Re: [cryptography] Stealthy Dopant-Level Hardware Trojans
Thank you. I like this paper, because its tied into the world of real semiconductor processing and diagnostic machines. The understanding of defenses and attacks against silicon requires an understanding of the capability of these machines and their use. What makes passive voltage contrast imaging good for detecting Becker style trojans is also what makes it a tool for side channel analysis and so as with other areas of hardware crypto engineering, knowing the tools of the enemy is a prerequisite to knowing what defenses are effective and what defenses are not. DJ On 7/1/14, 5:31 PM, Tony Arcieri wrote: This went to the cypherpunks list, but not to the others: http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/508 Reversing stealthy dopant level trojans! ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
Re: [cryptography] Stealthy Dopant-Level Hardware Trojans
This went to the cypherpunks list, but not to the others: http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/508 Reversing stealthy dopant level trojans! ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
Re: [cryptography] Stealthy Dopant-Level Hardware Trojans
On Sun, Jun 22, 2014 at 2:49 AM, coderman coder...@gmail.com wrote: ... full URI to PDF for posterity: http://www.emsec.rub.de/media/crypto/veroeffentlichungen/2014/02/20/BeckerChes13.pdf one last note: it has been pointed out that this paper discusses one potential implementation of the gates in question and does not actually represent Intel chip designs as produced. it is not clear how many potential ASIC runs could be affecting by this technique. i am accepting BTC donations for a FIB rig and operating costs, with the promise to public domain the imaging. ;) best regards, ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
Re: [cryptography] Stealthy Dopant-Level Hardware Trojans
On Fri, Sep 13, 2013 at 2:49 AM, Eugen Leitl eu...@leitl.org wrote: ... http://people.umass.edu/gbecker/BeckerChes13.pdf Stealthy Dopant-Level Hardware Trojans ? Georg T. Becker1 this paper has disappeared from the net. any one have copies? (looking at you, JYA ;) [bonus points for backstory on the distribution woes] ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
Re: [cryptography] Stealthy Dopant-Level Hardware Trojans
On Sun, Jun 22, 2014 at 01:46:44AM -0700, coderman wrote: On Fri, Sep 13, 2013 at 2:49 AM, Eugen Leitl eu...@leitl.org wrote: ... http://people.umass.edu/gbecker/BeckerChes13.pdf Stealthy Dopant-Level Hardware Trojans ? Georg T. Becker1 this paper has disappeared from the net. any one have copies? http://sgnsa2lp64l6v3l6.onion/BeckerChes13.pdf -- otr fp: https://www.ctrlc.hu/~stef/otr.txt ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
Re: [cryptography] Stealthy Dopant-Level Hardware Trojans
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On 22/06/14 09:46, coderman wrote: On Fri, Sep 13, 2013 at 2:49 AM, Eugen Leitl eu...@leitl.org wrote: ... http://people.umass.edu/gbecker/BeckerChes13.pdf Stealthy Dopant-Level Hardware Trojans ? Georg T. Becker1 this paper has disappeared from the net. any one have copies? (looking at you, JYA ;) http://www.emsec.rub.de/research/publications/Hardware-Trojans/ [bonus points for backstory on the distribution woes] PhD students suck at maintaining their web pages. Cheers, Michael -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJTpqUmAAoJEBEET9GfxSfMUz8H/3lqO7I1/4nfe006ebV2IIvO hsyntYGUri3/42WfeeBfLf3yCwC7bYtgQLOwL5FWM2Y61crBaPYp9BM2HO5o1z/1 E7UH0c+deFtp87jHUaPL4dRxNoLJITm1eAqt4GTJlcgQyy86TWBjbbL0HiwvwdB0 0QWHNJ383sW3b/iZVMIR8Wbpyc/jol0jdcokXiREronT/7L9rw+HW5/eJiVQW0KK p0b+TPC8MLB/RFLuLNuBYd7ETqrEljGPLMDXYUhCvd5y+0TSTHeWHXS7bAURBlH0 WJzmRWjBtRATT2ARo52ykyLzSiaMaaZxxBXzawkVSVVtmGSxhg8ylM+H1L2xC3Y= =9aAl -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
Re: [cryptography] Stealthy Dopant-Level Hardware Trojans
On Sun, Jun 22, 2014 at 2:43 AM, Michael Rogers mich...@briarproject.org wrote: ... http://www.emsec.rub.de/research/publications/Hardware-Trojans/ ... PhD students suck at maintaining their web pages. ah well, :) full URI to PDF for posterity: http://www.emsec.rub.de/media/crypto/veroeffentlichungen/2014/02/20/BeckerChes13.pdf thanks to al! best regards, ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
[cryptography] Stealthy Dopant-Level Hardware Trojans
http://people.umass.edu/gbecker/BeckerChes13.pdf Stealthy Dopant-Level Hardware Trojans ? Georg T. Becker1 , Francesco Regazzoni2 , Christof Paar1,3 , and Wayne P. Burleson1 1University of Massachusetts Amherst, USA 2TU Delft, The Netherlands and ALaRI - University of Lugano, Switzerland 3Horst ortz Institut for IT-Security, Ruhr-Universiat Bochum, Germany Abstract. In recent years, hardware Trojans have drawn the attention of governments and industry as well as the scientific community. One of the main concerns is that integrated circuits, e.g., for military or critical infrastructure applications, could be maliciously manipulated during the manufacturing process, which often takes place abroad. However, since there have been no reported hardware Trojans in practice yet, little is known about how such a Trojan would look like, and how dicult it would be in practice to implement one. In this paper we propose an extremely stealthy approach for implementing hardware Trojans below the gate level, and we evaluate their impact on the security of the target device. Instead of adding additional circuitry to the target design, we insert our hardware Trojans by changing the dopant polarity of existing transistors. Since the modified circuit appears legitimate on all wiring layers (including all metal and polysilicon), our family of Trojans is resistant to most detection techniques, including fine-grain optical inspection and checking against golden chips. We demonstrate the ectiveness of our approach by inserting Trojans into two designs | a digital post-processing derived from Intel's cryptographically secure RNG design used in the Ivy Bridge processors and a side-channel resistant SBox implementation and by exploring their detectability and their ects on security. Keywords: Hardware Trojans, malicious hardware, layout modifications, Trojan side-channel signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
