Re: Al Qaeda crypto reportedly fails the test
Steven M. Bellovin writes: http://www.petitcolas.net/fabien/kerckhoffs/index.html for the actual articles.) Does there exist an English translation (I'd be surprised if not)? If not, I'd be happy to provide one if there were sufficient interest. -- Chris Palmer Staff Technologist, Electronic Frontier Foundation 415 436 9333 x124 (desk), 415 305 5842 (cell) - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
SF Bay Area Cypherpunks August 2004 Physical Meeting Announcement
--- begin forwarded text Date: Tue, 10 Aug 2004 09:56:44 -0700 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED] From: Bill Stewart [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: SF Bay Area Cypherpunks August 2004 Physical Meeting Announcement Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Rick Moen suggested we have a Cypherpunks meeting in August, so: SF Bay Area Cypherpunks August 2004 Physical Meeting Announcement General Info: DATE: Saturday 14 August 2004 TIME: 12:00 - 5:00 PM (Pacific Time) PLACE: Stanford University Campus - Tressider Union courtyard Agenda: Our agenda is a widely-held secret. (This will be our first meeting since April 2003, so the agenda is somewhat up for grabs. Among upcoming events to note is the 7th annual Information Security Conference, aka ISC04, Sept. 27-29 at Xerox PARC, http://isc04.uncc.edu/ . Also of note: Our friendly Federalistas seem to be imposing unprecedented visa restrictions on visiting foreign cryptographers. Is it time for all international cryptography conferences to move off-shore? See: http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0407.html#3 ) As usual, this is an Open Meeting on US Soil, and the public is invited. Location Info: The meeting location will be familiar to those who've been to our outdoor meetings before, but for those who haven't been, it's on the Stanford University campus, at the tables outside Tressider Union, at the end of Santa Theresa, just west of Dinkelspiel Auditorium. We meet at the tables on the west side of the building, inside the horseshoe U formed by Tresidder. Ask anyone on campus where Tressider is and they'll help you find it. Food and beverages are available at the cafe inside Tresidder. Location Maps: Stanford Campus (overview; Tressider is dead-center). http://campus-map.stanford.edu/campus_map/bldg.jsp?cx=344cy=471zoomto=50zoomfrom=30bldgID=02-300 Tressider Union (zoomed detail view). http://campus-map.stanford.edu/campus_map/results.jsp?bldg=Tresidder Printable Stanford Map (407k). http://www.stanford.edu/home/visitors/campus_map.pdf [ This announcement sent to the following mailing lists: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED] Mailing list complaints or address corrections to [EMAIL PROTECTED] Agenda and Location questions to Rick Moen, [EMAIL PROTECTED] ] Bill Stewart [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- end forwarded text -- - R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED] The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/ 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA ... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' -- - R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED] The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/ 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA ... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: How a Digital Signature Works
R. A. Hettinga wrote: The publisher first has to obtain a digital certificate from a recognized certificate authority or CA (VeriSign (VRSN ) is the largest and best known CA in the U.S.). The publisher receives a private and a public key, each of which is a long number of about 300 digits. These are used to create a digital signature for each program (see BW Online, 8/10/04, Windows of Vulnerability No More?). And which will guarantee to... erm... *try* not to sell the same certificate to someone else, or to at least notice if they do (provided it has a famous name on it like microsoft of course) and what is new about MS's signed executable support? its been around long enough... - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Al Qaeda crypto reportedly fails the test
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], John Denker writes: Here's a challenge directly relevant to this group: Can you design a comsec system so that pressure against a code clerk will not do unbounded damage? What about pressure against a comsec system designer? Modulo Steve's comments about the threat model, Ben Laurie and I wrote a paper on this theme a few years ago: http://www.acsac.org/2000/papers/47.pdf I developed that paper's threat model into chapter 4 of my PhD thesis: http://www.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/I.Brown/pimms/thesis.pdf We are still hopeful that we will eventually get somewhere with our Internet draft improving the forward secrecy capabilities of OpenPGP: http://www.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/I.Brown/openpgp-pfs.txt -- +44 7970 164 526 / http://www.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/I.Brown/ - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
RE: Microsoft .NET PRNG (fwd)
-Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Ed Gerck Sent: 10 août 2004 13:42 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Microsoft .NET PRNG (fwd) The PRNG should be the least concern when using MSFT's cryptographic provider. The MSFT report 140sp238.pdf says: RSAENH stores keys in the file system, but relies upon Microsoft Windows XP for the encryption of the keys prior to storage. Yes that's true. The security policy explains that the safeguarding of private keys is done outside the crypto boundary. (as someone mentioned to me in personal email you need to have a look at the fine print of such accreditations, this is an example of a fine print). Note however that the OS uses the crypto provider to encrypt the private key using a secret that is generated based on (or protected by a key generated based on, don't remember off the top of my head) the user's password. The strength of the system is based on the user's Windows password, which I think is reasonable (anyone who can login as the user can use his private keys, stored in his container, anyways)... --Anton - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Microcontrollers bring cryptography onboard - Microchip Technology
http://www.electronicstalk.com/news/ari/ari172.html Electronicstalk Product news received on 12 August 2004 from Microchip Technology (contact details) Microcontrollers bring cryptography onboard Two new PIC Flash microcontrollers feature integrated Keeloq cryptographic peripherals, providing a complete solution for remotely controlled security systems and authentication applications. Two new PIC Flash microcontrollers feature integrated Keeloq cryptographic peripherals, providing a complete solution for remotely controlled security systems and authentication applications. Designers of such systems need an integrated solution that provides control of system power consumption and ensures reliable battery-powered operation. The new PIC12F635 and PIC16F636 microcontrollers meet these requirements by providing the Keeloq cryptographic peripheral, nanoWatt Technology power management modes, and reliable battery reset and detect features, including: programmable low voltage detect (PLVD), a wake-up reset (WUR) function, software-controlled brownout reset (BOR) and an extended watchdog timer (EWDT). Applications for the PIC12F635 and PIC16F636 include: remote security control (remote keyless entry, passive keyless entry and remote door locks and gate openers); authentication (property and identity); security systems (remote sensors and their communications); and other general purpose applications. The successful Keeloq technology is based on a proprietary, nonlinear encryption algorithm that creates a unique transmission on every use, rendering code capture and resend schemes useless. The new devices now feature this encryption algorithm as a hardware peripheral integrated within the PIC microcontroller. Key additional features of these two new PIC microcontrollers include: an 8MHz internal oscillator with software clock switching; ultra-low-power wakeup (ULPW); up to 3.5Kbyte of Flash program memory, and up to 256byte of EEPROM data memory; 64 or 128byte of RAM; and analogue comparators. The PIC12F635 and PIC16F636 are supported by Microchip's world-class development tools, including the MPLAB integrated development environment, MPLAB ICE 2000 in-circuit emulator, MPLAB PM3 universal device programmer, PICstart Plus low-cost development system, MPLAB ICD 2 in-circuit debugger/programmer and the PICkit 1 Flash starter kit. The two new PIC microcontrollers are available today for general sampling and volume production. The PIC12F635 offers a choice of 8-pin PDIP, SOIC and DFN-S packages, and the PIC16F636 comes in 14-pin PDIP, SOIC and TSSOP outlines. -- - R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED] The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/ 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA ... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Hackers download College's Patriot database
--- begin forwarded text Date: Thu, 12 Aug 2004 02:18:19 -0500 (CDT) From: InfoSec News [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: [ISN] Hackers download SIUE data, police say Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] List-Id: InfoSec News isn.attrition.org List-Archive: http://www.attrition.org/pipermail/isn List-Post: mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] List-Help: mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] List-Subscribe: http://www.attrition.org/mailman/listinfo/isn, mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.stltoday.com/stltoday/news/stories.nsf/News/Metro+East/A3F75AB9CA0230BB86256EEE0012DF3B?OpenDocumentHeadline=Hackers+download+SIUE+data,+police+say By Trisha Howard Of the Post-Dispatch 08/11/2004 The names and passport information of more than 500 foreign students at Southern Illinois University Edwardsville was illegally downloaded last week by a fellow student at the school, according to a search warrant filed Wednesday by university police. Greg Conroy, an SIUE spokesman, said Wednesday that three students had been questioned Friday after university officials discovered the security breach. Conroy said he expected the university to seek criminal charges in the case. The search warrant, filed in Madison County Circuit Court, said that the hacker downloaded the information from a special database set up to comply with provisions of the federal Patriot Act. The data included names, dates of birth, Social Security numbers and visa information, Sgt. Marty Tieman of the SIUE Police Department said in his affidavit. Conroy said that employees in the university's Office of Information Technology found out about the breach on Friday while doing their daily check of activity logs. The log showed that someone had downloaded the information early that morning. Computer experts then tracked the computer to one of three students who share an apartment at Cougar Village, Conroy said. On Friday afternoon, police seized three computers from the apartment and questioned the three students, Conroy said. Tieman said in his affidavit that police were greeted at the door by one of the three students, who admitted that he had seen his roommate access the server and download the information. Conroy said that