Justice Stevens during oral argument was pretty clear that RLUIPA in the
prison context just assured equal treatment of all faiths,not just those
Ohio chose to accommodate though its chaplaincy program..Since Stevens
views accommodation largely through the prism of discrimination,it is no
surprise he thought prison RLUIPA  constitutional.
Marc

________________________________

From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Douglas Laycock
Sent: Monday, June 23, 2008 1:06 PM
To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
Subject: Re: Justice Stevens



One possibility is that in Cutter and Gonzales, the equality protecting
function of religious exemptions was much more apparent.  Ohio openly
said that it accommodated good religions in its prisons, but not the bad
religions in which the plaintiffs participated; the state was pretty
explicitly arguing for its right to designate good and bad religions.
In Gonzales, the government never had a plausible explanation for why it
exempted peyote but not hoasca.  This sort of discrimination was not
developed in the record in Boerne, which was up basically on the
pleadings, and the city did not openly avow it the way Ohio did.

Another possibility is that he was just confused in Boerne, and, less
likely, that he eventually realized that.  He said that an art museum
owned by an atheist would not be protected by RFRA.  But of course, an
art museum owned by a Catholic almost certainly would not be protected
by RFRA either.  The relevant analogy to the church would be an atheist
meeting house, which should be protected by RFRA, although many judges
are reluctant to see it that way.

 

 

Quoting Kevin Pybas <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:

> Can someone shed light on why Justice Stevens in Boerne viewed RFRA as
a
> violation of the Establishment Clause but raised no EC problem with
RLUIPA
> in Cutter or RFRA in Gonzales?  In Boerne he wrote that RFRA "provided
the
> Church with a legal weapon that no atheist or agnostic can obtain.
This
> governmental preference for religion, as opposed to irreligion, is
forbidden
> by the First Amendment."   Shouldn't this understanding have led him
to also
> object in Cutter and Gonzales?  The answer's probably staring me in
the face
> but I don't see it.  Thanks.
>
>
>
> Kevin Pybas
>
> Missouri State University
>
>
>
>


 

Douglas Laycock
Yale Kamisar Collegiate Professor of Law
University of Michigan Law School
625 S. State St.
Ann Arbor, MI  48109-1215
  734-647-9713

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