, this leaves 450 yuan/mu in income, or about 3,600 yuan in income per family, and usually not more than 5,000 if you include income from sidelines. This figure is an approximation of farm income in currency, while only about 3,000 yuan of a family's income comes in the form of cash. Because education, medical, and the production costs of farmers are all high, it is thus difficult for farming households to break even. According to a survey undertaken by students from Nanjin University in their hometowns, 66% of central-western rural households find it difficult to maintain simple reproduction, and 64% of households are operating in debt.
Migrant workers in cities currently earn about 6,000 yuan a year, but they have on average 900 yuan in medical expenses, 1,500 yuan in rent, 2,000 in food and incidental expenses, 200 yuan in clothing expenses, etc. This leaves them with about 600 yuan/year to take home. It is not possible for a young man to accumulate enough money to build a house, get married, and prepare for children and old age on 600 yuan a year.
2. Central-western China's infrastructure has been crumbling. Health, education and other public goods exist only in name. Rural markets are depressed, and financial resources have dried up. Production and life in general are difficult in rural areas, and the romantic image of farming in China is now nothing more than a historical memory.
In recent years, the state has spent a great deal on managing large river systems, with impressive results. However, because the level of organization and mobilization in villages has fallen from the past, many of the infrastructure projects built under the communes are not being maintained, lowering villages' abilities to fight natural disasters. The number of school buildings has increased in the last few years, but the public education system that existed before the 80s no longer exists. Schooling is now farming households' biggest expense (36% of their income). A survey by the Ministry of Health revealed that rural households pay on average 500 yuan/year in medical expenses. Falling ill and going to the hospital have become a luxuries for farmers, and also one of their greatest fears.
In the 80s, middle schools, roads, electricity, communication, pumps, etc., were all part of the state's responsibility, but now they are all the "people's" responsibility. How will farmers, who have a difficult time with simple reproduction, be able to shoulder what should be the state's burden to provide public goods? Farmers' disposable cash income is falling, as is their purchasing power. Rural markets are shrinking, and TVEs (town and village enterprises) are having a rough time as rural markets shrink. The four major state banks have retreated from rural areas, and the inability of farmers to secure loans has become one of the bottlenecks for rural development. The new generation of farmers no longer feel a connection with the land, signaling that the age of chaotic urban growth is set to begin.
3. Agricultural investment continues to drop, the natural environment in rural areas is getting worse, farmers produce more and earn less, and many villages are being pressured to return to self-sufficiency.
The central government increased its agricultural investment, but provincial, city, county and township governments, heavily in debt (rural townships alone owe 230 billion yuan in debt) and under pressure to issue wages to their millions of bloated staff, prevented this money from reaching the countryside. Since the 1990s, hundreds of millions of hours of labor were mobilized each year to undertake infrastructure projects, but the practice stopped in the 1990s as local governments are no longer able to organize such projects. Fiscal and labor investments have thus fallen sharply, with serious ill effects on life and the environment. Many illnesses that had been eradicated in rural China are reappearing, and combined with new diseases like AIDS, are threatening rural lives and production.
Since the mid-90s, agricultural products went from a shortage to oversupply, but the cost to produce these products rose. The agricultural economy entered a phase wherein output increased but income stagnated. Since China joined the WTO, more and more foreign agricultural products have entered China's markets, reducing the volume of sales by China's farmers that produce these goods, and driving many farmers back to self-sufficiency.
4. The ability of the Central Government to solve the rural problems is very limited, and what resources are earmarked for this problem are often siphoned off by local government offices and ministries. China is facing an unprecedented structural and systemic barrier to the solution of rural issues, and this is critically affecting farmers' trust in the Party and government.
Currently, it is very common to see the Central Government's policies distorted by local governments during their implementation. Government ministries often place their own interests about that of the nation or the people when carrying out their duties. For example, if the Central Government allocates 100 yuan to improve rural education, this money may not help rural parents, but actually increase their financial burden by 10s of millions of yuan.
Farmers make their living off of the natural environment, but local officials' existence is secured via their power to exploit farmers, a widespread phenomenon in China. in the past few years the Central Government has put an immense amount of energy into the "fee to tax" reform in an attempt to control the illegal collection of fees in rural areas. Many regions, however, continue to abide by the reforms only for a short time, and soon continue to collect illegal fees. This problem is becoming more widespread. The slogan is "policy and strategy are the lifeblood of the Party", but many local governments and local Party organizations have alienated themselves from the Party and government's policies, to varying degrees, again affecting farmers' trust in the Party and government.
