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Himal - Southasian
November 2005

Analysis

BLINDED BY THE BOMB

Against all civilisational values, Islamabad and New Delhi proceed to 
prepare their bombs and missiles - for nuclear war to be fought on 
our soil.

by  Zia Mian


For decades, leaders of India and Pakistan have been bewitched by the 
power of the bomb. Regardless of their various other differences, 
they seem to have believed that the threat of massive destruction 
represented by nuclear weapons is a force for good, and that the 
weapons themselves are vital to the well-being of their respective 
countries. President A P J Abdul Kalam, for instance, has claimed 
that nuclear weapons are "truly weapons of peace". For his part, 
President Pervez Musharraf has declared that his country's nuclear 
weapons are as critical and important as national security, the 
economy and Kashmir.

For those not blinded by the Bomb, however, the pursuit of nuclear 
weapons has brought nothing but a competition in destructive 
capabilities and crisis after crisis. The Cold War seemed proof 
enough, but the lessons have been lost to those who rule in India and 
Pakistan. New Delhi's nuclear ambitions have served only to encourage 
Islamabad to follow blindly. The 1974 nuclear test at Pokhran 
sharpened Pakistan's determination not to be left behind and, as many 
had feared, the bomb was not willing to be left in the shadows for 
long. First India and then Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in May 
1998.

Things went from bad to worse. The Kargil War followed barely a year 
afterwards, proving that two nuclear armed countries could indeed 
fight wars - contrary to the suggestions of some. Many hundreds of 
soldiers died on each side, as the leadership in the two countries 
threatened apocalypse. A little over two years later, India and 
Pakistan prepared to fight again. An estimated half-million troops 
were rushed to the border and, as days turned into weeks and months, 
nuclear threats were made with abandon. What lessons were learned 
from the extended standoff at the border? None, it seems - other than 
perhaps that each country needed to be better prepared to fight a 
nuclear war.

In 2005, both countries carried out major war games that assumed the 
possible use of nuclear weapons. An India-Pakistan nuclear war, in 
which each used only five of their available nuclear weapons, would 
kill an estimated three million people and severely injure another 
one-and-a-half million. Meanwhile, even as Southasian and world 
public opinion press both countries to step back from the nuclear 
brink, New Delhi and Islamabad respond with efforts to portray 
themselves as 'responsible' nuclear states. At the same time, they 
continue to push forward as hard as possible with their arms race.

The abyss between words and deeds was clear from the first public 
show of nuclear responsibility - the 1999 Lahore summit between prime 
ministers Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Mian Nawaz Sharif. Even though the 
two men had ordered their nuclear establishments to undertake tests 
barely a year earlier, in Lahore they discussed "sharing a vision of 
peace and stability" and "progress and prosperity" for their peoples. 
The summit produced little in the way of tangible progress on 
controlling the nuclear arms race. The two states did agree to inform 
each other about ballistic missile tests, but it was only in October 
2005 that they finally followed through on that agreement. Even so, 
the accord does nothing to limit the future development or testing of 
missiles.

War games
The Subcontinent is in the middle of a missile race. Both India and 
Pakistan have tested various types of missiles in recent years, even 
taking initial steps towards the deployment of nuclear-armed 
missiles. India has introduced the 2000 km-range Agni-II missile into 
its arsenal. Pakistan has done the same with the 750 km Shaheen 
missile, as well as having tested the 1500 km Ghauri. These missiles 
would need as little as five minutes of flight time to reach 
important cities in the 'opposing' countries.

Just as happened during the Cold War between the United States and 
the Soviet Union, in Southasia the development of these missiles has 
triggered a frantic search for a defence shield, as well as a counter 
to such a defence. India has sought ballistic missile defences from 
Russia, Israel and the US to neutralise Pakistan's missiles. Pakistan 
has responded by testing a 500 km-range ground-launched cruise 
missile, which General Musharraf linked to concerns about Indian 
plans: "There was a feeling that there was an imbalance, which is 
being created because of the purchase of very advanced-technology 
weapons ... Let me say this improves the balance."

