RE: charlatanism
John Hull wrote: Example 3: Subjective Utility Most of the utility 'functions' occurring in neoclassical microeconomics...are not well defined--as Henri Poincare pointed out to Leon Walras. In fact, the only conditions required of them is that they be twice differentiable, the first derivative being positive and the second negative. Obviously, infinitely many functions satisfy these mild requirements. THIS OFTEN SUFFICES IN SOME BRANCHES OF PURE MATHEMATICS BUT THE FACTUAL (OR EMPIRICAL) SCIENCES ARE MORE DEMANDING: HERE ONE USES ONLY FUNCTIONS THAT ARE DEFINED EXPLICITLY...OR IMPLICITLY. Finally, experimental studies have shown that preferences and subjective estimates of utility and risk do not satisfy the assumptions of expected utility theory. In short, THE USE OF UTILITY FUNCTIONS IS OFTEN MATHEMATICALLY SLOPPY AND EMPIRICALLY UNWARRANTED. Now, rational choice models make heavy use of both subjective utilities and subjective probabilities, as well as of the simplistic hypothesis that selfishness is the only motivation of human behavior. Not suprisingly, NONE OF THESE MODELS FITS THE FACT. Hence, although at first sight they look scientific, as a matter of fact they are pseudoscientific. My only comment on this is: it is a silly, uninformed criticism of economics. Economics may or may not be pseudoscientific, but not for these reasons. First, it has been shown long ago, by Gerard Debreu and others, that utility functions are not needed in order arrive at many of the important results in microeconomic theory. Second, the claim that economists use the hypothesis that selfishness is the only motivation of human behaviour is simply wrong, wrong, wrong. Finally, yes, economists often use models that are false and don't fit some data. So do physicists when they assume away the existence of any frictions. Is physics also a pseudoscience for this reason? Alex
Re: charlatanism
Please Remove
Re: charlatanism
On Tue, 13 Aug 2002, john hull quotes Mario Bunge: In short, THE USE OF UTILITY FUNCTIONS IS OFTEN MATHEMATICALLY SLOPPY AND EMPIRICALLY UNWARRANTED. It is an interesting regularity that some non-economists -- particularly philosophers and physicists, and Bunge is both -- seem to think even the most cursory glance at economic theory is sufficient background to generate criticism such as this unfortunate piece. Amongst many other misunderstandings of basic theory, Bunge's point above, which he repeats several times, confuses the empirical content of the assumptions that underpin a theory with the empirical content of the theory itself. Systematic violation of (expected) utility theory in experiments does not mean that theories based on those assumptions are empirically unwarranted any more than the insight that there are not just two people in two countries using two factors of production to produce two products invalidates any predictions of trade models based on those assumptions. The paragraph about utility functions needing explicit or implicit functional forms is just bizarre. Cheers, Chris Auld Department of Economics University of Calgary [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: charlatanism
The real charlatans in academia are the many frauds who build their whole careers by getting their names put on coauthored papers to which they have not legitimately contributed. Marc Poitras
Nations as Corporations
Imagine that a nation like the US were run like a corporation. To live (and vote) here, you'd have to own a share. You could sell your share and leave, and foreigners could come if they bought a share. The corporate management would be given financial incentives to maximize the market value of these shares. They could issue more shares if these new shares were handed out to previous share holders in proportion to the shares they currently hold. What would go wrong or right with running the US this way? Would management focus too much on making immigrants happy, versus people already here who are reluctant to leave? Would there be too many or two few people here? Would government spending increase or decrease? Would we get less desirable immigrants, relative to picking and choosing among applicants? Would the homeless prefer to cash out and leave, rather than stay and beg here? Would people tend to leave when they retire? Robin Hanson [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://hanson.gmu.edu Asst. Prof. Economics, George Mason University MSN 1D3, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030- 703-993-2326 FAX: 703-993-2323
Re: charlatanism
Does anyone think, at least in the excerpts we read, that the article attacked libertarian or libertarian-leaning economics as much as it attacked economics generally? David Levenstam
Re: charlatanism
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: The real charlatans in academia are the many frauds who build their whole careers by getting their names put on coauthored papers to which they have not legitimately contributed. That's a sort of embezzlement; but `charlatan' implies that the *content* of the papers is fraudulent. -- Anton Sherwood, http://www.ogre.nu/
