|
p102-104 Power and Principle, Brzezinski [Carter admin position pressed by Sec State] Cyrus Vance ...Israel back to 1967 borders...Palestinian self-determination and nation-state...we were more and more inclined to engage in a dialog with the PLO itself regarding its participation[at Geneva]...clearly an effort[by the Israelis]...to convert us into a satellite of their policy rather than an independent agent working for a settlement...[Israeli PM] Begin[speaking for the PLO] said it would be a waste of time to insist that the PLO accept Resolution 242[acknowledge Israeli statehood] ...[but the Palestinians themselves said]...willing to accept Resolution 242[acknowledge Israeli statehood contingent on a preparatory, advance formal assurance of an interpretation of 242 promising a Palestinian state]..."the language of Resolution 242 relates to the rights of all mideastern states to peace[implicitly and expressly including a Palestinian state]". While he was in Alexandria, Vance was handed a draft peace treaty by Sadat...atmosphere became more tense as Israeli settlements multiplied...despite Carter's personal request to Begin to refrain from making any new settlements...State Department denounced the new settlements as being against international law [All Carter and Vance but Brzezinski now] I felt that the draft of a proposed message to the Israelis , warning them that unless they immediately terminated their military operations [in Lebanon, but the settlements are military operations, too] we would halt all military aid to Israel[history has proven this necessary to move the Israeli settlements in the face of assassinations of Sadat and Rabin and October Surprises, and the success of a threat against Syria, why not threaten the Israelis with a US invasion?!] The Soviets no longer insisted on a separate Palestinian state...[another thing wrong with the idea of Soviet participation was] I did subsequently feel that I erred in not consulting our domestic political advisers about its likely internal impact and in not objecting more strenuously to the very notion of a join US-Soviet statement. Sadat at first welcomed the US-Soviet statement of October 1, telling the US ambassador Hermann Eilts that it was "a master stroke" because it would put pressure on the Syrians to be more accomodating. He was then shaken by the manner in which the United States[Carter personally] retreated [from the Israeli US media playing the McCarthy card]. Proposal by Sadat to hold a world summit in East Jerusalem...and the PLO...we worried...that Sadat ...might be losing his sense of reality[his sense of Brzezinski the S&B McGeorge Bundy of Carter's Bay of Pigs[JFK was not even president for two of three S&B's successfully and strategically failed Bay of Pigs invasions]. Cy was pressing very hard for Soviet participation. I started speaking of a "concentric circles" approach, building on the Egyptian-Israeli accord, then expanding the circle by including the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza as well as the Jordanians, and finally moving to a still wider circle by engaging the Syrians and perhaps even the Soviets in a comprehensive settlement. Sadat-Begin initiative [could freeze out the Palestinians] freeze out the rest of the middle east[the Palestinians]...we should find some ways that progress on the West Bank[NOT GAZA FIRST. FIRST, *********NOT********* GAZA FIRST!!!] In the Washington meetings held on December 16 and 17, 1977...At the morning meeting with Begin... Cy was quite upset because Phil Habib, his very close friend, was stricken with a heart attack[Sadat was assassinated, JFK/RFK/MLK, Rabin, so Habib has a timely heart attack. Vince Foster, Charles Briggs, William Casey, all timely ill folks. But] ...[Begin said]"autonomy for the local population... Israeli sovereignty would go to the 1967 line"... [but] military governor...no...withdrawal from West Bank...no self-determination...annexationism[with regard to Greater Israel notion reflected in use of certain biblical terms like "Samaria"]. page 438 1979...president...wanted...a negotiator...Richard Strauss...to provide him a shield domestically... Strauss[himself also cowed by US Israeli press] from the outset particularly concerned with the domestic implications...wanted to get out of the assignment[thoroughly cowed by US Israeli press hegemony, some domestic shield for the president!] ....along with [VP] Mondale made it clear [to the president] that any[unconditional surrender to US Israel press now!] pressure on Israel would be damaging politically at home[but October Surprise was damaging politically at home]. [Carter's UN ambassador] Andy Young's meeting with a PLO representative became public and he had to resign. Appointment first of Strauss and later of [Sol] Linowitz [negotiated Panama Canal handover, another faux pas as a Palestinian issue move!] was the undermining of Vance[which strategically meant the undermining of]...Vance was determined to press hard on the settlements issue...1979...June 12...he told me that he intended to urge the President to approve reductions in economic aid to Israel every time the Israelis moved forward with an additional settlement[Carter admin held up an Israeli cargo ship containing arms paid for by the elected government of Nicaragua, the result being the Sandinistas waltzed into power in Nicaragua in 1979. Vance had wanted to be similarly tough on the Israelis from the start in 1977]. In July [1979] Vance resumed the effort to obtain approval for US condemnation of Israeli settlements, but the President was reluctant[appointment of Strauss was the president turning his back on the Palestinians and the real security of Israeli people]. March 1980...the UN resolution, for which the US had voted, turned out to be replete with references to Jerusalem and included a call for the dismantling of existing settlements...