crypto/web impementation tradeoffs

2002-07-04 Thread John Saylor

Hi

I'm passing some data through a web client [applet-like] and am planning
on using some crypto to help ensure the data's integrity when the applet
sends it back to me after it has been processed.

The applet has the ability to encode data with several well known
symmetric ciphers.

The problem I'm having has to do with key management.

Is it better to have the key encoded in the binary, or to pass it a
plain text key as one of the parameters to the applet?

I know that the way most cryptosystems work is that the security is in
the key. But having a compiled-in key just seems like a time bomb that's
going to go off eventually. Is it better to have a variable key passed
in as data [i.e. not marked as key] or to have a static key that sits
there and waits to be found.

Thanks.

-- 
\js

'People who work sitting down get paid more than people who work standing up.'
  - Ogden Nash (1902-1971)

-
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]



Horseman Number 3: IRC and crypto and stego, oh, my...

2002-07-04 Thread R. A. Hettinga

http://news.bbc.co.uk/low/english/sci/tech/newsid_2082000/2082657.stm


BBC News Online: Sci/Tech
Tuesday, 2 July, 2002, 13:30 GMT 14:30 UK
Accessing the secrets of the brotherhood

Police using the internet to lure paedophiles
As police break an internet paedophile ring known as the Shadowz
Brotherhood, News Online looks at how they did it.

The arrest of 50 people all over Europe and the seizure of scores of
computers, hard drives and thousands of disks is the culmination of a
complex and elaborate operation.

The National Hi-Tech Crime Unit and their colleagues in Europol had to use
all their technical know-how to break into the Shadowz Brotherhood.

Paedophiles are naturally suspicious of newcomers into their social circle
and, like many criminal groups operating in cyberspace, are skilled at
counter-surveillance.

 Child pornography constitutes a disgrace to human dignity. 
Gilles Leclair
Europol

Neither Europol or the National Hi-Tech Crime Unit would comment on whether
undercover police officers posed as paedophiles in order to infiltrate the
ring.

But, reading between the lines, that is the only way the police could have
accessed the Shadowz Brotherhood's website and gained the confidence of the
other members.

A Europol spokesman said the group's activities centred around a website
which had an archive of child abuse images.

He said that when uploading and downloading images to and from the site
they used sophisticated encryption techniques, often hiding obscene
material in apparently innocent picture files.

The website was run by a group of hardcore paedophiles called
administrators who operated a star-rating system.

Girl identified

The administrators would vet new members, who would then receive a one
star rating allowing them to enter fairly tame newsgroups and bulletin
boards.

To gain further stars they had to upload images of child sex abuse for
viewing and downloading by other members.

As they gained more stars they were allowed access to restricted sites and
protected rooms containing the most perverted material.

An administrator would be on duty 24 hours a day to assess new images.

Proxy servers were used to disguise where members were accessing the site
from and it is believed that special software was used to give those
involved cyber anonymity.

BBC News Online's technology correspondent Mark Ward said criminal groups
often used servers run by other innocent organisations to host illegal
images.

 Criminal groups take advantage of the high-tech technology to attack the
principles and the values of our democratic systems 
Gilles Leclair
Europol
He said many universities and other vulnerable organisations spent a lot of
effort making sure their servers were not used by such groups.

He said paedophiles often met each other in prison and kept in contact
afterwards, passing on codewords, information about sites online and advice
about how to avoid scrutiny online

Most of those involved are believed to have taught themselves computer
encryption techniques.

But Europol had its own team of intelligence analysts, working in a secure
operations room in The Hague equipped with the latest technology.

They processed information received on a daily basis from investigators in
the different participating states.

In March police monitoring the site identified a six-year-old girl and went
to the US to take her away from a suspected paedophile.

Team of analysts

Detectives are expected to spend months trawling the suspects' hard drives
in an attempt to locate images which would lead to convictions.

Europol said the Shadowz Brotherhood was formed in 2000, but some of its
members had been in contact on the internet before that date.

Europol's deputy director Gilles Leclair, head of Serious Crime Department,
said: Child pornography constitutes a disgrace to human dignity.

Criminal groups take advantage of the high-tech technology to attack the
principles and the values of our democratic systems.

But, once more, the international law enforcement co-operation proved very
effective and gave a strong and decisive answer against organised crime.

