I am not suggesting that "divisiveness" should be a rule of decision. Rather the purpose of the religion clauses is to allow people with strong, differing views live together in reasonable harmony. Thus in interpreting religious exemptions the Court needs to keep that principle in mind. Perhaps the Hobby Lobby decision itself is not important, but it will set a precedent. As far as I am concerned medical insurance provided by the employer is compensation and the employer should not be able to limit an employee's use of compensation. If the religious view that enabling someone else to get an abortion, or birth control that the employer, but not the medical profession, regards as abortion, then almost any arguably religious based claim must be upheld. That, I suggest, would give people defining their own religious beliefs an exemption to interfere with the rights of others. And a country where religious people, but not others, need not obey the general laws of the land is not the way to help the religious and the non-religious live together in reasonable peace. So what I am talking about is not the consequences of any one decision, but of a general interpretation of religious exemptions.

I do realize that Congress has the right to enact federal law with exceptions, but as with conscientious objection, I do not think it is proper to treat non-religious people unequally. I have never seen an argument that the due process clause limits the religion clauses although I have seen equal protection reasoning use in free speech cases.

Someone (maybe off-list) suggested that treating for-profit companies like non-profit groups and allowing them to put the cost of coverage on the insurance companies on the theory that there is no significant cost to the companies of covering contraception would solve the problem. But as I understand it, the Little Sisters of the Poor will not certify that they have a religious objection to covering abortion because that certification would facilitate their employees in obtaining such services.

Finally, I realize that there are many other problems with other freedoms stemming from mandated health insurance coverage. For example, should employers be allowed to refuse to hire smokers, or people who eat junk food, or who drink the "Big Gulp" at fast food places? There was a case argued before the NY Court of Appeals last week about whether the Board of Health in New York City had the power to prohibit serving sodas in containers larger than a specified size. But I realize this goes beyond the list. To avoid an inconsistency argument in stating that employers should not control the use of compensation by employees based on the employers' religious views I mention this. I know there might be competing considerations in other areas. And I am not taking a position on them now.

                                                       Jon

On 2014-06-08 19:54, Volokh, Eugene wrote:
I agree very much with Tom on this point.  In most controversies,
both sides are acting in ways that could plausibly be labeled as
"divisive."  Government religious speech may be seen as "divisive,"
because it may alienate members of other religious groups; but
prohibitions on such speech, or litigation seeking such prohibition,
may be as divisive or more so.  A pro-Hobby-Lobby decision might be
divisive, but an anti-Hobby-Lobby decision might be divisive. Indeed,
academic criticism of a pro-Hobby-Lobby decision (or an
anti-Hobby-Lobby decision) might be divisive -- and so was the
implementation of the mandate without a broad religious exemption, as
Tom points out.  The Employment Division v. Smith regime can be seen
as divisive -- but the RFRA regime, or the Sherbert regime, which
makes controversial judicially implemented religious accommodations
possible, can apparently be divisive, too.

        Indeed, in my experience, most people -- I speak generally here, and
not with a focus on this list -- can easily see the potential
"divisiveness" of decisions they dislike on substantive grounds, but
don't even notice the divisiveness of decisions they think are sound.
After all, if one thinks a decision is sound, it's easy to view those
who disagree as just unreasonable, so that their feelings of
alienation don't really count (since they deserved to lose, and are
now just being sore losers).

        Of course,

        Eugene

Tom Berg writes:

I get those arguments, but they don't really seem to rest on a ruling for Hobby Lobby being "divisive"--they rest on it being (assertedly) substantively wrong. One could just as easily charge the Obama administration with being "divisive" (undermining "harmony," to use Jon's term) by adopting the mandate in the first place. (See Rick Garnett's piece on why arguments about divisiveness should do
only very limited work in religion cases.)
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