The Becket Fund recently won a
strikingly similar case (sans the shoplifting) this past
March, in In re Saeed Salman et al., no. A77-820-450, see http://www.becketfund.org/index.php/case/28.html.
The case concerned a family of Iranians who arrived to the U.S. on a
visitor's visas in 1999. They applied for political asylum and
were denied but in the intervening years the family had converted to
Christianity. We applied for an asylum rehearing based on a
well-founded fear of religious persecution and won. Although the Board of Immigration Appeals and the
Immigration Judge questioned the timing of their conversions, they found
the family credible. While the credibility finding regarding their
beliefs was correct and helpful, I don't believe it was absolutely
necessary to the judgment.
The key standard is not how fervently or
consistently convert asylum applicants hold to their new beliefs (in order
to prove sincerity), rather, it is a question of how Sharia courts in Iran would respond to
the applicant's actions and stated beliefs. In our case, the Salmans
were publicly baptized and their stories and photos appeared in the Chicago
Tribune confirming their conversion. We proved that these
actions in themselves could result in a death sentence
for apostasy in Iran. At that point, whether the Salman's believed
very consistently or fervently (which they did) was irrelevant, they
had already established a well-founded fear of religious persecution based on
what the Iranian authorities would actually do to them given the
facts. Since Sharia judges in
Iran do not distinguish between apostates that publicly
renounce Islam and apostates that publicly renounce Islam and
really mean it, neither should federal judges. Courts have held
as much, particularly in the 7th Circuit.
See Bastanipour v. INS, 980 F.2d 1129 (7th
Cir.), Najafi v. INS, 104 F. 3d 943 (7th Cir. 1997), Huang v.
Gonzales, 03-4009 (7th Cir. April 14,
2005), INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca 48 U.S. 421, 440
(1987), Yang
v. Gonzales, No. 04-9538 (10th
Cir.), Zheng v. Gonzales, No. 04-2402 (7th Cir. May 26,
2005). But See Singh v. Ashcroft, no. 03-1814 (7th Cir.
2004), Mansour v. Ashcroft, no. 02-72515 (9th Cir. March 31, 2004).
Roger Severino
Legal
Counsel
The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty
1350 Connecticut Ave., NW,
Suite 605
Washington DC, 20036
202-349-7230
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Friday, July 15, 2005 9:50 AM To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Subject: Religious conversions,well-founded fear of persecution & shoplifting An Iranian national is subjected to deportation proceedings, as a result of
a string of 3 shoplifting arrests in Virginia. In response, she petitions
for asylum based on a wellfounded fear of persecution if she returns to
Iran. The basis of her well-founded fear is the application of Sharia to
her, a Muslim convert to evangelical Christianity. The immigration hearing
officer has been asked by the government to reject the application on two
grounds: first, the shoplifting offenses put in reasonable dispute the
sincerity of her religious conversion; second, the slight or speculative nature
of any risk of harm to a Muslim convert to Christianity upon returning to
Iran.
How do the government (in its administrative and enforcement
activities) and the hearing officer (in conducting its quasi-judicial
hearing) evaluate this matter?
Can the government decide that a convert's conversion is insincere because
of continued instances of sin in the converser's life?
I understand that the officer could look at the State Department country
information for any particular country and make certain factual determinations
about likelihood of persecution, and would want to receive any relevant
testimony or evidence on this point. And I understand that sincerity of
belief is about the only thing that a court continues to have clear authority to
decide based on evidence. But how do we avoid the problem of confusing
doctrine and practice in any particular religion, or in any sect of a
religion?
This is not, by the way, just the basis of good exam question. The
matter is pending in Arlington, Virginia.
Jim Henderson
Senior Counsel
ACLJ
|
_______________________________________________ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.