Part (4) - Psycho USS Liberty Conspiratorial Slanders
by Hank Roth (Formerly an operations cryptologist/analyst at the White House for the President of the United States. Also formerly with the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff in the War Room at the Pentagon. - veteran of Vietnam and Yom Kipper Wars - past Commander Jewish War Veterans Post780) Continued: http://pnews.org/art/ussliberty.shtml On June 7th [my birthday, so I remember it well], it was the third day of the war and the Israeli naval command was under-equipped to defend Israel's shores and dependent on the air force and human observation for long range early warning. It would be an understatement to say, the Navy was fearful and frustrated. because of the tension after the loss of an elite frogman commando unit, which was captured by the Egyptians, and the sightings of three Egyptian submarines close to the Israeli shore. There was also a report of several Soviet vessels in the area. An Israeli Nord aircraft took off from an airfield early on the morning of the 8th with an Israeli navy spotter on board to patrol the shore and insure that enemy vessels did not penetrate Israeli waters during the night before. Israel had to have a human spotter for early warning because Israel in 1967 had very limited radar capability. Almost two hours after the aircraft started its patrol, it notified the duty officer in the navy war room that a ship had been spotted West of Gaza. It appeared to be a destroyer from the air. The officer ordered a red marker placed on the battle control table. Red was the color used to indicate an "unidentified" ship. Almost 20 minutes later the Nord sent another report in which the spotter identified the ship as an "American naval-supply vessel. The ship was identified by the spotter and would have then been considered neutral, but the marker was not changed from red to green, to designate a neutral vessel. The Israelis admitted this. They did not deny it. he reason given by the duty officer at a board of inquiry was the "identification had been vague and uncertain." And, then from 6 to 9 a.m. the navy's attention in the war room was diverted to an emergency, with the penetration of an enemy submarine west of the town of Atlit, where a huge oil slick had been sighted. At 8:50 the navy dispatched the destroyer MV Haifa to the area. The Haifa detonated five depth charges at 9:02 without success. While the hunt for the enemy sub was ongoing, Admiral Erell entered the underground war room to take personal command and he questioned the duty officer about the red marker west of the Sinai coast. Told that the marker designated what was thought to be an American supply ship, he ordered the marker changed to green and he concentrated on the submarine. More depth charges were detonated and air bubbles and oil was rising to the surface. At the same time, the war room received a cable from an Israel pilot reporting that he was being shot at by an "unidentified" ship off the Sinai coast. After he landed and in debriefing he said that he was not fired at, but he had seen a ship and it appeared to be "gray" and "wider than usual, and with a bridge in the middle." The information was filed and forgotten. Then, after 10 a.m. the Nord aircraft returned and in debriefing the navy spotter reported that he had clearly seen a GTR-5 on the side of the vessel. Major Pinchasi at the naval operations room at Naval Headquarters consulted Jane's Fighting Ships and identified the ship as an American intelligence vessel named the "Liberty." At 11 a.m. the duty commanders in the navy war room changed shifts and a Lt. Col took over temporary command. He ordered the green marker removed from the battle control table so it would not be cluttered. Standard naval operating procedure dictated that battle control table should be kept as simple as possible, but in retrospect, it was a fatal decision for the Liberty because from 11:05 on the Liberty was no longer a known quantity for those who were operationally responsible for conducting a fast-moving, three-front, war, who were feeling the heat of battle decision making. At 11:24 the air force reported to the naval chief of operation, Col Issy Rehav, that the Sinai coast city of El Arish, captured by Israeli forces the day before was being shelled from the sea. And, at 11:27 a.m., a second, independent report ame in, and this time from Southern Command Hqts, that El Arish was indeed being bombarded from the sea. In his book, Ennis also reported explosions in El Arish. The smoke and explosions were clearly visible to the crew of the Liberty, which is how close they were to what was presumed to be an enemy attack on the coastal city. Later it was determined that an Egyptian ammo depot had exploded in El Arish. The Israeli general command assumed that the city was under attack from the sea and the Liberty just happened to be there, which made it look an awful lot like the Liberty had been doing the shelling. Col Rehav at 12:05 p.m. ordered three torpedo boats from the 914 Squadron to leave Ashdod and proceed towards El Arish and at 12:15 captain of the flagship torpedo boat, Lt. Col Moshe Oren was ordered to sail to 20 miles north of El Arish and