Re: Nations as Corporations
Imagine that a nation like the US were run like a corporation. To live How would you enforce shareholder rights and monitor managers? For corporations inside nations, one could appeal to the state for law enforcement or start a lawsuit. What recourse do shareholders have in such a worlds? Fabio
Re: charlatanism
--- john hull [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: The ALL CAPS lines are my emphasis. I think it is better to use other symbols, such as *caps*, since when they get copied, one may want to revert to u/l. NEO-AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS, EVEN CLAIM THAT THEIR THEORIES ARE TRUE A PRIORI. This means a priori to specific history, but still posterior to experience, however general. Most of textbook microeconomics is a priori. For example, when deriving the law of demand, do they justify this with data? Fred Foldvary = [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: charlatanism
Does anyone think, at least in the excerpts we read, that the article attacked libertarian or libertarian-leaning economics as much as it attacked economics generally? David Levenstam It's typical to say that bad science is X, and my political opponents just happen to do X. IMO, it is usually easier to attack an economic theory in this roundabout way than just to confront the idea head on because you really don't have to understand what's going on. Example from my professional life: As is probably obvious, I'm not an economist - I'm a sociologist who takes economics very seriously and I sometimes use economic tools in my research. So I'm always in a position of explaining economic ideas to non-economists and I frequently find that people tend to avoid economic issues. For example, when I explain human capital theory to people, they seem horrified and obsess over whether their sacred cow - education - can be thought of as something as dirty as an investment. Instead of asking whether the idea is internally coherent and has empirical support, they go nuts over just the wording of the theory. Similarly, I find that these articles that trash economics because it is psuedoscientific do the same - they obsess over the wording (the use of math) rather than think real hard about the intuitions behind things. Of course, there is always bad research hiding behind equations - but the equations just express an idea - that can be debated - in a coherent way. Fabio
Re: Nations as Corporations
These are very interesting questions! This would clearly affect the decision to have children in one of two ways (that I can think of): 1. Couples would have fewer children if they had to purchase a share for each child they had. 2. Couples would have more children if they were granted a share for each child they had. I'm sure there are many more consequences, though. Imagine that a nation like the US were run like a corporation. To live (and vote) here, you'd have to own a share. You could sell your share and leave, and foreigners could come if they bought a share. The corporate management would be given financial incentives to maximize the market value of these shares. They could issue more shares if these new shares were handed out to previous share holders in proportion to the shares they currently hold. What would go wrong or right with running the US this way? Would management focus too much on making immigrants happy, versus people already here who are reluctant to leave? Would there be too many or two few people here? Would government spending increase or decrease? Would we get less desirable immigrants, relative to picking and choosing among applicants? Would the homeless prefer to cash out and leave, rather than stay and beg here? Would people tend to leave when they retire? Robin Hanson [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://hanson.gmu.edu Asst. Prof. Economics, George Mason University MSN 1D3, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030- 703-993-2326 FAX: 703-993-2323 -- John A. Viator, Ph.D. Beckman Laser Institute 1002 Health Sciences Road East University of California Irvine, CA 92612 (949)824-3754 (949)824-6969 fax [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: charlatanism
The real charlatans in academia are the many frauds who build their whole careers by getting their names put on coauthored papers to which they have not legitimately contributed. That's a sort of embezzlement; but `charlatan' implies that the *content* of the papers is fraudulent. Anton Sherwood, http://www.ogre.nu/ It is a sort of charlatanry about the content of your career - you sort of imply you've done a bunch of original stuff by associating yourself with the successful. Fabio
Re: charlatanism
