|
Alan: Doesn't it depend on what constitutes "studying Talmud." I
imagine one could study the Talmud as a legal commentary and not have
any interest in the religious aspects of it? Would it be ok if
faculty member said we will study Talmud, the Koran, some Christian
texts, and other religous texts to see how they relate to law? I am
not trying to be difficult here, but I envision the study group at UCLA
to be made up of people of different faiths interested in this complex
set of legal arguments. Indeed, if is studying Talmud for religious
purposes, then I am with you: it is an establishment clause violation. Paul Finkelman Alan Brownstein wrote: Good questions, Eugene. I'm glad to hear that students are studying Talmud at UCLA. And I doubt there is a problem with a faculty member joining them if they meet in an open classroom as a Jewish Study Group.But I have a problem with the faculty member organizing and leading a Talmud study group in his office and inviting students from his class to participate. (I also have a problem with a faculty member organizing and leading a Republican Party study group in his office and inviting students from his class to participate.) If the former isn't an Establishment clause violation, I think it comes close enough to be prohibited under the play in the joints analysis in Locke. As for the free exercise argument, if a prohibition against such study groups did not violate the free speech clause, there may be a real problem in holding that it violates the free exercise clause. We would need to know whether a prohibition against other group meetings would also be upheld under free speech clause, government as employer doctrine. If meetings involving other subjects and viewpoints could also be prohibited, can religious expressive activities receive greater protection under the free exercise clause than secular expressive activities receive under the free speech clause? Alan Brownstein -----Original Message----- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene Sent: Tuesday, November 08, 2005 2:06 PM To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Free Exercise Clause and government employees Alan asks some excellent points. I should say that there are sometimes Talmud study classes held during the day at UCLA law school; I don't think they're taught by a faculty member, but if there were a faculty member who wanted to teach them, I think that would be great, and I think it would also be great if students were invited. But let me ask a broader question; we've spoken so far about the Free Speech Clause, but it seems to me the Free Exercise Clause is also involved here. Holding a Bible study class in the place where one lives, it seems to me, is the exercise of religion. A rule that facially discriminates against such exercise of religion would thus presumptively implicate the Free Exercise Clause. See McDaniel v. Paty; Lukumi Babalu. Does Locke v. Davey rescue such a prohibition from invalidity? Does the Free Exercise Clause somehow not apply to discrimination against religious practices when the government is acting as employer? Eugene Alan Brownstein writes: -- Paul Finkelman Chapman Distinguished Professor of Law University of Tulsa College of Law 3120 East 4th Place Tulsa, OK 74105 918-631-3706 (voice) 918-631-2194 (fax) [EMAIL PROTECTED] |
_______________________________________________ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
