To answer the last couple questions I read...
Of course, the statute protects Muslim, Jewish, Buddhist chaplains too, and applies equally to mosques, temples, etc, not just churches.
Conscientious objectors are administratively discharged from service, often based on a chaplain's interview and recommendation, so that's another service we do provide, but we cannot advocate disobedience to military orders, which is rebellion.
We can't tell Sailors to disobey, but we can advise them to obey their conscience, and advocate with the commanding officer to respect their conscience, and he must then reasonably offer them discharge, unless he wants to throw them in jail, which most CO's won't do, because they don't want bad press for coersion against conscience, or allegations of religious harassment. Which is why they should always eagerly grant discharge, unless they want bad P.R. My CO failed this consideration, in forcing our Orthodox Sailor to remain in the Navy, ordering him to shave his beard, for example, when he cited a sincere religious objection. He should've granted discharge.
Civilian pastors can advocate rebellion (civil disobedience), as MLK Jr. did in many churches, without the government invading the church to punish his sermons. So I'll concede military chaplains have more limited (not wider) discretion under the 1st Amendment, when it comes to advocating rebellion, we cannot, while civilian pastors can. But treason and violence are entirely out, as Prime Minister Blair is now advocating to invade mosques to promote terrorism. I've no problem with that, if the pastor/imam is calling for treason or violence.
A military chaplain who's a rabbi, I think, can advocate for Israel, even if it contradicted political views of the administration, which was the entire point of the Rigdon vs. Perry trial, which sided with the chaplain, as I understand the ruling.
"Manner and form" is absolutely equivalent to "substance and content," despite Steve's attempted distinction. And he said a strange thing here, perhaps I misunderstood...
"I think chaplains have much broader latitude than the narrowest reading of the statute would permit, but I don't think this statute necessarily means as much as it might seem to."
Question: So if the 1st Amendment is the only thing that could override the statute (Title 10 Section 6031), but the 1st A. gives chaplains even broader latitude, then the statute would never be overturned, correct?
If the statute is valid, then federal judges must honor it, and side with the chaplain, always, because even the 1st A. requires the judge honor Title 10 Section 6031, which gives the chaplain autonomous rights during all public worship events.
If so, Sandy and Steve are conceding, I think, that my memorial service (defined as "public worship" within the meaning of the statute), lies entirely within the chaplain's autonomous discretion, according to the statute.
I may allow individual people to hold private opinions about whether or not I "erred in judgment" (I personally don't think I did, and I'd preach it again that way), but regardless, I will not allow the government to render an official judgment that quoting the Bible is an "error in judgment." Military officials just don't have that right, in their official capacity.
Their religious coersion and abuse of rank to enforce their faith upon me (and the deceased) is far more aggregious than anything I've heard of at the Air Force Academy, and far worse than any hurt feelings suffered by those who were "shocked" to hear the Bible quoted in the chapel.
Very respectfully,
Chaplain K.
Steven Jamar <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Sandy,First, I would need to interpret it to include things other than churches -- so rabbis, imams, and others can conduct services according to their own religious traditions for the most part._______________________________________________I don't think it extends to content like an imam saying "all good muslims will oppose the war in Iraq and refuse to go" or a Quaker or Buddhist advocating consciencious objection as the weekly diet of preaching or a Rabbi exhorting support for Israel and against the creation of a Palestinian state.All of these things happen in some mosques, synagogues, and meeting houses and could be claimed to be part of the "manner and form" of the religious tradition. But this highlights the distinction between "manner and form" on the one hand and substance and content on the other. So I could read the provision to be a formal one (singing, prayer, silence, whatever are allowed), but one where the government can censor what is said. That would be a permissible (though ill-advised, and I hope wrong) reading of the statute (leaving aside constitutional issues for a moment).Chaplains do not get carte blanche and this statute doesn't give it to them.As a matter of policy, and I would argue, constitutional protection of free exercise, I think chaplains have much broader latitude than the narrowest reading of the statute would permit, but I don't think this statute necessarily means as much as it might seem to.I have not researched the statute and am not an expert at all in military law or religion in the military, and so these comments are relatively off-the-cuff.SteveOn Oct 11, 2005, at 11:43 AM, Sanford Levinson wrote:
But the content of the worship must be free from regulation, as Title 10 Section 6031 clearly allows: "An officer in the chaplain corps may conduct public worship according to the manner and forms of the church of which he is a member." I've yet to hear Chip, Sandy, Alan, Steve, or Paul people acknowledge the legitimacy of this law. Were you a judge, would you uphold this law as written? I'm asking.I do think such a law is legitimate on its face. I suppose the one question is what happens if a particular service is thought to present a "threat" to the military along the lines we've been discussing. But this would clearly be case-by-case, fact-intensive, as opposed to challenging the law above on its face.sandy_______________________________________________To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.eduTo subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlawPlease note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
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Prof. Steven D. Jamar vox: 202-806-8017
Howard University School of Law fax: 202-806-8428
2900 Van Ness Street NW mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Washington, DC 20008 http://www.law.howard.edu/faculty/pages/jamar
"Nonviolence means avoiding not only external physical violence but also internal violence of spirit. You not only refuse to shoot a man, but you refuse to hate him."
Martin Luther King, Jr.
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