officials had not yet determined a motive. For all I know, these students could have been doing this as a prank, Conroy said. At this point, I don't know what they wanted to do with the information. Conroy said investigators from a Metro East law enforcement computer task force were examining all three computers for evidence. He emphasized that the system does not allow hackers to change vital information. But he said that the breach was possible because an employee had failed to disable a feature that gives people access to the system without a password. The students were scanning the system, they found the flaw, and they started downloading files, Conroy said. It's an unfortunate mistake, but it happened. _ Open Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB) Everything is Vulnerable - http://www.osvdb.org/ --- end forwarded text -- - R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED] The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/ 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA ... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[ISN] Hack . . . hack back . . . repeat
--- begin forwarded text Date: Thu, 12 Aug 2004 02:13:41 -0500 (CDT) From: InfoSec News [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: [ISN] Hack . . . hack back . . . repeat Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] List-Id: InfoSec News isn.attrition.org List-Archive: http://www.attrition.org/pipermail/isn List-Post: mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] List-Help: mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] List-Subscribe: http://www.attrition.org/mailman/listinfo/isn, mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.nwfusion.com/news/2004/080904defcon.html By Rodney Thayer Network World 08/09/04 LAS VEGAS - Capture the flag might be only a game, but it was serious business at DefCon, the world's largest annual computer hacker convention. For 36 straight hours, eight teams of experienced hackers and serious security professionals played predator and prey as they tried to hack into competitors' networks while defending their own. From my front-row seat as a member of the winning team, Sk3wl of R00t (hacker slang for School of Root, where root refers to gaining administrator access to a system), I got a bird's-eye view of how new - and not so new - attacks could be launched and thwarted. Each qualified team playing the game - organized by a Seattle security community group called the Ghetto Hackers - controlled a pair of Windows machines running a variety of network and Web-based services that were connected to each other and a central scoring mechanism called the Scorebot via a Gigabit Ethernet network. Rest assured, this hacker network was not connected to the Internet. As soon as the doors to the secluded hacker playground disguised as a hotel ballroom were opened at 10 a.m. July 30, the air was tense in this crowded room. The game scenario and the legitimately purchased Windows images were presented to participants two hours before the official noon start time. How would you like to have to lock down two Windows boxes in just two hours as you started to recognize that there were world-class exploit developers in the room - and on your network? A team scored by attacking rivals' servers and stealing flags (data strings stored within the servers). The successful hacker then presented the stolen flags to the scoring system for credit. The overall score was a combination of credit for attacking other teams' servers and successfully defending your own services. Penalties were issued for excessive consumption of bandwidth, so simple port scans and brute force attacks were not used, and denial-of-service attacks were forbidden. In the middle of the room sat the Ghetto Hackers' gear, necessary for keeping the game within bounds and blasting loud techno music for the entire 36-hour ride. We'd trained for the competition in small conference rooms with similar tunes blaring as white noise to desensitize. But by the time it was 2 a.m., and you were staring at a network trace flying by on a screen, you noticed that your heartbeat and your breathing synchronized with the music and the packet traffic. At that point, it was time to take a walk. At the beginning everyone was organized with their supplies. Our cooler was stocked with ice and Coke. As time dragged on, people started bringing in food and drinks. At first we were organized and sent out someone for bread and cold cuts. But by the middle of Day Two we gave up and started ordering pizza. We stuck with soda for the most part, but as the contest wore on, a beer or two appeared. As we scanned the room (discreetly, of course) we saw the other teams behaving the same way if not more so. One team had a steadily draining bottle of Southern Comfort on top of its server. The Ghetto Hackers' full-length equipment rack was ornamented by a large, red, wooden arch in the style of a Japanese archway complete with Asian script. Our Japanese language expert slunk over for a closer look and determined the writing on the wall to be complete gibberish, with no hidden message to help us crack the code. Each team carefully arranged its equipment - everything from laptop Macs to Cisco switches, some piled 3 feet high on the allotted two tables - around the periphery of the room. Teams were supposed to have a maximum of 15 members, but no one stuck to that upper limit as the flow in and out of the room easily boosted each roster to more than 20 people. The ground rules I agreed to dictate that I not divulge individuals' identities. But in general terms I can say the teams included at least two CTOs; security professionals from Ernst Young, AOL and the University of California at Santa Barbara; and well-known and unknown hackers. Additionally, at least four teams had members hailing from the U.S. Department of Defense. We mostly kept to ourselves and minimized visible screen space to avoid becoming vulnerable to shoulder surfing or other forms of spying. You also had to do some reconnaissance to sniff out any secret deals being cut to share or trade information among teams. Think
