Bob Ham wrote:
> Adds support for the Araneus Alea I USB hardware Random Number
> Generator. This RNG creates entropy at a high rate, about 100kb/s.
>
> Signed-off-by: Bob Ham
> ---
>
> +++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/alea.c
Why didn't you just add the device ID to chaoskey.c?
(Because that one is
Stephan Mueller wrote:
> Am Donnerstag, 7. November 2013, 02:03:57 schrieb Nicholas Mc Guire:
>> On Wed, 06 Nov 2013, Stephan Mueller wrote:
>>> Besides, how on earth shall an attacker even gain knowledge about the
>>> state of the CPU or disable CPU mechanisms? Oh, I forgot, your NSA
>>> guy. But
Stephan Mueller wrote:
> Am Mittwoch, 6. November 2013, 08:04:32 schrieb Theodore Ts'o:
>> On Wed, Nov 06, 2013 at 01:51:17PM +0100, Stephan Mueller wrote:
That's unfortunate, since it leaves open the question of whether this
jitter is something that could be at least somewhat predictable
Stephan Mueller wrote:
> Am Samstag, 9. November 2013, 23:04:49 schrieb Clemens Ladisch:
>> Stephan Mueller wrote:
>>> Am Mittwoch, 6. November 2013, 08:04:32 schrieb Theodore Ts'o:
>>>> On Wed, Nov 06, 2013 at 01:51:17PM +0100, Stephan Mueller wrote:
>>
Stephan Mueller wrote:
> Am Sonntag, 10. November 2013, 17:31:07 schrieb Clemens Ladisch:
>> In the case of CPUs, the jitter you observe in delta
>> times results in part from the complexities of the inner state, and in
>> part from real random noise. The first part is de
Stephan Mueller wrote:
> Am Sonntag, 10. November 2013, 21:28:06 schrieb Clemens Ladisch:
>> Many CPUs allow to disable branch prediction, but this is very vendor
>> specific (try to find MSR documentation). The biggest offender probably
>> is the out-of-order execution en
Stephan Mueller wrote:
> Am Mittwoch, 13. November 2013, 12:51:44 schrieb Clemens Ladisch:
>> (And any setting that increases accesses to main memory is likey to
>> introduce more entropy due to clock drift between the processor and the
>> memory bus. Or where do you assume t
Stephan Mueller wrote:
> Am Donnerstag, 14. November 2013, 11:51:03 schrieb Clemens Ladisch:
>> An attacker would not try to detect patterns; he would apply knowledge
>> of the internals.
>
> I do not buy that argument, because if an attacker can detect or deduce
> the
Rafael Aquini wrote:
> This patch introduces changes to the random_write method so it can split the
> given seed and completely stir the output pools with different halves of it,
> when seed lenght allows us doing so.
>
> - ret = write_pool(&blocking_pool, buffer, count);
> + ret = write_po
Stephan Mueller wrote:
> Am Freitag, 10. Januar 2014, 09:13:57 schrieb Clemens Ladisch:
>> Rafael Aquini wrote:
>>> This patch introduces changes to the random_write method so it can
>>> split the given seed and completely stir the output pools with
>>> diff
Stephan Mueller wrote:
> Am Freitag, 10. Januar 2014, 12:37:26 schrieb Clemens Ladisch:
>> Stephan Mueller wrote:
>>> Am Freitag, 10. Januar 2014, 09:13:57 schrieb Clemens Ladisch:
>>>> Rafael Aquini wrote:
>>>>> This patch introduces changes to the
Stephan Mueller wrote:
> This is a clean-room implementation of the DRBG defined in SP800-90A.
Why? I guess it's for certification?
> +static bool drbg_fips_continuous_test(struct drbg_state *drbg,
> + unsigned char *buf)
> ...
> + ret = memcmp(drbg->prev, bu
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