I know from personal experience. From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Saperstein, David Sent: Monday, December 02, 2013 4:19 PM To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics Cc: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: The Establishment Clause, burden on others, the employer mandate, and the draft
And you'll be relieved to know that it was only a coincidence that seminary applications sky-rocketed beginning around 67. Sent from my iPhone On Dec 2, 2013, at 4:04 PM, "Marc Stern" <ste...@ajc.org<mailto:ste...@ajc.org>> wrote: There was also an exemption for divinity students. From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu> [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Douglas Laycock Sent: Monday, December 02, 2013 4:01 PM To: 'Law & Religion issues for Law Academics' Subject: RE: The Establishment Clause, burden on others, the employer mandate, and the draft Of course it's possible I am wrong. When they went to the lottery in 1969, that was certainly understood to be national - but I suppose the actual selections could have been by state. Before that, they were supposed to be taking the oldest men first (up through age 26, at which point you aged out), and I certainly thought at the time that it was on a national basis, but maybe not. If the answer is not in the Imus opinion or a source cited there, it might be deep in regulations from the 60s, or perhaps in a statute from the 60s. Of course the number of student deferments dwarfed the number of conscientious objectors and Mormon missionaries. Only the latter could be attacked with Establishment Clause arguments. Douglas Laycock Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of Law University of Virginia Law School 580 Massie Road Charlottesville, VA 22903 434-243-8546 From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu> [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Michael Worley Sent: Monday, December 02, 2013 3:46 PM To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: The Establishment Clause, burden on others, the employer mandate, and the draft Some at the time of Vietnam thought otherwise: In Imus v. United States 447 F.2d 1008 (10th Cir. 1971), drafted Utahns where LDS Missionaries got an exemption claimed "The appellees assert in effect that the classification of the missionaries as ministers during the period of their service served to reduce the number of men eligible for service and thus made appellees' induction more likely." The Court reversed an injunction, relying upon a Supreme Court summary affirmance in another case, Boyd v. Clark 393 U.S. 316 (1969), where "The plaintiffs asserted that by reason of the number of men student deferments they were more likely to be inducted." Imus, 474 F.2d at 1009. The classification in Imus was "on behalf of all Selective Service Registrants in this State of Utah"-- so Imus thought Utahns were harmed more. Were the Plaintiffs just wrong in Imus? It would seem odd for a case to be appealed if everyone knew it was over n+1 instead of b. (I realize this is a question of fact; If the Plaintiffs in Imus were wrong, I withdraw my line of reasoning here.) Michael On Mon, Dec 2, 2013 at 1:27 PM, Douglas Laycock <dlayc...@virginia.edu<mailto:dlayc...@virginia.edu>> wrote: The draft pool was effectively local, as you envision it, through the Civil War. Each county was given a quota to fill. I think it was nationalized for World War I, but I don't really know. It was certainly nationalized by the time of Vietnam. Local boards administered the classification system, but all those classified I-A went into a national pool from which draftees were selected. It was called the Selective Service System, and your draft letter began, "Greetings! You have been selected . . ." So for every person granted conscientious objector status, your odds of being drafted went from n over however many million in the denominator to n + 1 over that denominator. Considered at that stage, the increase was infinitesimal. Somewhere there was a guy who got drafted who otherwise would not have been, but it was impossible to identify that person. Douglas Laycock Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of Law University of Virginia Law School 580 Massie Road Charlottesville, VA 22903 434-243-8546<tel:434-243-8546> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu> [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu>] On Behalf Of Michael Worley Sent: Monday, December 02, 2013 12:48 PM To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: The Establishment Clause, burden on others, the employer mandate, and the draft Maybe I misunderstand how the draft worked (I am quite young), but it would seem to me that a local draft board would not be much bigger than an insurance plan in size (indeed, for Hobby Lobby, the draft board would seem smaller), and thus, Gedicks' and Van Tassel's claim that "a person's decision making calculus," would not be affected seems incorrect in the sense that identifiability of who is burdened (and thus, the ability of a person to make such changes in response to a objector)is just as strong in the draft case, if not stronger. On Mon, Dec 2, 2013 at 10:18 AM, Micah Schwartzman <mj...@virginia.edu<mailto:mj...@virginia.edu>> wrote: Eugene's suggestion that the religious exemption from the contraception mandate be analogized to the draft protester cases is anticipated by Gedicks and Van Tassell in their article, RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2328516). Gedicks and Van Tassel argue that the burden of the exemption is not material because it would not affect the decision-making of non-pacificists in considering whether to participate in the draft. That is because the burden is minor and remote -- for any individual, a small number of exemptions amounts to a minor increase in the probability of being selected for the draft. Whethers Gedicks and Van Tassel are right, there is at least the difference that the burden of the religious exemption from the contraception mandate, like the burden in Caldor, falls clearly and specifically on identifiable individuals. It is a separate question whether broadening the exemption to include non-religious objectors would cure a possible constitutional defect under the Establishment Clause. If the reason for broadening the exemption is a based on a sham purpose -- that is, if it is broadened only for the purpose of saving an otherwise unconstitutional exemption, rather than to accommodate non-religious objectors (as in Seeger) -- I wonder whether that is (or should be?) permissible. It could be framed as a form of constitutional avoidance, but, given the history, it might also look like an impermissible purpose. _______________________________________________ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu> To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. -- Michael Worley BYU Law School, Class of 2014 _______________________________________________ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu> To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. -- Michael Worley BYU Law School, Class of 2014 _______________________________________________ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu> To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
_______________________________________________ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
