Re: Steganography covert communications - Between Silk andCyanide

2002-01-05 Thread Ben Laurie

Matt Crawford wrote:
 
  David Honig wrote:
   Unbeknown to the latter, Marks had already cracked General de Gaulle's
   private cypher in a spare moment on the lavatory. -from the obit of Leo
   Marks, cryptographer
 
  But this was because it was, in fact, one of his own ciphers.
  Cheers,
  Ben.
 
 Not one that he invented or approved of, but one that he knew and had
 to work with, yes.

Indeed, it was the cipher he inherited (and spent much time and energy
to have replaced, for excellent reasons).

Cheers,

Ben.

--
http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html



-
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]



Re: Hackers Targeting Home Computers

2002-01-05 Thread Jeff Simmons

On Friday 04 January 2002 09:54 am, Hadmut Danisch wrote:
 
 On my private computer (DSL, dynamically assigned IP address), I
 detect an increasing density of attack attempts. More or less serious
 attempts happen every few minutes in average (depends on daytime).
 Highest density is in the evening hours, when hackers and victims
 find time to be online.

Unless I'm misunderstanding you, I find this hard to believe.

[Moderator's note: I find it easy to believe, because I see exactly
what he does on the networks I control. I don't know why you are
attacked less often. --Perry]

On my computer (DSL, fixed IP), which is pretty heavily monitored, I'm 
detecting only a few, maybe up to a dozen, actual attacks a day.  Most of 
them are from well-known root kits, targeting old vulnerabilities.  Sunrpc, 
lpr, imap, and anonymous ftp seem to be popular.  Most attacks come from 
Asia, eastern Europe used to be popular, but seems to have died down recently.

The only way I could get anywhere near your numbers is to count all of the 
Windows-based http attacks coming from automated worms and the like.

I'd be interested in hearing from others what kind and frequency of attacks 
they're experiencing.

 This means the probability of an infection of an unprotected
 private computer is quite high after only some hours of internet
 access. Most (normal) people I know use such unprotected
 computers for internet access.

This is of course true no matter what the frequency of attacks is.

-- 
Jeff Simmons   [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 Simmons Consulting - Network Engineering, Administration, Security
You guys, I don't hear any noise.  Are you sure you're doing it right?
- My Life With The Thrill Kill Kult



-
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]



Re: Hackers Targeting Home Computers

2002-01-05 Thread Hadmut Danisch

On Fri, Jan 04, 2002 at 11:42:27AM -0800, Jeff Simmons wrote:
 
 Unless I'm misunderstanding you, I find this hard to believe.
 
 On my computer (DSL, fixed IP), which is pretty heavily monitored, I'm 
 detecting only a few, maybe up to a dozen, actual attacks a day.  Most of 
 them are from well-known root kits, targeting old vulnerabilities.  Sunrpc, 
 lpr, imap, and anonymous ftp seem to be popular.  Most attacks come from 
 Asia, eastern Europe used to be popular, but seems to have died down
 recently. 
 
 The only way I could get anywhere near your numbers is to count all of the 
 Windows-based http attacks coming from automated worms and the like.
 
 I'd be interested in hearing from others what kind and frequency of attacks 
 they're experiencing.


There's good reason for the different results.

I'm located in Germany and my DSL line is from Deutsche Telekom
(T-DSL, T-Online). This is by far the biggest provider in 
Germany for private DSL internet access, and they also do 
provide large numbers of modem and ISDN accounts. They use
a few very well known ip address ranges for all DSL, modem and
ISDN customers. Scanning the T-Online address ranges allows you 
to find heaps of german private computers. Many of the attacks
I detect come from within the T-Online network, others often come from
the countries you describe. I compared results with some of the 
colleagues results and with results we get from commercial firewalls
at the same time. There is a significant difference. It
appears that the T-Online network ranges are a favored
target of many hackers/scanners/script kiddies.

There's no doubt that some attackers prefer attacking private
computers and select address ranges where they find most of
these computers.

Hadmut




-
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]



Re: Hackers Targeting Home Computers

2002-01-05 Thread Hack Hawk

At 06:54 PM 1/4/02 +0100, Hadmut Danisch wrote:
  WASHINGTON -- Computer hackers...are turning their sights to home
  computers that are...less secure than ever before.

On my private computer (DSL, dynamically assigned IP address), I
detect an increasing density of attack attempts.

I see the same thing here.  But most of its http/web attacks against the 
unicode vulnerability.  Back when code red was out of control I performed a 
little experiment.  I took 5 IP address of Code Red infected servers on DSL 
and tested them for the *very* old (Oct/Nov 2000) unicode 
vulnerability.  All 5 systems had NOT been patched.  Its not surprising 
that I now see virus infected machines trying to attack my systems using 
unicode attack strings.  I guess somebody took the idea one step further 
and developed a virus.

It surprises me that providers like Earthlink  GTE (I have one DSL on 
each) aren't taking measures to filter out virus traffic from infected 
systems.  It seems a simple enough task to me.

It seems to me that the biggest cause of the problems are ignorance and 
lack of concern as the article suggests.  So rather than complain and rant, 
I've setup a non-technical alert list for my friends and family to keep 
them informed and safe.

