This is not the same as giving money to a synagogue or other religious
institution; a Jew can use food stamps for kosher food; and Hindu for
vegitarian food; a Moslem for Halal meat; but they should not be
allowed to give the stamps to their synagogue, temples, etc.
Rick Duncan wrote:
Or better yet, change the food stamp hypo to Kosher food. Why
should non-Jews be taxed to pay for Kosher observance? The answer, of
course, is that they are not being taxed to pay for Kosher
observance. They are being taxed to pay for food supplements for the
poor, including food stamp recipients who choose to keep a Kosher
kitchen.
The same with education taxes supporting school choice. No one
is being taxed to support religious instruction as such. Everyone is
being taxed to pay for education, and everyone gets a free
tax supported education up front in return for paying a lifetime of
educational taxes. Both Kosher education (in private religious
schools) and non-Kosher education (in all other schools) are equally
funded. There should be no strife at all, because everyone pays and
everyone receives. Indeed, the battles over the public school
curriculum we have been discussing would be less likely to occur (less
strife) if dissenting families could exit the public schools without
penalty.
The real strife is created when Jews are denied Kosher food in
the food stamp program and when families who choose private schools are
denied their fair slice of the K-12 educational benefit pie. I deeply
resent being forced to pay taxes to support a system which provides no
benefits to my children. I feel like a second class citizen. And many
millions more feel the same way.
Given the regulatory state in which we live—one that
requires that parents who send their children to religious private
school must pay for both the school tuition as well as taxes to fund
public schools--it seems to me that the principle from which Madison
drew his conclusion is not so easily dispositive in resolving this
dispute. Suppose, for example, it were discovered that food stamp
recipients were using some of them for the purchase of bread and grape
juice for Catholic Masses conducted in their homes. Would that violate
Madison’s principle, since the purchase results from money acquired
through taxing non-Catholics? Or would it be consistent with Madison’s
principle, since the purchase is the result of the free agency of the
citizen who received the food stamps rather than a result of a
government-directed order (as in the case of r! eligious assessments in
early America)? Suppose we change the “food stamps” to “school
vouchers” and the “bread and grape juice” to “Catholic school
admission”?
I’m not sure Madison is helpful here.
Frank
On 8/3/05 11:27 PM, "Paul Finkelman" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
I would suggest you reread
Madison's remonstrance on Religious freedom; one of the clear
motivating factors for the establishment clause was to preclude the
possibility that people would have to pay for other people's religion.
That was what was going on in Va and that, quite frankly, is what the
voucher system is all about; when tax money ends up in a religious
school, it means that taxpayers of one faith are forced to support the
religious schools of someone else. Madison understood how deeply
wrong, dangerous, and offensive that was. I am surprised that you and
Rick don't see this.
Paul Finkelman
Pybas, Kevin M wrote:
All of the comments are helpful,
but let me raise another question that is akin to the one Rick raised.
He asked
whether, why, and / or how
these motivations, or the
undesirability of such strife should be used to supply the
Establishment Clause's enforceable content.
WIth regard to neutral aid programs (as the Court characterizes them),
is it really religious strife that worries us? In other words, in the
context of the modern administrative state, are the conflicts over the
funding of education, for example, whether it be vouchers or the type
of aid at issue in Mitchell, really about religion, or
religiously-motivated in any sense? In other words, how do we tell the
difference between religously-motivated political strife and ordinary
political disagreements (I understand that the word "ordinary" may not
he all that helpful, but hopefully you see what I mean.)
________________________________
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] on behalf of Paul Finkelman
Sent: Wed 8/3/2005 5:08 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Re: religiously-motivated political strife
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Rick Duncan
Welpton Professor of Law
University of Nebraska College of Law
Lincoln, NE 68583-0902
"When the Round Table is broken every man must follow either Galahad or
Mordred: middle things are gone." C.S.Lewis, Grand Miracle
"I will not be pushed, filed, stamped, indexed, briefed, debriefed, or
numbered." --The Prisoner
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--
Paul Finkelman
Chapman Distinguished Professor of Law
University of Tulsa College of Law
3120 East 4th Place
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918-631-3706 (voice)
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