-- 
-
R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

-
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]



Smart ID Cards Planned for Sailors to Spot Terrorists

2002-07-04 Thread R. A. Hettinga

http://quote.bloomberg.com/fgcgi.cgi?ptitle=Top%20World%20Newss1=blktp=ad_topright_topworldT=markets_box.hts2=ad_right1_windexbt=ad_position1_windexbox=ad_box_alltag=worldnewsmiddle=ad_frame2_windexs=APSMyZRY2U21hcnQg

Bloomberg News

Top World News

07/03 13:20
Smart ID Cards Planned for Sailors to Spot Terrorists (Update1)
By Amy Strahan Butler

Washington, July 3 (Bloomberg) -- The identities of more than 500,000
commercial sailors worldwide would be verified through thumb or iris scans
under tough, new anti-terrorism standards backed by the U.S. and other
industrialized nations.

``The whole idea is to come up with a worldwide system for positive,
verifiable identification of seafarers,'' said Mary Covington, associate
director of the Washington office of the International Labor Organization,
a United Nations-affiliated group that's developing the standards.

The labor organization got a big boost when representatives of the Group of
Eight nations -- the U.S., Japan, Germany, the U.K., France, Canada, Italy
and Russia -- endorsed the standards during a meeting in Canada last week.

The plans have drawn criticism from seafarer's groups concerned that port
authorities may insert information in so- called ``smart'' identification
documents without the cardholder's knowledge.

Those concerns are being swept aside as the drive to close loopholes in
shipping security has gained momentum since Sept. 11 in the U.S., where
less than 2 percent of cargo entering ports is inspected by the U.S.
Customs Service.

After the terrorist attacks, the Coast Guard began requiring ships to
notify ports 96 hours prior to arrival and to submit a list of crew members.

Card-Carrying Sailors

Commercial sailors in countries that ratify the ILO standards would be
required to carry identification cards similar to driver's licenses that
also contain biometric information, such as a thumbprint or iris scan.
Under the proposal, port authorities would be able to verify the identity
of the card bearer by scanning his thumb or eye.

The credentials could be issued to more than a half-million shipping
employees as governments attempt to tighten port security to prevent
terrorist activities.

``This would help produce uniform treatment of seafarers,'' said Chris
Koch, president of the World Shipping Council, a trade association
representing more than 40 shipping companies, including Atlantic Container
Line AB and Crowley Maritime Corp. ``That's in the interest of not only
seafarers but of commerce.''

The current ILO convention for identifying shipping employees entering
foreign ports asks that countries to provide seafarers with documents, such
as passports, that include their name, date of birth, nationality and photo.

Technology Lag

Once the identification standards are drafted, individual governments would
be responsible for ratifying and enforcing them. Only 61 countries have
ratified the ILO's existing documentation standards for commercial sailors.

Critics of the proposal say that technology sophisticated enough to
differentiate between the characteristics of thousands of irises, for
example, is still years away.

``There is no perfect biometrics technology,'' the Automatic Identification
Manufacturers Association of Japan wrote to the ILO. An accurate system
would lengthen inspection times while a cheaper, faster one would be more
inaccurate and possibly a target for terrorists, the agency said.

Still, it's important to set the standards and then let the technology
catch up, said Joseph Cox, president of the Chamber of Shipping of America.
Biometric characteristics within the identification cards are essential for
security, Cox said.

``There's no question we're going to have something like that,'' Cox said.
``We will get there because we have to get there.''

-- 
-
R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

-
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]



Re: Montgomery Multiplication

2002-07-04 Thread Nomen Nescio

On Tue, 2 Jul 2002, Damien O'Rourke wrote:

 I was just wondering if anyone knew where to get a good explanation of
 Montgomery multiplication for the non-mathematician?  I have a fair bit
 of maths but not what is needed to understand his paper.

Bear replied:

 Montgomery Multiplication is explained for the computer scientist
 in Knuth, _Seminumerical Methods_.

 Briefly: The chinese remainder theorem proves that for any set
 A1...AN of integers with no common divisors, any integer X which is
 less than their product can be represented as a series of remainders
 X1...XN, where Xn is equal to X modulo An.

 if you're using the same set of integers with no common divisors
 A1...AN to represent two integers X and Y, you have a pair of series
 of remainders X1...XN and Y1...YN.