I try to keep the list fun and easy to read.  Its taken a great deal of 
time and explaining, but slowly more and more of them are beginning to see 
the bigger picture.

My favorite scenario to lay out for my friends is simple and 
effective.  Lets say that a hacker gains control of your computer and uses 
it to attack another site/system.  Lets say that site is a Fortune 500 
company or a military or government site.  Even if you don't get into 
trouble, the FBI could still show up on your door step and take your 
computer away for analysis.  No more email or web for you.  Oh, and they'll 
probably need to sift through your phone records to see if the hacker 
dialed out from your computer.  Kiss your privacy goodbye.

- hawk




-
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]



Baltimore Sun: MD police seek easier wiretaps

2002-01-05 Thread John Gilmore

http://www.sunspot.net/news/custom/guns/bal-wiretap03.story?coll=bal-home-headlines 

Md. police seek law for easier wiretaps
Use of technology by criminals outruns current authority

By Sarah Koenig
Sun Staff
Originally published January 2, 2002, 9:16 PM EST

Aware that police might be eavesdropping, drug dealers not only watch 
what they say on their cell phones. They burn their phones, and bust 
them. They create phantom phone numbers and treat a handset the way a 
tourist might treat a disposable camera, discarding it after a few good 
shots.

As prosecutors and detectives in Baltimore increase the use of wiretaps 
against major drug organizations, they have discovered that their 
targets' phone capabilities outpace their own.

To catch up, law enforcement officials from across Maryland are 
proposing legislative changes that would expand and simplify the use of 
wiretaps.

A principal objective is to be able to quickly switch a wiretap from 
phone to phone, mirroring a suspect's maneuvers.

Over the last couple of years, as we've been doing more of these 
wiretap investigations, we've come face to face with what the 
shortcomings are, said city State's Attorney Patricia C. Jessamy, who 
will hold a news conference on the issue today.

But efforts to streamline the wiretap application process, which is now 
closely re viewed by a judge, are sure to meet some opposition in the 
General Assembly from the American Civil Liberties Union, among others.

There is reason to be concerned that the police will become Big 
Brother, said Maryland ACLU spokesman Dwight Sullivan. We want police 
to be aggressive in fighting crime, but we also need to have the barrier 
between the aggressiveness and the public, and that barrier is the judge.

Wiretapping is the most intrusive and sophisticated investigative tool 
police have, to be used only when more conventional methods are 
exhausted. Maryland's wiretap laws, which require more judicial 
oversight and offer less flexibility than those of most other states, 
were last updated in 1988, back when having a pager was cool.

Since then, investigators say, technology and sophistication have shot 
ahead. It's not unusual for drug organizations to buy cell phones in 
bulk, making sure not to use one line for more than a few days. In one 
Baltimore case, a suspect owned about 50 cell phones.

Current law is geared more toward the phone than the suspect, requiring 
investigators to reapply for a new warrant each time they want to listen 
to a new line -- a process that means writing about 100 pages of 
affidavits explaining to a judge why the wiretap is crucial to a case.

Rewriting the warrant applica tion also slows down an investigation, 
sometimes at a crucial moment.

In July, for instance, Eric L. Buckson, 31, a now-convicted drug dealer 
serving a 40-year prison sentence, had just met with a cocaine source 
when he noticed someone following his car.

He hit a parked vehicle, then another. His car burst into flames and he 
ran away, leaving the drugs and his tapped cell phone to get drowned by 
firefighters.

To Buckson, the incident was probably a scare and a nuisance. To 
investigators it represented a significant obstacle: Within hours, 
Buckson was using a new phone, but it would take prosecutors much longer 
to apply for a new wiretap. By the end of the investigation, prosecutors 
would tap 15 different phones, creating 22,000 pages of evidence.

Maj. Anthony G. Cannavale, commander of the Baltimore Police 
Department's drug enforcement unit, said changes to the law would help 
reduce the criminals' advantage.

It's always a game of wits with the drug dealers, he said. We're 
really at a breakwater point, where if we don't get a handle on the 
technology, we're going to be out of business.

In the past couple of years, Baltimore has greatly expanded its use of 
wiretaps in an effort to move from street arrests of low-level drug 
pushers to kingpins with international narcotics connections. The city 
Police Department and State's Attorney's Office have created special 
technology units, and they perform more wiretap investigations than 
any other jurisdiction in Maryland.

Though wiretaps consume enormous amounts of time and money, their 
success is undeniable, as compiled in a recent report prepared by 
Jessamy's office: In the past two years, wiretaps have led to the 
dismantling of nine drug organizations -- a total of 118 defendants with 
links to Colombia and the Dominican Republic, and the seizure of nearly 
$800,000, 66 cars, 84 guns, 14 kilos of heroin and 10.5 kilos of cocaine.

But criminals are becoming more savvy about wiretaps, thanks in part to 
the recent investigations.

Cannavale said his officers have found wiretap affidavits, which include 
extensive surveillance details, when doing searches in drug dealers' 
houses -- documents probably provided by their lawyers.

In