Vik Amar and I wrote a lengthy column on this case several years ago:

The Establishment Clause and the Free Speech Clause in the Context of the Texas 
High School Cheerleader Religious Banner Dispute

Nov. 9, 2012 Justia.com Verdict.


Our conclusion was that the cheerleaders should lose under either an 
Establishment clause or a Free Speech analysis.


Alan

________________________________
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu <religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu> 
on behalf of Marty Lederman <lederman.ma...@gmail.com>
Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 10:42 AM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Re: Texas Cheerleaders display Bible Verses on banners

Herewith, the briefs in the Texas Supreme Court:

Cheerleaders’ 
Brief<http://www.search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=12062a65-65f9-44a7-90b6-34da0e0da7a9&coa=cossup&DT=BRIEFS&MediaID=e616b07e-b3f3-4eef-90dd-b2cba8d2f314>

School District 
Brief<http://www.search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=d7ea2ab0-e759-427a-b556-1f4d5ff98e5e&coa=cossup&DT=BRIEFS&MediaID=32959254-780a-4281-8466-c85de7f3a51a>,
 which argues that the case is moot, and then, at the end, that even though the 
speech is that of the school district, it does not violate the EC, citing van 
Orden

Brief for Amici Ted Cruz and John 
Cornyn<http://www.search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=1c3a29d2-b5cd-4eb7-ae65-1fd44d76446b&coa=cossup&DT=BRIEFS&MediaID=5ac602e8-a411-4817-a4d4-c843b3105c63>,
 arguing that it’s not an EC violation because it’s private speech

Brief for Amicus the State of 
Texas<http://www.search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=a5de5583-3992-4a47-88a1-38830c404ae3&coa=cossup&DT=BRIEFS&MediaID=1c6fed76-baaa-4e0d-be8c-a8461347a613>,
 also arguing that it’s private speech

Brief for Amicus the American Jewish 
Committee<http://www.search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=beff7107-86be-41e8-9ee0-840da8e804b3&coa=cossup&DT=BRIEFS&MediaID=4c71abeb-3d45-4e82-bcc5-a6863b853abf>,
 arguing that the case is moot but that, on the merits, the trial court reached 
the wrong result on the Establishment Clause issue, “in the absence of genuine 
adversary argument”

Brief for Amici ACLU and Americans 
United<http://www.search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=c9491c85-166e-4b5d-b02d-bb2f0970e3f9&coa=cossup&DT=BRIEFS&MediaID=a62bbd06-6536-4b95-8b5c-38c2c973ad8a>,
 arguing that it’s an EC violation

Reply Brief for the 
Cheerleaders<http://www.search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=c31bbddb-6a69-490b-b73e-8032cbf8f6a0&coa=cossup&DT=BRIEFS&MediaID=e6ba8867-e8f9-479c-be22-8766c71d1d66>

On Sat, Jan 30, 2016 at 1:24 PM, Marty Lederman 
<lederman.ma...@gmail.com<mailto:lederman.ma...@gmail.com>> wrote:
Here's what's happened in this very confusing case.  Warning:  It's not very 
comprehensible.  But what is clear is that no court has (thus far) actually 
adjudicated any substantive dispute, on the merits, about any state or federal 
constitutional question:

1.  The cheerleaders of the Kountze Independent School District (KISD)
have traditionally constructed and displayed "run-through" banners that KISD 
players tear through as they storm the field before every game.  For years, the 
cheerleaders have placed inspirational religious messages on the banners, often 
based on Bible verses, e.g.:

“A lion, which is strongest among beasts and turns not away from any.”
“I can do all things through Christ who strengthens me.”
“If God is for us, who can be against us?”
“But thanks be to God which gives us victory through our Lord Jesus Christ.”

2.  Freedom from Religion Foundation sent a letter to KISD, arguing that the 
practice violates the EC.  The District, apparently without conceding the FRF 
constitutional claim prohibited the signs, at least for the purpose of heading 
off an FRF lawsuit.

3.  The cheerleaders then sued the District, under the State Constitution free 
speech and free exercise clauses, and obtained a P.I.

4.  The District then determined that the EC does not bar the practice, and 
rescinded its prohibition on the display of religious messages, while 
continuing to assert that it has an "unfettered" authority to prohibit the 
content of such signs.

5. At this point, on summary judgment, the trial court issued a "declaratory" 
judgment, agreed to by both the District and the cheerleaders, that in relevant 
part states “[n]either the Establishment Clause nor any other law prohibits the 
cheerleaders from using religious-themed banners at school sporting events.”  
(Again:  Neither party argued that the EC does bar such banners.)

