Background: Sen. Arlen Specter is urging his colleagues to approve the so-called "conference report," which is a substantial rewrite of the Patriot Act. It expands surveillance power but increases oversight of how the law's being used. It also has plenty of unrelated Drug War silliness in it. More history is here:
http://www.politechbot.com/2005/12/08/patriot-act-update/

Text of conference report:
http://news.com.com/pdf/ne/2005/Final_Conference_Report.pdf

-Declan

---

December 9, 2005



Dear Colleague,



Upon the Senate’s return during the week of December 12th, we will be voting on the conference report reauthorizing the USA PATRIOT Act. I write to seek your support and to explain how the provisions of the conference report retain the most important civil liberties and privacy protections from the bill that passed the Senate and include additional safeguards that emerged from the negotiations between the House and Senate conferees. The conference report retains the tools essential to law enforcement in fighting international terrorism while significantly expanding protections for civil rights from the Act currently in force.



Although the conference report contains many valuable provisions, such as important protections for the nation’s seaports and mass transportation systems, as well as new penalties to combat the growing problem with methamphetamine abuse, I would like to focus on several of the more contentious provisions of the PATRIOT Act itself.



Section 215: Business Records

The most controversial provision of the PATRIOT Act has been Section 215, the so-called “library records” provision. The conference report adds several safeguards to prevent abuse of Section 215 that neither the Senate bill nor the House bill contained. First, the conference report requires a comprehensive audit by the Justice Department’s independent Inspector General of law enforcement use of Section 215. Second, the conference report will permit, for the first time, public reporting of the total number of 215 orders sought and granted. A third safeguard is the conference report’s provision that Section 215 orders may not be used merely for threat assessments. This requirement ensures that Section 215 will be used only during those authorized investigations that have progressed somewhat beyond the initial stages. A fourth new safeguard is that every order under Section 215 will require minimization procedures that curtail the retention and dissemination of information concerning United States citizens.



The conference report also retains key provisions from the Senate bill: (1) the requirement of a statement of facts to accompany an application for an order under Section 215; (2) the express vesting of discretion in the FISA judge to review, and to reject, the FBI’s application for a 215 order; (3) the express right of recipients to consult legal counsel and seek judicial review of 215 orders; (4) the requirement of approval by the FBI Director, Deputy Director, or Executive Assistant Director for National Security before the government can seek library records, medical records, or other sensitive documents; (5) the enhanced reporting to Congress on the use of Section 215, including specific information concerning requests for the most sensitive documents; (6) the requirement that 215 orders can compel the production only of those tangible things that could be obtained under a grand jury subpoena or other orders issued by federal courts; and (7) the inclusion of a four-year sunset provision to guarantee that Congress will revisit Section 215 at a later time.



The major difference between the Senate bill and the conference report with respect to Section 215 is that the conference report authorizes the FISA court in certain narrow circumstances to issue a Section 215 order upon a showing of relevance to an already authorized terrorism investigation without a demonstration that the person’s records being requested is a known terrorist or acting on behalf of a foreign power. The relevance standard will apply only in extraordinary circumstances because the conference report is set up so as to channel all applications for orders under Section 215 into the three categories the Senate established in its reauthorization bill. By establishing three circumstances to demonstrate relevance when the government shows a connection to a suspected terrorist or spy, the bill ensures that requests falling outside the three categories will be the exception and not the rule. Thus, the Senate bill’s three-part test remains a substantial safeguard in the conference report.



Law enforcement will face an uphill battle in any effort to obtain a 215 order that does not fall into one of the three categories and thereby provides an incentive for the FBI to use the tool only when it can show a connection to a suspected terrorist or spy. This provision was deemed necessary because the Department of Justice was able, in a classified setting, to demonstrate that circumstances may exist in which an individual may not be known to a foreign power or be a recognized terrorist but may nevertheless be crucial to a terrorism investigation.



National Security Letters

The conference report also makes important changes to the laws governing National Security Letters (NSLs), which the FBI has used for several decades to request communications records and financial information from third parties in intelligence and terrorism cases. First and foremost, the conference report makes explicit the right of NSL recipients to ask a court to set aside the requirement to turn over information as well as the requirement to keep the request for information confidential. This is in stark contrast to current law, which affords no such explicit Second, in a protection analogous to one provided for Section 215, the conference report requires the Justice Department’s Inspector General to audit the FBI’s use of NSLs. Finally, the conference report significantly enhances reporting to Congress and requires an annual public report on the FBI’s use of NSLs. These reporting requirements enable both Congress, and the public, to ensure that NSLs are not being abused.



Section 213: Delayed-Notice Warrants

The conference report has retained the important protections from the Senate bill’s amendments to Section 213 of the PATRIOT Act, which authorizes warrants allowing the government to wait a number of days after the search before notifying the target. The conference report requires that a target be notified within 30 days of the search, unless the facts of the case justify a later date. Although this period is longer than the 7-day time limit from the Senate bill, it is considerably shorter than the 180 days permitted in the House bill and is a significant improvement over the original PATRIOT Act, which imposes no limits on the period of delay beyond what is “reasonable.” And, like the Senate bill, the conference report permits extensions of the delay period only upon an updated showing of the need for further delay. As in the Senate bill, these extensions are limited to 90 days, unless the facts justify a longer delay. Finally, and again like the Senate bill, the conference report requires public reporting of all delayed-notice warrants.





Section 206: Multipoint Wiretap Orders

Many, including myself, have discussed the need for changes to Section 206 of the PATRIOT Act, which authorizes multipoint or “roving” wiretap orders. I think the conference report successfully meets that need. The ability of the Justice Department to obtain multipoint wiretaps is in part a result of changes in communications technology that have made the use of cell phones ubiquitous. Terrorists have taken advantage of those changes to cover their tracks by using multiple phones.



Borrowing elements from both the House and Senate bills, the conference report limits the use of roving wiretaps to those cases in which the FBI includes in its application a “specific” description of the target and “specific facts in the application” that show the target’s actions may thwart surveillance efforts. Further, the conference report adopts the Senate bill’s requirement that the FBI notify the court within 10 days of moving its surveillance of a target from one telephone number to another. As an additional safeguard, the conference report requires that the FBI report periodically to Congress on its use of the roving wiretap authority. Finally, like the Senate bill, the conference report includes a four-year sunset for Section 206 so that Congress will revisit this provision in the near future. I believe these important modifications will go far in preventing abuse of this provision.



***



Much of the criticism has really involved complaints about the current PATRIOT Act without understanding the improvements in the conference report. Numerous hearings have determined that the PATRIOT Act has not been subject to abuse. But in order to promote public confidence, the conference report includes significant changes that will enhance oversight by the Congress, the judiciary and the public at large. The conference report represents a balanced compromise designed to maintain our ability to investigate—and hopefully preempt—terrorist attacks, while ensuring that the rights enshrined in our Constitution are not violated.




     Very truly yours,








     Arlen Specter
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