In a message dated 8/14/02 1:47:34 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: The real charlatans in academia are the many frauds who build their whole careers by getting their names put on coauthored papers to which they have not legitimately contributed. That's a sort of embezzlement; but `charlatan' implies that the *content* of the papers is fraudulent. -- Anton Sherwood, http://www.ogre.nu/ Does anyone think that the real charlatans in science include the people who do research which always concludes that the federal government must fund more research (in other words, pay the researchers more) and impose new, draconian regulations over our lives to save us all from alleged environmental catastrophes? David Levenstam
Re: Nations as Corporations
How would we know what price to charge for a share? Would the U.S. have a monopoly? Or would it compete with other nations? What would we do about people who try to sneak in without buying a share? Will people be required to proove at any time they own a share or be deported (or worse)? Would it be one share, one vote in an election for management? Could a person end up with more than one share, buying from people who leave? Cyril Morong
Re: Nations as Corporations
--- Robin Hanson [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Imagine that a nation like the US were run like a corporation. To live (and vote) here, you'd have to own a share. You could sell your share and leave, and foreigners could come if they bought a share. The corporate management would be given financial incentives to maximize the market value If you own a share, that implies that this is a cooperative, where each person owns one share and has one vote. What would go wrong or right with running the US this way? The problem is central planning. The US corporation would be a giant enterprise subject to the inefficiencies of any large organization. Also, minority interests would be overpowered as they are now. Would government spending increase or decrease? If the members vote as citizens do now, it seems to me that the government would be under similar special-interest influence, and there would be little change in government spending. Fred Foldvary = [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Nations as Corporations
Cyril Morong wrote: How would we know what price to charge for a share? There's be an open market which would set prices. Would the U.S. have a monopoly? A monopoly on rights to live in the US, but other places are substitutes. What would we do about people who try to sneak in without buying a share? Same as you'd treat people who stole stock. Will people be required to proove at any time they own a share or be deported (or worse)? Yup. Would it be one share, one vote in an election for management? Yup. Could a person end up with more than one share, buying from people who leave? Yes, but it seems unlikely many would do so. Robin Hanson [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://hanson.gmu.edu Asst. Prof. Economics, George Mason University MSN 1D3, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030- 703-993-2326 FAX: 703-993-2323
Re: Nations as Corporations
Fred Foldvary wrote: Imagine that a nation like the US were run like a corporation. To live (and vote) here, you'd have to own a share. You could sell your share and leave, and foreigners could come if they bought a share. The corporate management would be given financial incentives to maximize the market value If you own a share, that implies that this is a cooperative, where each person owns one share and has one vote. OK. What would go wrong or right with running the US this way? The problem is central planning. The US corporation would be a giant enterprise subject to the inefficiencies of any large organization. But as with any corporation, the leaders could use decentralized planning, or break the corporation into pieces, if they thought that would maximize stock value. They could dismantle most regulation, if they thought that would help. Also, minority interests would be overpowered as they are now. And as they are in any corporation. Robin Hanson [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://hanson.gmu.edu Asst. Prof. Economics, George Mason University MSN 1D3, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030- 703-993-2326 FAX: 703-993-2323
Re: Nations as Corporations
Fabio wrote: Imagine that a nation like the US were run like a corporation. To live How would you enforce shareholder rights and monitor managers? For corporations inside nations, one could appeal to the state for law enforcement or start a lawsuit. What recourse do shareholders have in such a worlds? Are state-enforced lawsuits really what keeps large multinational corporations honest now? If not, then the concept here is to use mechanisms similar to whatever large corporations now use. Robin Hanson [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://hanson.gmu.edu Asst. Prof. Economics, George Mason University MSN 1D3, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030- 703-993-2326 FAX: 703-993-2323
Re: falling murder rates attributable to better trauma care?
