Announce: San Francisco Cypherpunks, Sat 2/16/02, 6pm - 225 11th, SF

[Bill Stewart]

This announcement will be at 
http://cryptorights.org/cypherpunks/meetingpunks.html
and is being sent to several cypherpunks-related mailing lists.
===

The San Francisco Bay Area Cypherpunks Meeting will be
Saturday, February 16, 2002, at Don Ramon's Restaurant, 225 11th St, San 
Francisco.


As usual, this is an open public meeting on US soil.
Everyone's invited, including non-US-citizens, and several suspected Canadians
will be present :-)

Our agenda is a widely-held secret.
Predicted topics include Intrepid Traveller Bill Scannell's trip to Cuba,
discussion of the crypto and data-sharing presentations from Codecon,
potentially a couple of projects that were too late for Codecon,
and generally what everybody's been doing and working on.

The unusual time and place are because the Codecon conference www.codecon.org
will be a block away at the DNA Lounge www.dnalounge.com Friday-Sunday 
afternoons,
and the RSA conference will be at the San Jose Convention Center the 
following week.
A number of cypherpunks will be speaking at Codecon (See people.html and 
schedule.html.)

The RSA Conference appears to have decided to protect their agenda through 
Obscurity;
you can obtain PDFs of the agenda from their website if you have Multimedia 
Flash :-)
Codecon is a low-priced conference; RSA has high-priced talks, low-priced 
exhibits,
and the usual vendor parties.

=== DIRECTIONS AND PARKING 
Don Ramon's Restaurant - Look for Usual Suspects, probably upstairs.
The restaurant serves family-style Mexican food, as well as
caffeine and ethanol, and is said to be pretty good.

Directions: 225 11th St. is a block north of the DNA Lounge,
for which directions are available at http://www.dnalounge.com/directions/ .

 From the South Bay:
Take 101 North to the 9th Street / Civic Center exit.
Take 9th Street, and turn left onto Harrison, then right onto 11th.

 From the East Bay:
From the Bay Bridge, take I-80 West to the 9th Street / Civic Center exit.
Keep right at the fork in the ramp. Turn left onto Harrison, then right 
onto 11th.

By Public Transit:
The nearest BART stations are at 16th and Mission and Civic Center (Market 
and Hyde),
both about 3/4ths of a mile away.
There are bus stops at 11th and Harrison (right outside the club),
and at Market and Van Ness (four blocks away).
From Caltrain, it appears that the #47 bus is probably the best choice.

Parking is easy for once:  Ample public parking is available at the Costco 
parking lot,
at the corner of 11th and Harrison. The parking lot entrance is on 11th.
You can also find free street parking, but beware of the street cleaning 
signs.

=



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Re: Losing the Code War by Stephen Budiansky

[marius]

Trei, Peter wrote:
 
  marius[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] wrote:
 
   marius wrote:
Not quite true. Encrypting each message twice would not increase the
effective key size to 112 bits.
There is an attack named meet in the middle which will make the
effective key size to be just 63 bits.
  
   Peter Trei wrote:
Don't forget that the MITM attack (which Schneier claims
takes 2^(2n) = 2^112 time), also requires 2^56 blocks
of storage.
   [...]
I don't lose sleep over MITM attacks on 3DES.
 
  2^57 operations, with 2^56 blocks of storage manipulation can be
  approximated to: 2^56 * log(2^56) + 2^56 * log(2^56) = 2^62 + 2^62 =
  2^63
 
  Betting on storage as a show stopper is not a good idea, regardless of
  sleep pattern.
 
  Marius
 
 Oh, I totally agree - my first followup (Feb 4) read:
 
 - start quote -
 
 Either way, my point stands: any attack which requires 2^56 blocks
 of storage is probably intractable for the time being, imho. 10 years
 from now, I'm not so sure.
 
 - end quote -
 
 The expansion of storage over the last 20 years is even more
 astonishing than the  speedup of microprocessors. The first IBM
 PC to ship with a HD (PC-XT ~1983) had a 5 Mb drive. When I
 worked for Columbia U, undergraduates were given about 50kb
 of diskquota for a semester.
 
 Nevertheless, 2^56 blocks of centralized storage is a lot, and
 will remain a lot for a while.
 
 Peter Trei

So let say that I don't have 2^56 blocks of centralized storage, but I
have 2^40. Now by independently guessing 16 bits of each Key1 and Key2,
I will need only 2^(56-16) = 2^40 blocks of centralized storage . But
the attack must be run now over 2^16 * 2^16 pairs of such tables to
allow all possible key pairs. So the time is on order of 2^(2*16) *
2^(56-16) = 2^72.

That means that I can make an time-memory tradeoff, such that it will
accommodate my resources. 

Marius

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