Brin/FedWorld: Transparent Privacy
http://www.govtech.net/magazine/story.print.php?id=90772 Government Technology Feature Transparent Privacy Who should be watching the watchers? By Shane Peterson July 2004 Futurist, scientist and author David Brin has long studied what tomorrow could hold for humanity. Several of his novels have been New York Times best sellers, winning multiple Hugo, Nebula and other awards. A 1989 ecological thriller, Earth, foreshadowed global warming and the World Wide Web. Brin holds a bachelor of science from the California Institute of Technology, and a master's in electrical engineering and a Ph.D. in space physics from the University of California at San Diego. He also spent four years as a research engineer for Hughes Aircraft Research Labs. His 1998 nonfiction book, The Transparent Society: Will Technology Force Us to Choose Between Freedom and Privacy?, examines the ramifications of technological advances on individual lives. He begins by presenting a choice between living in two different cities of the near future. Each town appears the same, except for one significant difference. We have noticed something new about both of these 21st century cities -- a trait that marks them distinct from any metropolis of the late nineteen-nineties. Street crime has nearly vanished from both towns. But that is only a symptom, a result. The real change peers down from every lamp post, roof top and street sign. Tiny cameras survey traffic and pedestrians, observing everything in open view. Have we entered an Orwellian nightmare? Have the burghers of both towns banished muggings at the cost of creating a Stalinist dystopia? Consider City Number One. In this place, all the myriad cameras report their urban scenes straight to Police Central, where security officers use sophisticated image-processors to scan for infractions against the public order -- or perhaps against an established way of thought. Citizens walk the streets aware that any word or deed may be noted by agents of some mysterious bureau. At first sight, things seem quite similar in City Number Two. Again, there are ubiquitous cameras, perched on every vantage point. Only here we soon find a crucial difference. These devices do not report to the secret police. Rather, each and every citizen of this metropolis can lift his or her wristwatch/TV and call up images from any camera in town. Over by the mall, a teenage shoplifter is taken into custody gingerly, with minute attention to ritual and rights, because the arresting officer knows the entire process is being scrutinized by untold numbers who watch intently, lest her neutral professionalism lapse. In City Two, such micro cameras are banned from some indoor places ... but not Police Headquarters! There, any citizen may tune in on bookings, arraignments, and especially the camera control room itself, making sure that the agents on duty look out for violent crime, and only crime. Despite their initial similarity, these are very different cities, disparate ways of life, representing completely opposite relationships between citizens and their civic guardians. Both futures may seem undesirable. But can there be any doubt which city we'd rather live in, if these two make up our only choice? Q: It's been a few years since The Transparent Society was published. Has anything happened since then to change your stance that the idea of a freedom/security tradeoff is, as you've described it, dismal and loathsome? A: People tend to find evidence to support what they already want to believe. So naturally, being human, I've seen plenty to support my notions. But the important thing is always to question yourself and get used to the idea that others will question you. Still, taking that into account, it does seem clearer every day that the 21st century simply has to feature positive-sum games -- or ways everybody can benefit while minimizing the bad. Those prescribing the zero-sum approach -- you can't get one thing without giving up another -- appear to lose credibility every day. They preach a dreary world view that better not be right, if we're to have any hope. I cannot prove with utter certainty that we won't face some genuine tradeoffs between safety and freedom, but I am sick of hearing that it's automatic -- assumed -- that they work against each other, that I must choose between these precious things. I have concluded that those who say so are either lazy, liars or fools. Q: The landscape has changed a little bit since your 1998 book came out. A: Although some readers point to page 206, where it says something like, What if terrorists ever, for example, topple the World Trade Towers? What would the attorney general then ask for? How will people respond? After September 2001, that passage struck some as rather creepy. Q: In one interview about The Transparent Society, you spoke of the need for constant public supervision to enforce accountability on government -- metaphorically a leash to
Interview with Bruce Schneier, Counterpane Internet Security
