http://edwardjayepstein.com/KSMQuestions.htm
Question:
In his 2004 State of the Union Speech, President Bush named the
"mastermind of September 11th:" Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (who had been
captured in Pakistan in March 2003.)
According to "leaks" from the U.S. government to the Associated Press,
KSM is now not only talking to his American interrogators but supplying them
with details of the plot. If so, he is presumably in a position to cast
light on some of the key issues that now confront the 9-11 Commission. What
questions should the Commission put to the KSM?
Answer:
Since KSM has been identified by the U.S. as the controlling case
officer for both Ramzi Yousef, who helped organize the attack on the World
Trace Center in 1993, and Mohammed Atta, who helped organized the attack on
the World Trade Center in 2001, he can clarify the planning,
intelligence-gathering and logical support that aided both attacks.
Questions for him should include:
1) You were indicted by a U.S. Grand Jury 1996 for plotting to destroying
12 U.S. airliners. At that time, your chief subordinate, Ramzi Yousef, had
been operating under a stolen Kuwaiti identity-- "Abdul Basit Karim"-- and
documentation backing up that identity legend, including Yousef's
fingerprints, had been inserted in Kuwait's records when they were in the
hands of the Iraq Intelligence Service. Why did the Iraq Intelligence
Service provide this service to your subordinate? Did you yourself, or any
other of your operatives, receive similar assistance in maintaining false
identities from Iraq? If so, what was the quid pro quo of the assistance?
2) Farouk Hijazi, the Iraqi Foreign Intelligence chief, met in in
Afghanistan in March 1998 with top Al-Qaeda leaders. Did he offer further
assistance in providing Al-Qaeda operatives false identities? If so, was
this offer accepted, and were these identities delivered?
3) Mohammed Atta applied for a Czech visa in May 2000 after receiving a U.S.
visa. On May 30th-- one day before the visa arrived-- Atta flew to the
Prague International Airport to spend 5 hours in the transit lounge and then
hereturned to Hamburg. What was the purpose of Atta's brief trip? Why was
it so time-sensitive that he could not wait until May 31, when his visa
arrived? Who did he meet in the transit lounge? Why did Atta return to
Prague on June 2, 2000, before he proceeded on his mission to America?
4) On April 4, 2001, Atta checked out of the Diplomat Inn in Virginia
Beach, Virginia, and withdrew $8,000 in cash from his account at the
Suntrust Bank-- the largest cash withdrawal he made-- and then disappeared
for at least a week. Was this withdrawal authorized by KSM? If so, what was
its purpose?
5) On April 8th, 2001, a Czech counterintelligence watcher identified Atta
in Prague. Was Atta authorized to be in Prague at this time? If so, what
was the purpose of his trip? What identity did he use to leave and re-enter
the United States? Who did he meet on this trip?
6) A number of the 9-11 hijackers were supplied with false identities. For
example, Atta's traveling companion used the stolen identity of Abdulaziz
Alomari (a Saudi engineer, whose passport had been reported stolen in 1995
in Colorado). How many false identities do the conspiracy obtain for the
hijackers and their logistical supporters? Were they backed up with
documented legends, as in the case of Ramzi Yousef? Who supplied these
false identities and back-up documentation?
7) On September 10, 2001, Atta and "Alomari" drove from Boston to Portland,
Maine, and booked themselves onto a commuter flight back to Boston on
September 11th. If that commuter flight was delayed by an hour, they would
not have been able to participate in the 9-11 attack. What circumstances
justified al-Qaeda taking this risk? What was the purpose of the trip to
Portland?
Corollary Question:
Why has the 9-11 Commission been denied access, even over a remote
television hook-up, to the "mastermind"?