6.  After the judgment was issued, the cheerleaders claimed that the order 
effectively confirmed their state constitutional right to speak -- that it is 
private speech -- but District officials insisted that it only resolved the EC 
question, and that the court had not precluded the district from theoretically 
limiting the content of the banners, because it is government-controlled 
speech.  Because of this dispute, the cheerleaders apparently took an 
interlocutory appeal, although it's not at all obvious what they were appealing 
from, since they approved of the trial court's declaratory order.

7.  The only issue the Texas Supreme Court decided is that the case is not 
moot.  It did not reach the merits of the state law free speech and free 
exercise claims, let alone opine on the lurking Establishment Clause question.:

http://www.txcourts.gov/media/1284936/140453.pdf

(One Justice, concurring separately, signaled that she would rule for the 
cheerleaders on their own constitutional claims, and/or in defense to a 
hypothetical EC claim:  http://www.txcourts.gov/media/1284938/140453c2.pdf)

8.  So what's to do on remand?  Who knows?  One of the Texas Supreme Court 
judges, concurring, wrote:  "My concern is that this case may return to the 
trial court for a final decision only to reappear on our docket with no clarity 
as to what this order achieves and what claims are actually live. If that 
situation arises, the parties and trial court would do well to confront the 
shadowy place in this litigation and clarify with precision the status of this 
order and the cheerleaders’ claims."



On Sat, Jan 30, 2016 at 12:35 PM, Ira Lupu 
<icl...@law.gwu.edu<mailto:icl...@law.gwu.edu>> wrote:
Following up -- This case was litigated in the state courts.  Once the 
cheerleader religious banners start flying at football games next fall (or 
basketball games right now), are there any doctrines of preclusion that would 
stop Freedom from Religion Foundation or others from litigating the 
Establishment Clause claim, against these public school districts, in the 
federal courts?  In light of Santa Fe School District v. Doe, the claim looks 
awfully strong to me.  Perhaps it would be difficult to find a plaintiff, even 
a Jane Doe plaintiff, because of fear of reprisals. But the situation seems 
constitutionally repulsive to me, and it's very sad if fear chases away all the 
potential plaintiffs.

On Sat, Jan 30, 2016 at 12:15 PM, Ira Lupu 
<icl...@law.gwu.edu<mailto:icl...@law.gwu.edu>> wrote:
Steve Jamar is absolutely right, and the Texas Supreme Court is quite wrong.  
Cheers uttered, and banners carried, by cheerleaders during a public high 
school football game are school sponsored speech. Does anyone on the list think 
the First Amendment would bar the school from ordering cheerleaders not to 
carry a sign that said "Feel the Bern -- beat Austin HS!"?  The school is 
responsible for the content of these banners, and a school sponsored banner 
that reads "“I can do all things through Christ, who strengthens me,” as one of 
them did, is a violation of the Establishment Clause.

On Sat, Jan 30, 2016 at 11:42 AM, Steven Jamar 
<stevenja...@gmail.com<mailto:stevenja...@gmail.com>> wrote:
Seems to me there is an establishment problem here.  Cheerleaders are sponsored 
by the school and are displaying religious messages to a captive audience who 
could choose to forego attending the game or else putting up with the religious 
banners.

Has the free speech approach become so dominant that stopping such displays 
becomes content-based discrimination and avoiding establishing religion doesn’t 
meet strict scrutiny as a reason to infringe on such speech?

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/texas-top-court-sides-with-cheerleaders-in-bible-banner-suit/2016/01/29/0939bbce-c6b7-11e5-b933-31c93021392a_story.html
--
Prof. Steven D. Jamar
Howard University School of Law
vox:  202-806-8017<tel:202-806-8017>
fax:  202-806-8567<tel:202-806-8567>
http://sdjlaw.org

Two quotes from Louis Armstrong:
"You blows who you is."
"If ya ain't got it in ya, ya can't blow it out."


_______________________________________________
To post, send message to 
Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu>
To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see 
http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw

Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private.  
Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can 
read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the 
messages to others.



--
Ira C. Lupu
F. Elwood & Eleanor Davis Professor of Law, Emeritus
George Washington University Law School
2000 H St., NW
Washington, DC 20052
(202)994-7053<tel:%28202%29994-7053>
Co-author (with Professor Robert Tuttle) of "Secular Government, Religious 
People" ( Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2014))
My SSRN papers are here:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=181272#reg



--
Ira C. Lupu
F. Elwood & Eleanor Davis Professor of Law, Emeritus
George Washington University Law School
2000 H St., NW
Washington, DC 20052
(202)994-7053<tel:%28202%29994-7053>
Co-author (with Professor Robert Tuttle) of "Secular Government, Religious 
People" ( Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2014))
My SSRN papers are here:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=181272#reg

_______________________________________________
To post, send message to 
Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu>
To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see 
http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw

Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private.  
Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can 
read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the 
messages to others.


_______________________________________________
To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see 
http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw

Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private.  
Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can 
read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the 
messages to others.

Reply via email to