http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2004/08/16/interview_with_bruce_schneier_counterpane_internet_security.html Netcraft Interview with Bruce Schneier, Counterpane Internet Security Interviews Bruce Schneier, founder and CTO of Counterpane Internet Security, is one of the world's foremost security experts and author of the influential books Applied Cryptography, Secrets Lies and Beyond Fear. His free monthly newsletter, Crypto-Gram, has over 100,000 readers. Interviewed by Glyn Moody, he discusses the lack of accountability of software companies, security through diversity, and why he would rather re-write Windows than TCP/IP. Q. You've said that Applied Cryptography described a mathematical utopia of algorithms and protocols: what was the attraction of that utopia for you? A. Cryptographic security comes from mathematics, not from people and not from machines. Mathematical security is available to everyone, both the weak and the powerful alike, and gives ordinary people a very powerful tool to protect their privacy. That's the cryptographic ideal of security. Q. To what extent is the Internet and its global linking of computers together to blame for the destruction of that utopia? A. They're entirely to blame, although blame is not really the right word. Cryptography worked well in the era of radios and telegraphs, where the threat was eavesdropping and mathematical cryptography could protect absolutely. But in the world of computers and networks, the threats are more complex and involve software and system vulnerabilities. Cryptography is much less able to provide security in this new world; that's the cryptographic reality of security. Q. In Secrets Lies you wrote that you had an epiphany about security in April 1999: can you say what it was? A. As a cryptographic consultant, I did a lot of work analyzing operating systems. Invariably I would break them, but almost never would I break the mathematical cryptography. I eventually realized that cryptography is the strongest part of a very weak system, and that the system aspects around the cryptography - the software, the operating system, the network, the user interface, etc. - are much more important. Q. One of the ideas in your book Secrets Lies is that at the root of the computer security problems we face today is the lack of accountability by software manufacturers for their faulty products: why do you think that they have managed to evade the responsibility - unlike everyone else - despite the scale of the damage and the associated profits? A. Computers are one of the few aspects of our modern society that we don't expect to work. If cars operated like computers, no one would buy them and there would be product liability lawsuits aplenty. But we're not seeing that with computers. This will eventually change. It has to; computers will eventually become as simple and reliable as telephones. And computers will have to deal with product liabilities, just as any mass-market product. But I've given up predicting when. Q. As you note, the arrival of email-borne malware has escalated security challenges hugely. Part of the problem is the spam deluge that assails nearly everybody's inbox: what is your preferred solution for dealing with spam? A. I use a service called Postini, and I love it. It cleans spam out of my mailbox before it hits my network, so I don't have to worry about it at all. Sure, there are some false positives, but after a few weeks of configuring my white list, I hardly get any. Spam filters aren't an ideal solution, though. I publish a free monthly newsletter: Crypto-Gram. It's subscription-based, and I have over 75,000 subscribers. Again and again my newsletter gets flagged as spam, even though it isn't. That's the real problem with spam filters: they fail to differentiate between solicited and unsolicited bulk e-mail. Q. Another aspect of the problem is people's apparently irresistible desire to open attachments: what can be done to discourage them from giving in to this urge, and to minimise the damage when they do? A. Education and containment. Some people still open attachments, but more people don't. That's education. Containment would be efforts to limit what attachments could do. Right now, when you open an attachment in Windows, it can do anything on your computer. That simply has to stop. Q. You've suggested the idea of a Net-based passport: how would the system work, and would it help here? A. I hope I haven't given that impression, because I think it's a terrible idea. Not only would it make the Internet less useful as a global societal infrastructure, it wouldn't help security very much. A digital passport would be too easy to forge and too difficult to check. And if people blindly trust the passport, it would just make things even worse. Q. Looking at this problem from another viewpoint, to what extent are the dangers of email-borne viruses, worms and trojans a consequence of a Microsoft
Johansen breaks AirPort Express encryption
http://macnn.com/print/25830 MacNN Johansen breaks AirPort Express encryption Wednesday, August 11, 2004 @ 7:20pm Jon Lech Johnasen, author of DeCSS, has discovered the public key that the AirPort Express uses to allow software to play audio through it. Johnasen says that the audio stream is encrypted with AES and that the AES key is encrypted with RSA. The public key is available on his blog as well as a software application (for Windows command-line) that streams Apple Lossless MPEG-4 audio to an AirPort Express. Though JustePort is Windows-only software at the moment, it should be only days before graphical software exists for the Mac now that the public key is out in the open. Apple could choose to change it via an AirPort Express firmware update, but it should still be possible to retrieve the new key. This is a huge step forward in giving standard applications the ability to use an Express for audio output, according to one developer. -- - R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED] The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/ 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA ... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
