Re: Palladium and malware

2002-09-04 Thread Bill Frantz

At 9:00 PM -0700 8/30/02, Nomen Nescio wrote:
Bill Frantz writes, regarding the possibility that the Palladium
architecture could be designed to resist the use of encrypted
code:

 All general purpose computers require a way to move data space to code
 space to support compilation.

Well, this is usually done by storing the data to the disk, and
then later loading it as a program file.  It does not prevent data
and code memory from being distinct, which was the proposal for how
Palladium could reduce the risk of being used to run encrypted code.
If a Palladium program was forced to go through the disk, that is, to
load data, decrypt it, store it to the disk, and then load it as code,
then that would provide a means to get access to the unencrypted code,
defeating the goal of keeping the code within the vault.

Usually, but not always.  Just-in-time compilation systems take interpreted
code sequences and compile it, in RAM, to machine instructions.  A number
of Java virtual machines make use of this technique.  More relevant, it is
also applicable to some of the Microsoft languages.


 Even if you don't allow compilation, most
 modern systems have enough different powerful scripting languages that
 interpretation is sufficient to support viruses.

It's not clear why these languages would use the Palladium features and
run their scripts in the shielded mode.  But you're right that if they
did, this could provide a mechanism for disassembly-resistant code.

Well, some vendors might want to protect their scripts.  Just because a
program is written in an interpreted language instead of a compiled
language doesn't mean that vendors don't want to protect their code.  There
is an active market in Java obfuscators for just this reason.

Cheers - Bill


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Re: Palladium and malware

2002-08-30 Thread Derek Atkins

Bill Frantz [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:

 All general purpose computers require a way to move data space to code
 space to support compilation.  Even if you don't allow compilation, most
 modern systems have enough different powerful scripting languages that
 interpretation is sufficient to support viruses.

application/shell anyone?  (Yes, some Mail-readers actually
implement this!)

 Cheers - Bill

-derek

-- 
   Derek Atkins
   Computer and Internet Security Consultant
   [EMAIL PROTECTED] www.ihtfp.com

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Re: Palladium and malware

2002-08-29 Thread Ben Laurie

Paul Crowley wrote:
 I'm informed that malware authors often go to some lengths to prevent
 their software from being disassembled.  Could they use Palladium for
 this end?  Are there any ways in which the facilities that Palladium
 and TCPA provide could be useful to a malware author who wants to
 frustrate legitimate attempts to understand and defeat their software?

That would depend on what facilities the OS layers on top of 
TCPA/Palladium. Certainly I could believe an OS would exist that would 
simply refuse read access to executables, and Palladium/TCPA could be 
used to encrypt them such that they were inaccessible except under that OS.

So, in short. Yes.

Cheers,

Ben.

-- 
http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html   http://www.thebunker.net/

Available for contract work.

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Re: Palladium and malware

2002-08-29 Thread bear



On 29 Aug 2002, Paul Crowley wrote:

I'm informed that malware authors often go to some lengths to prevent
their software from being disassembled.  Could they use Palladium for
this end?  Are there any ways in which the facilities that Palladium
and TCPA provide could be useful to a malware author who wants to
frustrate legitimate attempts to understand and defeat their software?

If it provides the protections that copy-protection groups want
(ie, it can be used to prevent keys in their software from being
read by other software) then yes, it can be used to prevent any
code from being read by any software.

Bear



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Palladium and malware

2002-08-28 Thread Paul Crowley

I'm informed that malware authors often go to some lengths to prevent
their software from being disassembled.  Could they use Palladium for
this end?  Are there any ways in which the facilities that Palladium
and TCPA provide could be useful to a malware author who wants to
frustrate legitimate attempts to understand and defeat their software?
-- 
  __  Paul Crowley
\/ o\ [EMAIL PROTECTED]
/\__/ http://www.ciphergoth.org/

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