In a message dated 8/14/02 3:38:21 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Here's a link to a NY Times article: http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/12/national/12MURD.html?ex=1030256121ei=1en=4 ca972cf978300ff It refers to a study by Anthony R. Harris, published in the journal Homicide Studies. He studies hospital admissions of assault victims, and finds that substantial advances in trauma care have reduced mortality among assault victims. That is, given an assault, the victim who would have died in 1960 (becoming a murder statistic) survives the assault in the 1990s. Thus, some of the declining murder rate since the 1960s may be attributable to better health care, not lessened murderous behavior. Has anyone seen the study? If so, does the finding appear genuine? As the news article sums up, [T]he study could raise questions about how crime statistics are analyzed, and that researchers should consider whether medical care has improved when assessing local changes in crime rates. Interesting stuff for the econ of crime folks. Noel As I understand it, rates of all crimes, violent and non-violent, have trended downward since around 1980, and that in the 1990s we actually saw drops in the numbers (not merely rates per thousand) of crimes of all types committed in the US. The largest factor tending to reduce crime rates might be an aging population, since young men tend to commit a disproportionately large share of crimes (I presume excluding white collar crimes, but with the advent of crimes by computer hacking, I'm not sure if that's true anymore either). While improvements in medical care might well account for a simple drop in the rate of murder (or even in the number of murders), how could it account for a drop in the rate (to say nothing of the number) of assaults? Even the aging of the population does not seems able to account for an actual drop in the number of assaults when the size of the population continues to increase. I do know that states which have passed general concealed carry permit laws have seen rather drastic drops in the rate of homicide and other violent crimes; I'm most familiar with the case of Florida, which experienced a drop in one year from 50% over the national average (of homicides) to just under the national average--an average that itself was falling, even I believe if you take the average of only the other 49 states. Medical improvements seem incapable of explaining such sudden drops, which I understand have been mirrored in each of the other states that has passed general concealed carry. It seems likely that concealed carry has itself contributed to drops in murder (and other violent crime) rates. Concealed carry didn't really start until the 1990s, so obviously it can't explain falling crime rates in the 1980s, and I suspect that it alone can't account for falling numbers of crimes in the 1990s. Beyond aging and concealed carry, we could look at prison sentences and likelihoods of incarceration. During the 1980s in particularly candidates touting a get tough on crime agenda got elected all across the US, and federal and state governments passed all sorts of laws to increase punishments and the likelihood of their imposition. I suspect that the get tough attitude and its impact on crime policies also contributed to the decline in crime in the US. I know that economists sometimes model crime. Does anyone here at GMU model crime, and is it something someone here can do as part of a dissertation? Sincerely, David
RE: charlatanism
fabio guillermo rojas: Similarly, I find that these articles that trash economics because it is psuedoscientific do the same - they obsess over the wording (the use of math) rather than think real hard about the intuitions behind things. Of course, there is always bad research hiding behind equations - but the equations just express an idea - that can be debated - in a coherent way. Speaking up for the innumerates here -- Part of my objection may be my inability to use the tools. But I cling to the notion that part of the objection is that some aspects of economic activity (to say nothing of activity which has been subjected to economics imperialism) _cannot_ be the sort of thing to which mathematical manipulation, in particular equations, can be properly applied. Michael Michael E. Etchison Texas Wholesale Power Report MLE Consulting www.mleconsulting.com 1423 Jackson Road Kerrville, TX 78028 (830) 895-4005
Re: falling murder rates attributable to better trauma care?
A while back I heard an ex-military man and author claim that first-person video games do lead to gun violence. He made the claim that better medical care has has hidden the rise in gun violence by reducing the mortality rate. It does make intuitive sense, if one looks at murder per se. While I don't think I've really answered your question, I just wanted to say that it may be an 'old' idea in some fields. Perhaps economists could profit from it. -jsh __ Do You Yahoo!? HotJobs - Search Thousands of New Jobs http://www.hotjobs.com
Re: charlatanism
--- Fred Foldvary [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I think it is better to use other symbols, such as *caps*, since when they get copied, one may want to revert to u/l. Sorry. Yahoo email doesn't give me many options. I was hesitant about yelling, which I guess is what all caps is. I'll try something else in the future. Thanks. Most of textbook microeconomics is a priori. For example, when deriving the law of demand, do they justify this with data? By that reasoning, aren't all the results obtained in Euclid's Elements assumed a priori? I took the law of demand, along with most textbook economics, to be derived axiomatically rather than assumed. Or is that what a priori means? Given reasonable assumptions (axioms), does that mean that economic findings are valid without being 'scientific,' i.e. rigoriously tested? It seems to me yes, but when data doesn't match theory, one must search for new or modified axioms. Thoughts on that? By the way, I was particularly interested in Bunge's assertions that a scientific research program is to find the functional forms between variables. Should economists spend more time on that program? It seems like it would be unnecessary in many contexts, e.g. the Tragedy of the Commons where a result can obtain by merely knowing that the production function is concave, inter alia. But then again, maybe not. It seems that alot of people critique econ. without learning it, and Bunge seems to be in that school of thought. But it is good to take critiques seriously. I bet there are a lot of psychic mediums and polygraph artists who actually believe what they're doing it valid and real. It's probably best to double check once in a while and make sure we're not headed down that road. I still maintain that Bunge's ridiculous assertion that economics assumes greed/money as the only human motivator is held by most people. I think it could be addressed by including the definition of rationality as the structure of preferences rather than the content of preferences in basic economics education. I think educators are doing a great disservice by not making this clear early on. -jsh __ Do You Yahoo!? HotJobs - Search Thousands of New Jobs http://www.hotjobs.com