5. The transformation of local officials into village creditors will further alienate the local government from rural economic policy, and worsen the relationship between cadres and the masses. For various reasons, township and rural governments are in debt for hundreds of billions of yuan. The vast majority of this debt is owed to local officials and their relatives. Village taxes are no longer a source of revenue for local projects, and have instead turned into revenue for the local officials themselves, alienating the local governments from the people. Many village leaders become cadres solely for the purpose of collecting interest from villagers. This has the effect of alienating the Party's local organization from the autonomous village organizations.
Because of the enormous size of the debt and interest, the debt held by many creditors continues to rise. In order to collect on their debts, many local officials force farmers to come up with money to repay the debt. Farmers who cannot pay are often forced to give up the rights to their land as collateral. This heinous violation of the law has even been 'promoted' by city and county governments. Some local government have, under the banner of 'property rights reform', proceeded to sell off barren or mountainous land, as well as TVEs. All that is left is the contracted land, well pumps, schools and roads. Because has been unprofitable to farm in the last few years, farmers had little initiative to work the land, and vast tracts have been leased to creditors with 30-50 year contracts. The creditors farm the land but do not pay taxes, and also collect great amounts via loans at very high rates of interest. Creditors have become 'landlords' that do not pay taxes. Now even schools and wells have become the target of these creditors. If the trend that tends to produce these conflicts is not turned around, it is inevitable that relations between officials and the masses will deteriorate, and the contradictions will sharpen.
Prevent rural problems from becoming a problem of revolution
The problems in the countryside are very complex. If the various contradictions come together and are not resolved, then it is possible that they could develop into a more complex problem. We must soberly examine this issue.
First, we must prevent the farmer's problems from becoming the problems of migrant workers; that is, we must prevent the rural issues from expanding into the cities. There are 250 million surplus laborers in the countryside, and about 10 million are added to the rural workforce each year. China's countryside will face the pressure employment demands from 200-300 million rural residents for the next several decades, while the cities can only absorb about 6-8 million each year. If the rural economy does not grow at a certain rate, and social developments in the countryside (compulsory education, medical care, pensions, etc.) do not begin to converge with those of urban areas, then rural labor will stream into the cities chaotically. If only 20 million working-age people move into the cities from the countryside, then the urban unemployment rate will rise by 4 percentage points. Migrant workers, laid-off state workers, and unemployed students could begin to form networks, which would be a more serious problem than the current problem that farmers face. A serious and long-term strategic goal for coordinated rural-urban development must be to prevent the linkages of urban intellectuals, workers and peasants.
Second, we must prevent the problems of the lower classes from becoming a public security crisis. Because of their poverty, farmers and migrant workers are forced to engage in illegal activities in order to lower their living expenses or increase their income. Because of the fiscal crisis, local governments are more and more forced to step outside of legal boundaries [in order to increase their revenue]. Once both the lower classes and local governments widely engage in illegal activities, then society as a whole will lose its legal foundations, and be plunged into chaos.
Illegal activities by government bodies are becoming more and more serious, as is corruption in the judicial system. More and more people from the lower class are petitioning their grievances, but it is becoming more and more difficult to uphold the rights of the people, and the costs to do this are increasing. Local governments and the judiciary are removed from the masses, and have lost their trust, resulting in a heightening of contradictions with Beijing. More and more people have no recourse to uphold their rights, or are unable to afford the costs to do so. Society is accumulating a propensity to 'uphold rights via violence.' In the near future, we must closely tie our sentiments, power, and interests with those of the people. But who will undertake this project? It will be impossible if we do not transform the current official-oriented system with one oriented towards the people. What method will bring about this transformation? Based on the current theories of reform and social practice, these problems will only worsen, and this new system will not be put in place.
Third, we must prevent the class polarization issue from becoming an antagonistic relationship. Income disparities are growing, and power and capital are becoming more closely intertwined. The rights of the poor are shrinking, and it is becoming more costly to uphold their rights. The Premier can only help a small number of people, and this will not solve the general problem. If this continues, this will force the poor to start their own "Three Talks" movement: talk about class theory, class forces, class struggle.
More and more people cherish the memory of Chairman Mao. The reason is that the Premier can only help a few poor people to recover their back wages. The Republic's laws cannot help the poor. More and more people feel that without a theory of class to arm themselves, the poor will not be able to unite. Merely relying on the Premier is not sufficient, and replying on bourgeois legal protection to protect the poor's interests is also not sufficient. What to do? Mao Zedong decided to 'bombard the headquarters' and carried out unrelentless class struggle. If a leader were now to issue a call to 'bombard the headquarters' and a new 'Three Talks', there might be a new Cultural Revolution.
No one hopes for a revolution, and we must strenuously avoid revolutions, both a bourgeious revolution and a proletariat revolution. Is a compromise possible? It will require the wisdom of the Chinese people.
