Thanks; I recognize the underlying question left open from Smith of whether the 
existence of any exemptions (scientific research) but no religious exemption 
triggers strict scrutiny.

Mike

From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Monday, October 10, 2016 1:41 AM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics <religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu>
Subject: RE: "California Court Issues TRO Against Kaporos Practices"

               I think that's right -- but I'm curious about whether there 
would indeed be viable objections to a criminal prosecution, whether for 
violation of the injunction or for violation of the underlying statute.  (I 
assume that prosecution for violation of an injunction is more likely than 
prosecution for violation of the statute, but I agree that the legal arguments 
would be pretty similar.)

               Eugene

From: 
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu> 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Michael Masinter
Sent: Sunday, October 9, 2016 8:18 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics 
<religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu>>
Subject: Re: "California Court Issues TRO Against Kaporos Practices"

Eugene,

I recall that CA does not follow the collateral bar rule. If that's true, then 
can't the Chabad pursue a two track strategy--try to have the injunction 
vacated tomorrow, and failing that, just ignore it and defend any ensuing 
criminal contempt (or implausible remedial civil contempt proceeding) by 
contesting the validity of the injunction?

Mike Masinter
masin...@nova.edu<mailto:masin...@nova.edu>

Sent from my iPhone

On Oct 9, 2016, at 2:44 PM, Volokh, Eugene 
<vol...@law.ucla.edu<mailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu>> wrote:

>From 
>http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2016/10/california-court-issues-tro-against.html:

As previously reported, in late September an animal rights group filed suit 
against Chabad of Irvine in a California federal district court challenging 
Chabad's promotion of the pre-Yom Kippur ceremony of kaporos that involves use 
of live chickens which are then slaughtered. (Complaint in United Poultry 
Concerns v. Chabad of Irvine, (CD CA, filed 9/29/2016)). The complaint 
contended that defendants are in violation of California's unfair business 
practices law. On Oct. 6, the court on its own motion ordered plaintiff to show 
cause why the case should not be dismissed for lack of standing. (Full text of 
court order.) On Oct. 7, plaintiff filed a response (full text) arguing in part:

               UPC has standing under the Unfair Competition Law based on its 
diversion of organizational resources spent addressing Defendants' unlawful 
activity and attempting to convince authorities to take action.

The court was apparently convinced. It issued another order (full text 
[https://www.scribd.com/document/326967590/Upc-v-Chabad-Tro]) on Oct 7 granting 
plaintiff a temporary restraining order barring defendants from killing 
chickens or other animals in exchange for a fee or donation in violation of 
California Penal Code Sec. 597(a). It set a hearing on whether to order a 
preliminary injunction for October 13, the day after Yom Kippur-- effectively 
barring the pre-Yom Kippur practice by defendants for this year.
Any thoughts on how to analyze this?  Note that sec. 597(a) generally bans 
killing animals, but excludes killings allowed under sec. 599c:

No part of this title shall be construed as interfering with any of the laws of 
this state known as the "game laws," or any laws for or against the destruction 
of certain birds, nor must this title be construed as interfering with the 
right to destroy any venomous reptile, or any animal known as dangerous to 
life, limb, or property, or to interfere with the right to kill all animals 
used for food, or with properly conducted scientific experiments or 
investigations performed under the authority of the faculty of a regularly 
incorporated medical college or university of this state.

I take it that, if the kaporos chicken were eaten after being slaughtered, the 
action would not be illegal, and the injunction would not cover the sale of the 
chicken.  But according to the plaintiff's papers, it appears that the chickens 
are not being eaten -- partly because plaintiffs had earlier argued that the 
carcasses were "unsanitary" -- but are instead being "rendered into fertilizer."

I'm inclined to think that these exceptions don't stop the law from being a law 
of general applicability for Employment Division v. Smith purposes, because 
they aren't focused on singling out religious practice for special burdens.  
(They do favor some secular practices over religious practices, but I think 
that's OK, as it is for a vast range of other laws that have many secular 
exceptions, such as Title VII, copyright law, the duty to testify, and many 
more.)  But I'd love to hear what others think.

Note also that California courts have not yet decided whether the California 
Constitution's religious freedom provision should be interpreted using the 
Sherbert/Yoder model -- though, given the current liberal retreat from the old 
Justice Brennan/ACLU position, I suspect that California courts will follow 
Justice Scalia rather than Justice Brennan on this.

Eugene
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