[Sec of State Cyrus] Vance was requested[ordered] by the white house[Carter, in accord with Mondale, Strauss the mideast sapper, and the political handlers] to state in forthcoming Senate testimony that our recent vote on the Jerusalem issue had been incorrect. Carter's unhappiness[with Vance and pressing the Israelis to withdraw to 1967 borders and accept Palestinian statehood] was intensified by a memorandum which Mondale submitted, urging in strong terms that our previous policy on the settlements be repudiated in time for the New York primary...Vance flatly refused to disavow the resolution as a whole...His Senate testimony was followed by the New York primary vote...Jewish voters swung heavily over to Senator Kennedy, ensuring Carter's defeat. This setback prolonged the Carter-Kennedy contest. Sadat...did not want a final showdown on the Palestinian problem [he was the Egyptian president, after all] prior to the return of the Sinai to Egypt...it was clear to Mondale that Begin wanted Carter to be defeated, and stated this directly on July 26[1980]...1979 the Soviet threat to the Mideast[invasion of Afghanistan] magnified by the Iranian disaster[October Surprise made it a disaster but the hostages otherwise would have been released to boost a mideast settlement if Carter had not been asleep at the wheel while Bush bribed the Iranians to hold the hostages until after his puppet Reagan beat Carter in November 1980.] State of the Union [Address], Jimmy Carter on January 23, 1980, committed the United States to the security of the Persian Gulf region...I had been seeking within the US government the adoption of such a policy, based on a formal recognition of the interdependence of these three central strategic zones[Western Europe, the Far East, and the Middle East-Persian Gulf area]... the Carter doctrine was modelled on the Truman doctrine...in response to the Soviet threat to Greece and Turkey...after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, I urged him explicitly to emulate Truman's historic act...explicit assurance of American involvement. General William Odom, who most energetically enlisted the support of key officials in the Defense Department, notably Under Secretary Robert Komer...First broached in the spring of 1979[the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December 1979]. page 32, In Cold Blood, Abdul Shams, former advisor to the president of Afghanistan, said that when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December 1979,"they came in trucks manufactured in the Kama River truck factory in the Soviet Union, a plant built with the financial support of the US Export-Import Bank and Chase-Manhattan Bank. They drove on roads built by the US Army Corps of Engineers". "factory ...built by Ford Motor Company" http://www.mishalov.com/Komer.html Working closely with William E. Colby, the top man for the CIA in Vietnam, Komer led a village-by-village effort to win hearts and minds. The pacification program evolved into a more tough-minded project called Operation Phoenix. In October 1968, Johnson named Komer ambassador to Turkey. His tenure was short. President Nixon took office in January 1969 and replaced him. Komer then worked as a consultant with the Rand Corp., writing classified studies on NATO and on the need for a rapid-deployment force for the Persian Gulf, until the next Democratic administration.He became undersecretary of defense for policy under President Carter and put many of those ideas into effect. Komer, 1969, "classified studies on NATO and on the need for a rapid-deployment force for the Persian Gulf", Brzezinski, 1965,"Alternative to Partition"[of Europe], for Atlantic Policy Studies and CFR. Brzezinski and Komer, spring of 1979, "rapid deployment forces for the Persian Gulf". The Soviets did not invade Afghanistan for oil. A former economic adviser to a president of Afghanistan, said "between 1950 and 1960, Afghanistan became heavily dependent on the Soviet Union...90% for petroleum and petroleum products" -Abdul Shams, ICB, p15 But the Soviets did remove natural gas from Afghanistan, in exchange for oil. All of the gas meters were on the Soviet side, and much of the Soviet abiotic oil was used to support the Soviet occupation. The Soviets were not even close to the Persian Gulf when they were bogged down in the Afghan quagmire, providing 90% of Afghanistan's oil and petroleum products in exchange for 95% of the gas from Afghanistan, and in 2005 Russia does not need mideastern oil, but Molotov may have expressed an interest in Afghanistan, Uzbekhistan, and Tajikistan, "in the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf, this is the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union", in a Soviet treaty with the Axis(Germany, Italy, Japan, Rockefeller, Standard Oil, Joseph Kennedy, IG Farben, Harriman, and Prescott Bush, manager of Harriman-Hitler's Economy for half of WW2") in 1940. -Bob Dodds Complete archives at http://www.sitbot.net/ Please let us stay on topic and be civil. OM YAHOO! GROUPS LINKS
|
