Re: [Bitcoin-development] Zeroconf-safe tx replacement (replace-for-fee)
Might leak less wiggle room and be simpler/more robut to validate that *everything* has to be the same except for the amount going to one (presumed change) address. A privacy leak I know, but dont do that - ie send enough change the first time. And network analysis has shown change addresses arent adding hardly any privacy. We need more robust privacy fixes independently. I do not support damaging the 0-conf feature, so I think this later approach is a better track for revising fees. Adam On Mon, Nov 04, 2013 at 05:52:43AM -0500, Peter Todd wrote: On Mon, Oct 28, 2013 at 07:17:50AM +, John Dillon wrote: This discussion seems to be a lot of hot air over a simple observation that estimates are imperfect and always will be. I do not understand you vehement opposition the notion that a backup is a good thing except in the context that replacement to change fees is halfway to profit-seeking replacement by fee. Peter Todd: You did a fair bit of leg work for replace-by-fee. Seems to me that replace-for-fee will help prep infrastructure to eventual replace-by-fee usage, while avoiding some of the politics around zero-conf transactions. -- Android is increasing in popularity, but the open development platform that developers love is also attractive to malware creators. Download this white paper to learn more about secure code signing practices that can help keep Android apps secure. http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=65839951iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk ___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development
Re: [Bitcoin-development] Zeroconf-safe tx replacement (replace-for-fee)
On Mon, Nov 04, 2013 at 12:10:38PM +0100, Adam Back wrote: Might leak less wiggle room and be simpler/more robut to validate that *everything* has to be the same except for the amount going to one (presumed change) address. A privacy leak I know, but dont do that - ie send enough change the first time. And network analysis has shown change addresses arent adding hardly any privacy. We need more robust privacy fixes independently. I do not support damaging the 0-conf feature, so I think this later approach is a better track for revising fees. There's been a number of uses found for tx-replacement beyond simply modifying fees. In additition, allowing for the value of a specificly designated change address to be changed after the fact is not compatible with current zero-conf-using implementations; they don't know to treat a txout as special so allowing its value to be reduced would allow for a zeroconf attack. Anyway, if you look at the code that actually implements the replacement, it's extremely simple already. I see no reason to make it less general; transaction relaying rules are not part of consensus. -- 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org 000a6dd96c551eca7299463e4e523462798a006535f412b519c7 signature.asc Description: Digital signature -- Android is increasing in popularity, but the open development platform that developers love is also attractive to malware creators. Download this white paper to learn more about secure code signing practices that can help keep Android apps secure. http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=65839951iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk___ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development