Re: Nations as Corporations
In a message dated 8/14/02 3:37:34 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: The problem is central planning. The US corporation would be a giant enterprise subject to the inefficiencies of any large organization. Also, minority interests would be overpowered as they are now. Would government spending increase or decrease? If the members vote as citizens do now, it seems to me that the government would be under similar special-interest influence, and there would be little change in government spending. Rereading the two passages, I wonder if there isn't a contraction. In the first passage we have minority interests overpowered, but in seeming contraction we have in the second passage special interests with influence. How other is a minority interest different from a special interest? Or are we talking about corporations in the first rather than the voters in the second. In the case of corporations, a minority holder ofte can, and does exert considerable interest, especially over a publicly-held corporation. Ross Perot gained some of his millions by using his minority stake in GM to harass the GM board of directors until they paid him off. Unrelated to the question of minority interests, could Americans participate in any other organizations? Or would everything be controlled by the corporation? Could Americans start other corporations, partnerships, sole proprietorships? Seperate churches and recreational or philanthropic organizations? Or would everything have to be done under the auspcies of the corporations? David
Re: Nations as Corporations
It's not clear (to me, anyway.) If new people were extremely productive, it seems that managers may want to encourage that type of person to be born, so they may give parents free shares for the child. If new people aren't very productive, then giving away shares for free doesn't make much sense. John A. Viator wrote: This would clearly affect the decision to have children in one of two ways (that I can think of): 1. Couples would have fewer children if they had to purchase a share for each child they had. 2. Couples would have more children if they were granted a share for each child they had. Yup. And which policy would profit maximizing managers choose? Robin Hanson [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://hanson.gmu.edu Asst. Prof. Economics, George Mason University MSN 1D3, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030- 703-993-2326 FAX: 703-993-2323 -- John A. Viator, Ph.D. Beckman Laser Institute 1002 Health Sciences Road East University of California Irvine, CA 92612 (949)824-3754 (949)824-6969 fax [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Nations as Corporations
Are state-enforced lawsuits really what keeps large multinational corporations honest now? If not, then the concept here is to use mechanisms similar to whatever large corporations now use. Robin Hanson [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://hanson.gmu.edu Multinationals come in different flavors. Those based in Western nations and that have assets that can be seized after litigation are probably kept in line by fear of lawsuits and jail terms. I have no idea how share holders keep faith in firms based in dodgy Third World nations. Probably some kind of trust, where paying out dividends and respecting voting rights signals that future investors will be treated well. But how often does this occur? Are these multinationals not based in 3rd world not trying to avoid shareholder rights? Fabio
Re: Nations as Corporations
--- [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: minority interests would be overpowered as they are now. would be under similar special-interest influence Rereading the two passages, I wonder if there isn't a contraction. There is no contraction, but one could read into it a contradiction. However, the two statements are compatible. In society there are minorities with little power and other minorities with much power. For example, a country could have a ruling elite with much wealth and power, and also despised minorities with little power. Fred Foldvary = [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: charlatanism
--- john hull [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Given reasonable assumptions (axioms), does that mean that economic findings are valid without being 'scientific,' i.e. rigoriously tested? If the logic is valid and the premises true, then the conclusion is sound and therefore fully scientific. Scientific should not be equated with tested. For example, the law of diminishing returns is scientific in being true, even if one does not test for it. Indeed, that law is so scientific that if one tested it and found that the outcome was inconsistent with that law, one would question the data before one would question the law. It seems to me yes, but when data doesn't match theory, one must search for new or modified axioms. Thoughts on that? If it is a general theory that has already been warranted, one would first examine the data and testing methods. But if it is a hypothesis about something specific, such as the consequences of the euro, then when the data rejects the hypothesis, one would search for a new one. I still maintain that Bunge's ridiculous assertion that economics assumes greed/money as the only human motivator is held by most people. How do you know? *That* is an example of a hypothesis that needs testing. I think it could be addressed by including the definition of rationality as the structure of preferences rather than the content of preferences in basic economics education. Agreed. And also, rationality has to do with the choice of means in the pursuit of ends, namely economizing or optimizing. Fred Foldvary = [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: falling murder rates attributable to better trauma care?
