This is a puzzlement about the whole thread, not David's posting. How -- legally -- is the skating rink's position different from one that featured a "Celebrate Being White" night (or, to give a precise parallel in advertising, a "White Night at the Rink"), advertising that there'd be music from identifiably white performers and no rap or hip-hop (which I in my ignorance will assume are roughly correlated with non-white performers, Eminem to the contrary notwithstanding)? Is the thought that the proprietor in that case would indeed have just as strong a constitutional claim (a right of expressive association claim, I would think) as the proprietor here? Or that the state's interest in addressing perceived racial discrimination is demonstrably greater than its interest in addressing perceived religious discrimination (on the assumption, which seems correct, that in neither case would non-Christians or non-whites respectively be denied entry were they to show up)? If the latter, what's the warrant for a court's displacement of the legislative judgment that both forms of perceived discrimination are worth legal response? (Or, if you don't like "the legislative judgment" in that sentence, substitute a version that invokes Chevron-like deference to legal interpretations proferred by administrative agencies.) -- Mark Tushnet William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law Harvard Law School Areeda 223 Cambridge, MA 02138
Quoting David Cruz <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > > On Mon, 3 Jul 2006, Paul Finkelman wrote: > > > [snip] > > The other difference, of course, is that one IS religious and the other > > is not. It was not "Catholic night" at the ball park and I bet there > > were few priests bringing their sunday school class in for "Polish > > Catholic" night. > > If Paul's point is that religious sense's (or realities) of exclusion are > different from non-religious ones, that's contestable. Legally, however, > exclusion based on Polishness could well be ancestry or national origin > discrimination prohibited by some publica accommodations laws. > > In California, in order to make their Mother's Day promotions survive > state public accommodations law, baseball stadia have taken to noting in > fine print that the frilly pink Mother's Day tote would be available to > the first X number of patrons not just mothers. And one of the ACLU state > affiliates argued that a business owner had a First Amendment right to put > of a clearly exclusionary message as long as he did not actually > discriminate on that basis. > > David B. Cruz > Professor of Law > University of Southern California Gould School of Law > Los Angeles, CA 90089-0071 > > _______________________________________________ > To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu > To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see > http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw > > Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as > private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; > people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) > forward the messages to others. > _______________________________________________ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
