On 1/2/2012 12:55 AM, Paul McMillan wrote:
Terry Reedy said:
I understood Alexander Klink and Julian Wälde, hash...@alech.de, as saying
that they consider that using a random non-zero start value is sufficient to
make the hash non-vulnerable.
I've been talking to them. They're happy to look at our proposed
changes. They indicate that a non-zero start value is sufficient to
prevent the attack, but D. J. Bernstein disagrees with them. He also
has indicated a willingness to look at our solution.
Great. My main concern currently is that there should be no noticeable
slowdown for 64 bit builds which are apparently not vulnerable and which
therefore would get no benefit.
Terry Jan Reedy
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