patrol that area. At 1:07 p.m. he was instructed to call for an air strike upon spotting the target. At 1:41, 2nd Lt Aharon Yfrach, the radar operator about the flagship, T-204, picked up a target on his scope. The ship was spotted at 20 nautical miles northwest of El Arish, 14 miles off the Bardawil shore, and moving west at a speed of about thirty knots. Standard operating procedure for the Israeli navy in 1967 was that any ship moving faster than 20 knots in a battle arena was to be presumed hostile. A second radar check indicated the target's speed at 28 knots. The Israelis later said the reading was inaccurate, which can be attributed to what is known as "radar jump" or simply an erroneous reading by the radar operator? The radar on torpedo boats were often inaccurate. The conclusions at the time however was, it was moving at faster than 20 knots and the target in question was probably a warship. It also 'appeared to be sailing an evasive course' in the direction of Port Said, at the mouth of the Suez Canal, which would also indicate it was hostile. At 1:45 p.m. it was decided by Rehav to order an attack on the ship. It would take awhile for the torpedo boats to get there so an air strike was called. Senior air force battle controller, Lt Col Shmuel Kislev, ordered two Mirage III C fighters on their way back to Israel from an air patrol over the Suez Canal to divert to the target. The Mirages reached the target at about 2 p.m. The lead plane dropped to an altitude of 3,000 feet and circled the target twice. The second aircraft circled the target only once. It was reported that the ship was NOT Israeli, it was painted battle-gray and had two cannons in the forecastle, a mast in the front and one funnel. In a Battle Arena Major General Mordechai Hod, the commander of the Israeli air force, asked the pilot by radio if any flag was visible. The pilot reported back "I see no flag or other signs of identification." Members of the crew find this a major point of contention, but regardless of that fact, there must be accountability for being in a battle arena, and assessments are made by the air force command, based on the pilot's observation, the course of the ship, the reported speed and the evasive running of the ship, location, etc., and the impression was that it was a hostile ship. At 2:06, the pilots began their straffing runs and straffed the U.S.S. Liberty four times. Fire had broken out on the left side of the ship. Two more aircraft were diverted, this time Super Mystere jets en route to a bombing mission over the Mitla Pass in the Central Sinai. The were carrying napalm bombs, which are not suitable for attacking targets at sea but it was decided to use the aircraft anyway. The Mysteres made two bombing runs, but only one bomb hit the ship. As there was no return fire from the Liberty, the lack of a response was puzzling and the lead pilot flew low enough to notice a P-30 painted on the hull. He then dropped to only ninety feet above the water line and this time noticed CTR-5 on the hull. He said he saw no flag. He was told to report on damages and leave the target area. At 2:15 the air force controller in central operation dispatched two helicopters to the area to pick up survivors. Meanwhile the torpedo boats had arrived at the scene. The flagship flahed the message, "What ship?" But, the U.S.S. Liberty replied "AA" meaning "Identify yourselves first." That was really dumb. Here they are listing, enveloped in smoke, heavily damaged and their captain is telling the torpedo boats to identify themselves first? Eleven years before, during the Sinai campaign, exactly the same exchange had taken place between an Israeli destroyer, the MV Yaffo, and an Egyptian ship, the Ibrahim-el-Awwal. Oren, who was a young offer on the Yaffo's bridge at the time, remembered the incident well. If he had any doubts that the burning vessel ahead of him was Egyptian, they were now dispelled. While he was deciding whether to attack, a burst of machine gun fire erupted from the ship's forecastle. It seems that a seaman apprentice on board did not hear the Captain's "hold-your- fire order" and fired several volleys at the torpedo boats. Oren still hestitated until he consulted the Israeli navy's book identifying the ships of the Arab navies and concluded that the ship in question was the Egyptian suppply vessel EL QUSEIR. One of the other captains of another torpedo boat came up with the same identification. And, at 2:37 Lt Col Oren gave the order to attack the ship. This was after being fired upon from the Liberty. At 2:43 advancing with rapid cannon fire, the topedo boats fired torpedos. At least one torpedo hit the ship. When the T-204 crossed the ship's bow, one of the officers aboard noticed the letters GTR on the hull of the ship and Oren immediately issued the hold-fire order. It was 2:47. Continued: http://pnews.org/art/ussliberty.shtml Hank Roth (Formerly an operations cryptologist/analyst at the White House for the President of the United States. Also formerly with the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff in the War Room at the Pentagon. - veteran of Vietnam and Yom Kipper Wars - past Commander Jewish War Veterans Post780) http://pnews.org/
