Executable discarded
We received a message claiming to be from you which contained a virus according to File::Scan v0.31, a Perl module from CPAN at http://www.cpan.org/authors/id/H/HD/HDIAS This message was not delivered to the intended recipient, it has been discarded. For information on removing viruses from your computer, please see http://www.google.com/search?q=antivirus or http://hotbot.lycos.com/?query=antivirus Postmaster Sender : [EMAIL PROTECTED] Recipient : [EMAIL PROTECTED] Message-Id : [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: A special excite game Virus : W32/Klez.gen@MM Original headers: From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Fri Jul 5 10:06:12 2002 Received: from waste.minder.net (daemon@waste [66.92.53.73]) by locust.minder.net (8.11.6/8.11.6) with ESMTP id g65E61E16352 for [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Fri, 5 Jul 2002 10:06:02 -0400 (EDT) (envelope-from [EMAIL PROTECTED]) Received: (from cpunks@localhost) by waste.minder.net (8.11.6/8.11.6) id g65E5x903178 for [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Fri, 5 Jul 2002 10:05:59 -0400 Received: from locust.minder.net (locust.minder.net [66.92.53.74]) by waste.minder.net (8.11.6/8.11.6) with ESMTP id g65E5vu03164 for [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Fri, 5 Jul 2002 10:05:57 -0400 Received: from einstein.ssz.com (cpunks@[207.200.56.4]) by locust.minder.net (8.11.6/8.11.6) with ESMTP id g65E5ZE16340 for [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Fri, 5 Jul 2002 10:05:36 -0400 (EDT) (envelope-from [EMAIL PROTECTED]) Received: (from cpunks@localhost) by einstein.ssz.com (8.8.8/8.8.8) id JAA07702 for [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Fri, 5 Jul 2002 09:09:35 -0500 Received: (from mdom@localhost) by einstein.ssz.com (8.8.8/8.8.8) id JAA07688 for cypherpunks-outgoing; Fri, 5 Jul 2002 09:08:08 -0500 Received: from rly-ip02.mx.aol.com (rly-ip02.mx.aol.com [152.163.225.160]) by einstein.ssz.com (8.8.8/8.8.8) with ESMTP id JAA07665 for [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Fri, 5 Jul 2002 09:04:22 -0500 Received: from logs-mtc-tg.proxy.aol.com (logs-mtc-tg.proxy.aol.com [64.12.102.135]) by rly-ip02.mx.aol.com (v83.35) with ESMTP id RELAYIN6-0705095953; Fri, 05 Jul 2002 09:59:53 -0400 Received: from Bqzlfj (ACA568F9.ipt.aol.com [172.165.104.249]) by logs-mtc-tg.proxy.aol.com (8.10.0/8.10.0) with SMTP id g65DgHD77734 for [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Fri, 5 Jul 2002 09:42:18 -0400 (EDT) Date: Fri, 5 Jul 2002 09:42:18 -0400 (EDT) Message-Id: [EMAIL PROTECTED] From: specials [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Old-Subject: CDR: A special excite game MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=F9K0Az2sVHboo3Rd4i2OtjV71h0 X-Apparently-From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Precedence: bulk Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] X-Mailing-List: [EMAIL PROTECTED] X-Unsubscription-Info: http://einstein.ssz.com/cdr X-List-Admin: [EMAIL PROTECTED] X-Loop: ssz.com X-Acceptable-Languages: English, Russian, German, French, Spanish Subject: A special excite game We received a message claiming to be from you which contained an executable attachment (batch file, script, program, etc). In order to protect users from malicious programs, we do not accept these file types thru this mail server. If you need to send the file to it's intended recipient, you must send it in an archived and/or compressed format. Your email has been sent to the intended recipient without this file included. A message detailing why it was dropped has been substitued in it's place. Postmaster Sender : [EMAIL PROTECTED] Recipient : [EMAIL PROTECTED] Message-Id : [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: A special excite game Mime type : application/octet-stream File name : play.exe
Executable discarded
We received a message claiming to be from you which contained a virus according to File::Scan v0.31, a Perl module from CPAN at http://www.cpan.org/authors/id/H/HD/HDIAS This message was not delivered to the intended recipient, it has been discarded. For information on removing viruses from your computer, please see http://www.google.com/search?q=antivirus or http://hotbot.lycos.com/?query=antivirus Postmaster Sender : [EMAIL PROTECTED] Recipient : [EMAIL PROTECTED] Message-Id : [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: A very funny website Virus : W32/Klez.gen@MM Original headers: From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Fri Jul 5 10:14:06 2002 Received: from waste.minder.net (daemon@waste [66.92.53.73]) by locust.minder.net (8.11.6/8.11.6) with ESMTP id g65EDpE16773 for [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Fri, 5 Jul 2002 10:13:51 -0400 (EDT) (envelope-from [EMAIL PROTECTED]) Received: (from cpunks@localhost) by waste.minder.net (8.11.6/8.11.6) id g65EDm503894 for [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Fri, 5 Jul 2002 10:13:48 -0400 Received: from locust.minder.net (locust.minder.net [66.92.53.74]) by waste.minder.net (8.11.6/8.11.6) with ESMTP id g65EDlu03880 for [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Fri, 5 Jul 2002 10:13:47 -0400 Received: from einstein.ssz.com (cpunks@[207.200.56.4]) by locust.minder.net (8.11.6/8.11.6) with