The quest for advantage triggers the quest for balance and on it 
goes. It is no surprise that military budgets in both India and 
Pakistan have spiralled since the nuclear tests began. India spent 
over INR 2.2 trillion on its military between 2000 and 2004. Gen 
Musharraf has revealed that Pakistan has spent more since 2000 on its 
nuclear arsenal than it had in the previous 30 years.

The future looks worse. In June 2005, the US and India signed a 
10-year defence-cooperation agreement, which involves the sale of 
advanced weapons and assistance to both India's space and nuclear 
programmes. As a senior US official explained: "[Our] goal is to help 
India become a major world power in the 21st century," adding, "We 
understand fully the implications, including military implications, 
of that statement." The agreement's purpose was made clear when 
former US ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill, asked, "Why should 
the US want to check India's missile capability in ways that could 
lead to China's permanent nuclear dominance over democratic India?"

The June decision was followed in July with a more explicit nuclear 
deal, in which the Bush administration agreed to overturn US and 
international regulations that have for decades restricted India's 
access to uranium, the raw material for both nuclear fuel and nuclear 
weapons. For its part, India will separate its military and civil 
nuclear facilities and programmes and will volunteer its civil 
facilities for inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA). The US has not asked India to halt the production of nuclear 
weapons material as part of the deal; India is unlikely to do so. 
Access to the international uranium market would allow India to free 
up more of its domestic uranium for a significant expansion of its 
nuclear weapons capabilities. India's options could, for example, 
include building a third nuclear reactor to make plutonium for more 
weapons; beginning to make highly-enriched uranium for weapons; or 
making fuel for the nuclear submarine it has been trying to build for 
decades.

Pakistan has now asked for the same deal from the United States. 
Former army chief Jahangir Karamat, now ambassador to the US, has 
warned: "The balance of power in Southasia should not become so 
tilted in India's favour, as a result of the US relationship with 
India, that Pakistan has to start taking extraordinary measures to 
ensure a capability for deterrence and defence." The US has refused 
Islamabad's request, citing, among other things, Pakistan's role in 
spreading nuclear weapons technologies to North Korea, Libya and 
Iran, and its refusal to come clean on the A Q Khan affair. Despite 
all the talk of a 'minimum deterrent', Pakistan may now seek to 
prepare for an expansion of its own programme. A former Pakistani 
foreign secretary has even argued that Islamabad "should refine its 
deterrent capability by stepping up research and development and by 
integrating strategic assets on land, air and sea - though even that 
project would be costly and take years."

Time of madmen
The increasingly powerful nuclear weapons complex in both India and 
Pakistan is overwhelming good sense and derailing the possibility of 
peace. On both sides, with similarly narrow goals, nuclear weapons 
proponents are driving the Subcontinent ever faster down the path 
toward bigger and more dangerous nuclear arsenals and war. The time 
has come for us to echo the words of the American sociologist Lewis 
Mumford, writing soon after the dawn of the nuclear age: "Madmen 
govern our affairs in the name of order and security. The chief 
madmen claim the titles of general, admiral, senator, scientist, 
administrator, Secretary of State, even President."

If Southasia is to survive its own nuclear age, we will need strong 
peace movements in both Pakistan and India, as well as throughout the 
rest of Southasia. The first steps have already been taken. The 
Pakistan Peace Coalition, founded in 1999, is a national network of 
groups working for peace and justice. On the other side of the 
border, Indian activists in 2000 established the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament and Peace. These movements will need all the help and 
support that they can get to keep the generals, presidents and prime 
ministers in check. Leaders in India and Pakistan must be firmly told 
that the people will not allow a nuclear war to be fought.

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SOUTH ASIANS AGAINST NUKES (SAAN):
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