As Marty notes, this is a different issue, although it is still an important one. I take Eugene’s most recent post to focus not on whether audience members are being coerced, but whether they are coerced into engaging in religious exercise.
There are situations where one stands for secular reasons. We stand when the judge walks into court. We stand to express patriotic commitments when the national anthem is played. We do not stand to respect the institution and practices of town boards. We don’t stand when the board comes in. We don’t stand when the members speak. We don’t stand when citizens speak to the Board during public comment. When we are asked to stand when clergy offer a prayer in our name, if we stand in response to that request we are doing something different than we usually do that reflects the religious nature of what is going on. This is particularly true because standing and other bodily motions are so much a part of religious worship and the act of prayer. In Town of Greece, we have clergy communicating to the audience using the same language they use when they address their congregation in their house of worship. The Court concedes this. The audience is asked to respond in the very much same way they would be asked to respond in a worship service. Many audience members stand, bow their heads and join in the prayer – clearly recognizing that they are being asked to participate in a religious exercise. The prayer is offered in the name of everyone in the audience. I simply do not understand how standing in such circumstances should be seen as anything other than religious exercise. Certainly, if the audience was ordered to stand I would argue they were being compelled to participate in a religious exercise. As Marty’s last comment suggests, if religious minorities were guests in the communities in which they live and were allowed to attend public meetings by virtue of a privilege granted by civil authorities, there might be a reason to view their conduct as having a distinct meaning – as is the case when one visits the house of worship of another faith. And that is the message—that minorities are guests, not respected members of the community-- communicated by the town of Greece in its policies and by the Court in this case. Alan From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu> [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Marty Lederman Sent: Monday, July 07, 2014 2:05 PM To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Town of Greece and coercion That's a different point, I think. I assume you'd agree that you'd remain standing not only because you think it's the right thing to do (out of respect for the institution), but also because there would be a steep price to pay if you were to sit down. So there certainly is substantial coercion. Now, I agree with you -- it's not coercion to pray, or even to feign praying. But for some people, it would be coercion to do something their religion forbids or strongly discourages -- namely, to act as though you are a willing part of the assemblage in whose name a god is being invoked, without objecting when Jesus is described as "our" savior who has "restored" "our" lives. When I am in someone else's church, of course I do not find it objectionable to stand respectfully. But when standing in the Court or city council of our own government?
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