 Montgomery proved that Z, the product of X and Y, if it's in the
 representable range, is Z1...ZN where Zn equals (Xn * Yn) mod An.

That's not Montgomery multiplication; that's what Knuth called modular
arithmetic, described in section 4.3.2 of Seminumerical Methods.

Montgomery multiplication is well described at
http://www.ciphergoth.org/writing/postings/news-992.txt, as Paul Crowley
posted.

-
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]



Re: crypto/web impementation tradeoffs

2002-07-04 Thread Mike Brodhead


 I'm passing some data through a web client [applet-like] and am planning
 on using some crypto to help ensure the data's integrity when the applet
 sends it back to me after it has been processed.

Help us to understand your threat model.  Do you trust the user and
his/her machine, but are worried about Mallory altering the
communications between client and server?  Do you need confidentiality
too, or just integrity?  How serious an attacter are you concerned
with?  Curious and semi-technical?  Determined hacker?  NSA?

 Is it better to have the key encoded in the binary, or to pass it a
 plain text key as one of the parameters to the applet?

Both strategies seem like doom to me.  Either way, the key is in a
form which allows Eve or Mallory to learn it.  You need to find a way
to keep from sending the key in the clear.

What about using Diffie-Hellman key exchange?  What about SSL?
Depending on your needs, SSL might be overkill, but it has the
advantage of having been prodded quite a bit at the protocol and
(often) implementation level.  SSH may be an option too.

Is the web client sent to the user over HTTP?  Can you ensure that the
connection uses SSL?  If so, the key does not have to travel in
plaintext form.  There is still the issue of key re-use.  How much
control do you have over the server from which the java client is
sent?  You could send a different symmetric key with each client,
though that is a little strange.  A better strategy might be to send a
private key with the client which it can then use to negotiate session
keys with the server.

Having said all that, I still lean towards using a library with an
existing protocol like SSL or SSH.  Whether either of those is
applicable really depends on the specifics of your app, to whom it is
distributed, etc.

--mkb



-
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]



Re: crypto/web impementation tradeoffs

2002-07-04 Thread bear



Without more knowledge of the parameters of the system
(especially the threat model), it's hard to say -- however,
this sounds like a case for the Diffie-Hellman key agreement
protocol.  Have the client and server each pick a random
number, and then use those numbers to generate a key
dynamically.

Bear


On Wed, 3 Jul 2002, John Saylor wrote:

Hi

I'm passing some data through a web client [applet-like] and am planning
on using some crypto to help ensure the data's integrity when the applet
sends it back to me after it has been processed.

The applet has the ability to encode data with several well known
symmetric ciphers.

The problem I'm having has to do with key management.

Is it better to have the key encoded in the binary, or to pass it a
plain text key as one of the parameters to the applet?

I know that the way most cryptosystems work is that the security is in
the key. But having a compiled-in key just seems like a time bomb that's
going to go off eventually. Is it better to have a variable key passed
in as data [i.e. not marked as key] or to have a static key that sits
there and waits to be found.

Thanks.

--
\js

'People who work sitting down get paid more than people who work standing up.'
  - Ogden Nash (1902-1971)

-
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]



-
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]



Re: crypto/web impementation tradeoffs

2002-07-04 Thread Ben Laurie

John Saylor wrote:
 Hi
 
 I'm passing some data through a web client [applet-like] and am planning
 on using some crypto to help ensure the data's integrity when the applet
 sends it back to me after it has been processed.
 
 The applet has the ability to encode data with several well known
 symmetric ciphers.
 
 The problem I'm having has to do with key management.
 
 Is it better to have the key encoded in the binary, or to pass it a
 plain text key as one of the parameters to the applet?
 
 I know that the way most cryptosystems work is that the security is in
 the key. But having a compiled-in key just seems like a time bomb that's
 going to go off eventually. Is it better to have a variable key passed
 in as data [i.e. not marked as key] or to have a static key that sits
 there and waits to be found.

If all you want to ensure is integrity, why are you using symmetric 
encryption? Surely a keyed HMAC would make more sense?

Not that this changes your question. However, you haven't specified your 
threat model, so I feel unable to answer.

Cheers,

Ben.

-- 
http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html   http://www.thebunker.net/

There is no limit to what a man can do or how far he can go if he
doesn't mind who gets the credit. - Robert Woodruff


-
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]