The Becket Fund recently won a strikingly similar case (sans the shoplifting) this past March, in In re Saeed Salman et al., no. A77-820-450, see http://www.becketfund.org/index.php/case/28.html.  The case concerned a family of Iranians who arrived to the U.S. on a visitor's visas in 1999.  They applied for political asylum and were denied but in the intervening years the family had converted to Christianity.  We applied for an asylum rehearing based on a well-founded fear of religious persecution and won.  Although the Board of Immigration Appeals and the Immigration Judge questioned the timing of their conversions, they found the family credible.  While the credibility finding regarding their beliefs was correct and helpful, I don't believe it was absolutely necessary to the judgment.
 
The key standard is not how fervently or consistently convert asylum applicants hold to their new beliefs (in order to prove sincerity), rather, it is a question of how Sharia courts in Iran would respond to the applicant's actions and stated beliefs.  In our case, the Salmans were publicly baptized and their stories and photos appeared in the Chicago Tribune confirming their conversion.  We proved that these actions in themselves could result in a death sentence for apostasy in Iran.  At that point, whether the Salman's believed very consistently or fervently (which they did) was irrelevant, they had already established a well-founded fear of religious persecution based on what the Iranian authorities would actually do to them given the facts.  Since Sharia judges in Iran do not distinguish between apostates that publicly renounce Islam and apostates that publicly renounce Islam and really mean it, neither should federal judges.  Courts have held as much, particularly in the 7th Circuit. 
 
See Bastanipour v. INS, 980 F.2d 1129 (7th Cir.), Najafi v. INS, 104 F. 3d 943 (7th Cir. 1997), Huang v. Gonzales, 03-4009 (7th Cir. April 14, 2005), INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca 48 U.S. 421, 440 (1987),  Yang v. Gonzales, No. 04-9538 (10th Cir.), Zheng v. Gonzales, No. 04-2402 (7th Cir. May 26, 2005). But See Singh v. Ashcroft, no. 03-1814 (7th Cir. 2004), Mansour v. Ashcroft, no. 02-72515 (9th Cir. March 31, 2004).
 
Roger Severino
 
Legal Counsel
The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty
1350 Connecticut Ave., NW,
Suite 605
Washington DC, 20036
202-349-7230 
 


From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Friday, July 15, 2005 9:50 AM
To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
Subject: Religious conversions,well-founded fear of persecution & shoplifting

An Iranian national is subjected to deportation proceedings, as a result of a string of 3 shoplifting arrests in Virginia.  In response, she petitions for asylum based on a wellfounded fear of persecution if she returns to Iran.  The basis of her well-founded fear is the application of Sharia to her, a Muslim convert to evangelical Christianity.  The immigration hearing officer has been asked by the government to reject the application on two grounds:  first, the shoplifting offenses put in reasonable dispute the sincerity of her religious conversion; second, the slight or speculative nature of any risk of harm to a Muslim convert to Christianity upon returning to Iran.
 
How do the government (in its administrative and enforcement activities) and the hearing officer (in conducting its quasi-judicial hearing) evaluate this matter?
 
Can the government decide that a convert's conversion is insincere because of continued instances of sin in the converser's life? 
 
I understand that the officer could look at the State Department country information for any particular country and make certain factual determinations about likelihood of persecution, and would want to receive any relevant testimony or evidence on this point.  And I understand that sincerity of belief is about the only thing that a court continues to have clear authority to decide based on evidence.  But how do we avoid the problem of confusing doctrine and practice in any particular religion, or in any sect of a religion?
 
This is not, by the way, just the basis of good exam question.  The matter is pending in Arlington, Virginia.
 
Jim Henderson
Senior Counsel
ACLJ
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