Re: Generating AES key by hashing login password?

2008-08-30 Thread Jon Callas


We were wondering if it was possible to use a hash function instead.
Using the password he provided at the login screen and hash it n  
times.


Master Password: hash(hash(login_password))

Would this be a good idea if we've used this generated hash as a key  
for AES?

Would the hashing be secure enough against different kinds of attacks?


The short answer is yes. A better answer is that you want to salt the  
password before you hash it many times, to keep from having rainbow  
tables created. Another better answer is that you want to hash many  
times to slow down password crackers.


As others have mentioned, there are standards that can show you the  
way. PKCS#5 has a mechanism for this. OpenPGP does, too. They're  
subtly different, and understanding the differences can help you roll  
your own.


Jon

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Origin of the nomenclature red-black?

2008-08-30 Thread Steven M. Bellovin
Does anyone know where and when the use of red (inside networks) and
black (outside, encrypted networks for crypto gear) started?  I'm
especially intrigued by the use of red, since in other military
nomenclature (in the US) blue is the usual color for US and friendly
forces and red is (for obvious geopolitical reasons) the enemy.

One hypothesis I've come up with is that the color was chosen by the
British from the so-called all-red route -- the web of underseas
telegraph links that touched only Britain and its colonies.  It was
named for the usual map color of the time (~100 years ago) for the
British empire.  The all-red route gave the British protection against
(some) foreign eavesdropping; it was also useful offensively, since the
1920 Official Secrets Act contained a provision requiring cable
companies to turn over copies of all telegrams to the government.
(Source: The Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications and International
Politics, 1851-1945, by Daniel R. Headrick, Oxford University Press,
1991.)


--Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb

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Re: Generating AES key by hashing login password?

2008-08-30 Thread Peter Gutmann
Daniel Carosone [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
On Fri, Aug 29, 2008 at 09:01:26PM +, Muffys Wump wrote:
 Master Password: hash(hash(login_password))
 
 Would this be a good idea if we've used this generated hash as a key for AES?
 Would the hashing be secure enough against different kinds of attacks?

You want to look at something like PKCS#5 for generating keys from
passphrases.

... and specifically PBKDF2, not the original PKCS #5.  See also the
discussion at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dictionary_attack.

Peter.

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Re: privacy in public places

2008-08-30 Thread Udhay Shankar N

Perry E. Metzger wrote, [on 8/28/2008 10:09 PM]:


Given this, I think the time for focusing on the privacy implications
of payment transponders and fare cars is over. Not carrying a cell
phone will not help you avoid tracking when your environment is
saturated with cameras. Digital cash toll collection systems will not
avoid records being kept of your car's movements when cameras are
reading and recording license plates anyway.

Unfortunately, I don't see anything technological that people can
reasonably do here to provide more privacy, at least short of everyone
going everywhere on foot while wearing a burqa and periodically
attempting to confuse the cameras. The solutions, if any exist at all,
appear to be non-technical.


Isn't this essentially what David Brin has been saying for several years 
 now? [1] [2]


Udhay

[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Transparent_Society
[2] http://www.davidbrin.com/privacyarticles.html

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Tromboning: Internet Traffic Begins to Bypass the U.S.

2008-08-30 Thread R.A. Hettinga

Tromboning. That's a word I've been looking for.

Tromboning is what happens when I send packets between the Cable   
Wireless DSL line and the Caribbean Cable cablemodem on the other side  
of the living room in Seafeathers Bay -- via New York (and  
Washington), and/or Miami (and Washington), and/or Atlanta (and  
Washington), not to mention Washington.


Too bad little countries like Anguilla don't permit third-party  
peering between competing internet service providers. After all, that  
kind of latency is just... unacceptable. ;-)


A geodesic internetwork sees um, latency, as damage, c.


Evidently not just anyone can stick two links together using one box  
and three ethernet cards, or whatever, or the Internet Gets Broken.


Geeze, to paraphrase Grace Slick, I wish I knew BGP.

(Though, like Grace was at the time, I'm too burned-out a dog these  
days to learn those new tricks. Easier to doze off on the veranda  
watching the weather go by.)


Cheers,
RAH
---

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/30/business/30pipes.html?_r=1oref=sloginpartner=rssuserlandemc=rsspagewanted=print 



New York Times

August 30, 2008

Internet Traffic Begins to Bypass the U.S.
By JOHN MARKOFF

SAN FRANCISCO — The era of the American Internet is ending.

Invented by American computer scientists during the 1970s, the  
Internet has been embraced around the globe. During the network’s  
first three decades, most Internet traffic flowed through the United  
States. In many cases, data sent between two locations within a given  
country also passed through the United States.


Engineers who help run the Internet said that it would have been  
impossible for the United States to maintain its hegemony over the  
long run because of the very nature of the Internet; it has no central  
point of control.


And now, the balance of power is shifting. Data is increasingly  
flowing around the United States, which may have intelligence — and  
conceivably military — consequences.


American intelligence officials have warned about this shift. “Because  
of the nature of global telecommunications, we are playing with a  
tremendous home-field advantage, and we need to exploit that edge,”  
Michael V. Hayden, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency,  
testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee in 2006. “We also need  
to protect that edge, and we need to protect those who provide it to  
us.”


Indeed, Internet industry executives and government officials have  
acknowledged that Internet traffic passing through the switching  
equipment of companies based in the United States has proved a  
distinct advantage for American intelligence agencies. In December  
2005, The New York Times reported that the National Security Agency  
had established a program with the cooperation of American  
telecommunications firms that included the interception of foreign  
Internet communications.


Some Internet technologists and privacy advocates say those actions  
and other government policies may be hastening the shift in Canadian  
and European traffic away from the United States.


“Since passage of the Patriot Act, many companies based outside of the  
United States have been reluctant to store client information in the  
U.S.,” said Marc Rotenberg, executive director of the Electronic  
Privacy Information Center in Washington. “There is an ongoing concern  
that U.S. intelligence agencies will gather this information without  
legal process. There is particular sensitivity about access to  
financial information as well as communications and Internet traffic  
that goes through U.S. switches.”


But economics also plays a role. Almost all nations see data networks  
as essential to economic development. “It’s no different than any  
other infrastructure that a country needs,” said K C Claffy, a  
research scientist at the Cooperative Association for Internet Data  
Analysis in San Diego.


“You wouldn’t want someone owning your roads either.”

Indeed, more countries are becoming aware of how their dependence on  
other countries for their Internet traffic makes them vulnerable.  
Because of tariffs, pricing anomalies and even corporate cultures,  
Internet providers will often not exchange data with their local  
competitors. They prefer instead to send and receive traffic with  
larger international Internet service providers.


This leads to odd routing arrangements, referred to as tromboning, in  
which traffic between two cites in one country will flow through other  
nations. In January, when a cable was cut in the Mediterranean,  
Egyptian Internet traffic was nearly paralyzed because it was not  
being shared by local I.S.P.’s but instead was routed through European  
operators.


The issue was driven home this month when hackers attacked and  
immobilized several Georgian government Web sites during the country’s  
fighting with Russia. Most of Georgia’s access to the global network  
flowed through Russia and Turkey. A