Re: [cryptography] Cryptographers win Turing award

2013-03-14 Thread ianG
I admit to total ignorance, and have an intuition that this is 
probabilistically unacceptable.  Of anyone wishes to explain the 
significance of their work, I'd be grateful.  Meanwhile, here are the 
things I've decrypted:


http://amturing.acm.org/award_winners/goldwasser_8627889.cfm

Shafi Goldwasser and Silvio Micali laid the foundations of modern 
theoretical cryptography, taking it from a field of heuristics and hopes 
to a mathematical science with careful definitions and security models, 
precise specifications of adversarial capabilities, and rigorous 
reductions from formally defined computational problems. Their results, 
jointly and with others, established the now-standard definitions of 
security for the fundamental primitives of encryption and digital 
signatures, and provided exemplary implementations meeting the stated 
security objectives. Even more importantly, their work helped to 
establish the tone and character of modern cryptographic research. 
Jointly and in collaboration with others, they provided stunning 
innovations in the form of random functions, interactive proofs, and 
zero-knowledge protocols, with implications beyond cryptography to 
theoretical computer science in general.


ACM Press release is helpful:
http://www.acm.org/press-room/news-releases/2013/turing-award-12
Wikipedia is too:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Probabilistic_encryption
better copy of the 1984 article:
http://groups.csail.mit.edu/cis/pubs/shafi/1984-jcss.pdf

That article in networkworld is fatally flawed, and thus meets and 
exceeds the standard for press commentary.




iang


On 13/03/13 23:57 PM, Kevin W. Wall wrote:

MIT professors Shafi Goldwasser and Silvio Micali were
selected as this year's ACM Turing award winner.

Their work on introducing mathematical formalism to the
field of cryptography was cited.

http://www.networkworld.com/news/2013/031313-turing-award-267635.html
--
Blog: http://off-the-wall-security.blogspot.com/
The most likely way for the world to be destroyed, most experts agree,
is by accident. That's where we come in; we're computer professionals.
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[cryptography] [FoRK] ELF .so encryption contract work, probably resulting in open source

2013-03-14 Thread Eugen Leitl
- Forwarded message from Stephen D. Williams s...@lig.net -

From: Stephen D. Williams s...@lig.net
Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2013 19:43:06 -0700
To: Friends of Rohit Khare f...@xent.com, fo...@lig.net, ge...@lig.net,
Michael Tiemann tiem...@redhat.com, fosdwn...@lig.net
Subject: [FoRK] ELF .so encryption contract work,
probably resulting in open source
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.8;
rv:17.0) Gecko/20130216 Thunderbird/17.0.3
Reply-To: Friends of Rohit Khare f...@xent.com

We need the ability to encrypt the code in code segments of an ELF .so, for 
Linux / Android at least, with an AES key and also decrypt it in memory 
after loading by libdl using the same key.  Key management is out of scope. 
Might want selective decryption/encryption.  Signed code is in scope.  
Result will probably be releasable as open source.

This is something that should already exist, we need it, and I can pay for it.  
If you know anyone interested, please connect us.

I could do it in 1-3 weeks, but that's not going to happen anytime soon for a 
long todo list of reasons.

Stephen

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[cryptography] random extractor hobby algorithm

2013-03-14 Thread Krisztián Pintér

dear list,

if you want to send me to hell, please first read the disclaimers on the bottom 
please. now let's just dive in.

i propose an algorithm for smoothing a weak random stream of bytes.

it is a combined-cycle rc4, that is, we continually feed the rc4 with the 
random input stream as password, and at the same time we extract whitened 
stream on the output. the pseudocode would be, courtesy of wikipedia:
 
loop
i := (i + 1) mod 256
j := (j + S[i] + R) mod 256   // note the + R here
swap values of S[i] and S[j]
output S[(S[i] + S[j]) mod 256]
end loop

where R would be the next byte of the input stream. we input one byte per 
cycle, and discard the output until we collect enough entropy. assumed the 
input stream has an average entropy of x bits per byte, we feed 8/x bytes 
before we extract one byte of output. it is necessary to discard the first 
chunk of the output.

benefits:

1. white. the output satisfies every requirement we have for a random stream.
2. we don't lose entropy, we can extract as much as the input grants us on 
average.
3. no wait. you can add randomness as it arrives, you can extract as few as one 
byte.
4. robust. even if the input entropy drops, the output is unpredictable and 
smooth
5. avalanche effect. single bit change in the input changes the output entirely.
6. easy tuning of input/output ratio, even allows for below one ratios
7. blazing fast, small footprint and easy implementation
8. pools. it stores 1700 bit entropy in its belly.

problems:
1. can be run backwards if the internal state is compromised and the input 
entropy dropped severly below the estimated
2. ?

do you see any security problems with it?



DISCLAIMER:

yes, i'm aware that the problem is already solved in a number of reliable ways. 
yes, i'm aware that wise man does not use algorithms in cryptography that are 
not analyzed throughly by many experts. this idea came to me as part of my 
hobby project. this will not be implemented in any secure systems, nor any 
nonsecure systems for that matter, just a hobby project. i'm curious what more 
knowledgable minds can tell about this algorithm, mainly for educational 
purposes.


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Re: [cryptography] Cryptographers win Turing award

2013-03-14 Thread Kevin W. Wall
On Mar 14, 2013 7:52 AM, ianG i...@iang.org wrote:

snip
 ACM Press release is helpful:
 http://www.acm.org/press-room/news-releases/2013/turing-award-12
 Wikipedia is too:
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Probabilistic_encryption
 better copy of the 1984 article:
 http://groups.csail.mit.edu/cis/pubs/shafi/1984-jcss.pdf

 That article in networkworld is fatally flawed, and thus meets and
exceeds the standard for press commentary.

:-) Ironically,  the NetworkWorld article was the one cited by ACM
TechNews, which was where I first encountered it. I was somewhat surprised
that the URL they cited for their Probabilistic Encryption paper was at
Peking University. I wasn't even able to access it from work because that
domain is blocked because of malware and spam.

-kevin
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Re: [cryptography] Sodium. (Was: Re: NaCl Documentation?)

2013-03-14 Thread Tony Arcieri
On Tue, Mar 12, 2013 at 12:53 AM, Joachim Strömbergson 
joac...@strombergson.com wrote:

 There is a new implementation of NaCl by Frand Denis called Sodium that
 tries to be more portable and user friendly.


Just want to clarify one thing: Sodium isn't a reimplementation so much
as a repacakging of the existing NaCl code, the most notable aspect being
the removal of the assembly code which allows Sodium to be fully PIC.

-- 
Tony Arcieri
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[cryptography] SafetyLock™

2013-03-14 Thread Tony Arcieri
Someone pasted this in #crypto on Freenode. It's rather hilarious:

http://www.onyxscientificinc.com/SafetyLockEncryptionInfo.pdf

I can't tell what my favorite feature is, the fact I can use up to 9,999
keys per file, the fact that keys are minimum 1 megabit long, or the fact
that it uses FRACTALS!

(NOTE: I am using the word fact rather loosely here)

-- 
Tony Arcieri
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