when I looked at theassault rates at the bureau of justice statistics homepage http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance/aslt.htm they show aggravatedassaults being approximately the samefrom 1973 to 1994and a steady decline since then.Wasthere some dramaticchange during the 60sor early 70s that causedthe increase inaggravated assaultsclaimed by the articleor isit something wrong with the statistics? Chat with friends online, try MSN Messenger: Click Here
Re: Nations as Corporations
On Wed, Aug 14, 2002 at 01:24:12PM -0400, Robin Hanson wrote: Imagine that a nation like the US were run like a corporation. To live (and vote) here, you'd have to own a share. You could sell your share and leave, and foreigners could come if they bought a share. The corporate management would be given financial incentives to maximize the market value of these shares. They could issue more shares if these new shares were handed out to previous share holders in proportion to the shares they currently hold. This seems very similar to having a poll tax, with the following twists: 1. You can voluntarily pay a higher tax and get proportionally more votes. 2. Management is given incentives to maximize revenue from poll taxes. (Other forms of taxes can be collected but management does not have direct incentives based on their revenues.) They're similar in the sense that they look the same to people who have access to perfect capital markets. I'm not sure how much this helps in analyzing Robin's proposal, but at least it gives a different approach to thinking about the problem. My variant may be an improvement since it allows people who would benefit most by living in the U.S. to enter even if they do not have access to credit. One effect that becomes apparent in my variant is that management would want to make income taxes more progressive and use the revenue to subsidize the poor so that they can afford to pay a higher poll tax. I think the effect carries over to Robin's system - subsidizing the poor at the expense of the rich increases the total market value of the shares. More generally, management would want to subsidize the marginal shareholder-residents at the expense of the non-marginal shareholder-residents. This amounts to de facto price discrimination even though all shares supposedly have the same price on the open market. On Wed, Aug 14, 2002 at 04:50:19PM -0400, Robin Hanson wrote: Are state-enforced lawsuits really what keeps large multinational corporations honest now? If not, then the concept here is to use mechanisms similar to whatever large corporations now use. One factor that keeps large corporations honest is the threats of hostile takeovers and bankruptcy. Unfortunately neither of these seem likely to apply to a large nation-as-corporation. Imagine creditors trying to force everyone else to leave the U.S. after a bankruptcy because they now own all of the shares.
Re: Nations as Corporations
If we assume that most people of USA have exactly one share, then changes from current system are mostly in immigration law - citizenship is for sale, and people are rewarded if they leave country and drop citizenship. We can expect much more rich immigrants and huge increase in government (INS) policy toward them - government will begin to actively attract wealthy immigrants. On the other side, poor americans will emigrate to probably cheap countries and live there on the money that they will receive for their share. (Or they will sell share and live as underclass without voting rights (and may be right to work and so on)) Both changes look attractive for me. I think we cannot expect big changes in voters behavior - so may be elected officials will be more or less the same (but with different motives, if they are rewarded for share price). We can expect, that generally market for shares would be small (not very liquid), so effect of wealthy people wanting to be USA citizens can be very strong (so, for example, their expected interest in low taxes can make taxes smaller, than now). On the other side, if we allow people to buy more than one share (as it happens in real corporations) - then I think we can expect that rich people will buy many shares (as they do in existing real corporations) to get political influence more directly than now and USA will become oligopoly with poor people having less power than they have now. Mikhail Gambarian Robin Hanson wrote: Imagine that a nation like the US were run like a corporation. To live (and vote) here, you'd have to own a share. You could sell your share and leave, and foreigners could come if they bought a share. The corporate management would be given financial incentives to maximize the market value of these shares. They could issue more shares if these new shares were handed out to previous share holders in proportion to the shares they currently hold. What would go wrong or right with running the US this way? Would management focus too much on making immigrants happy, versus people already here who are reluctant to leave? Would there be too many or two few people here? Would government spending increase or decrease? Would we get less desirable immigrants, relative to picking and choosing among applicants? Would the homeless prefer to cash out and leave, rather than stay and beg here? Would people tend to leave when they retire? Robin Hanson [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://hanson.gmu.edu Asst. Prof. Economics, George Mason University MSN 1D3, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030- 703-993-2326 FAX: 703-993-2323