ESMTP id g65EDLE16753 for [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Fri, 5 Jul 2002 10:13:21 -0400 (EDT) (envelope-from [EMAIL PROTECTED]) Received: (from cpunks@localhost) by einstein.ssz.com (8.8.8/8.8.8) id JAA07925 for [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Fri, 5 Jul 2002 09:17:22 -0500 Received: (from mdom@localhost) by einstein.ssz.com (8.8.8/8.8.8) id JAA07894 for cypherpunks-outgoing; Fri, 5 Jul 2002 09:15:58 -0500 Received: from mailbox-5.st1.spray.net (mailbox-5.st1.spray.net [212.78.202.105]) by einstein.ssz.com (8.8.8/8.8.8) with ESMTP id JAA07888 for [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Fri, 5 Jul 2002 09:15:43 -0500 Received: from Hnstszem (achn-d9b9f3d5.pool.mediaWays.net [217.185.243.213]) by mailbox-5.st1.spray.net (8.8.8/8.8.8) with SMTP id QAA16146 for [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Fri, 5 Jul 2002 16:10:33 +0200 (DST) Date: Fri, 5 Jul 2002 16:10:33 +0200 (DST) Posted-Date: Fri, 5 Jul 2002 16:10:33 +0200 (DST) Message-Id: [EMAIL PROTECTED] From: inet [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Old-Subject: CDR: A very funny website MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=I4MQ084735Sjnk3AkZ4qCOpl6 Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Precedence: bulk Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] X-Mailing-List: [EMAIL PROTECTED] X-Unsubscription-Info: http://einstein.ssz.com/cdr X-List-Admin: [EMAIL PROTECTED] X-Loop: ssz.com X-Acceptable-Languages: English, Russian, German, French, Spanish Subject: A very funny website We received a message claiming to be from you which contained an executable attachment (batch file, script, program, etc). In order to protect users from malicious programs, we do not accept these file types thru this mail server. If you need to send the file to it's intended recipient, you must send it in an archived and/or compressed format. Your email has been sent to the intended recipient without this file included. A message detailing why it was dropped has been substitued in it's place. Postmaster Sender : [EMAIL PROTECTED] Recipient : [EMAIL PROTECTED] Message-Id : [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: A very funny website Mime type : application/octet-stream File name : border.bat
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Re: Diffie-Hellman and MITM
Consider setting up a secure video call with somebody, and each of you reading the hash of your DH parameter to the other. It's really hard for a MITM to fake that - but if you don't know what the other person looks or sounds like, do you know it's really them, or did you just have an unbreakably secure call with the wrong person? Whatever you deploy to define somebody should be used as authentication channel. You are exactly as secure as as you can define somebody. Your al quaeda coworker probably has your never published public key. Your online-found busty and wet blonde is probably named Gordon. = end (of original message) Y-a*h*o-o (yes, they scan for this) spam follows: Sign up for SBC Yahoo! Dial - First Month Free http://sbc.yahoo.com
You have been choosen 4001
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Re: Need voluntary/optional TCPA/Palladium quote
[Repost] Lucky asks: I am looking for a quote by a TCPA or Palladium principal that states that TCPA and/or Palladium will be voluntary or optional. Google was not helpful. Did anybody on here run across such a quote in one of the interviews recently published? Please include the URL/citation. The TCPA FAQ at http://www.trustedcomputing.org/docs/Website_TCPA_FAQ_ver1.1.pdf includes the following: : 13. What has the TCPA done to preserve privacy? : : The TCPA believes that privacy is a necessary element of a trusted system. : The TCPA Specification has taken specific steps to enhance trust while : preserving privacy. The system owner has ultimate control and permissions : over private information and must opt-in to utilize the TCPA subsystem. : Integrity metrics can be reported by the TCPA platform, but do not : restrict the choice and options of the owner preserving openness. This describes the system as opt-in and that says that it will not restrict the choice and options of the owner. That is, users can enable the TCPA system and get their integrity metrics reported (these are basically hashes of the BIOS, OS boot loader, etc.), which will allow third parties to know that they booted into an unmodified, trusted system. But they always have the choice to boot into a modified, patched or untrusted system, and in that case either the TCPA chip will report it, or they can forego the use of the TCPA subsystem entirely.
Time to Replace your Ink Cartridges
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What's up with openpgp.net?
-- Forwarded message -- Date: Tue, 2 Jul 2002 18:51:17 -0500 From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: From [EMAIL PROTECTED] Tue Jul 2 18:50:39 2002 Received: (from cpunks@localhost) by einstein.ssz.com (8.8.8/8.8.8) id SAA31038 for [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Tue, 2 Jul 2002 18:50:17 -0500 Received: from localhost (localhost) by einstein.ssz.com (8.8.8/8.8.8) with internal id SAA30729; Tue, 2 Jul 2002 18:48:07 -0500 Date: Tue, 2 Jul 2002 18:48:07 -0500 From: Mail Delivery Subsystem [EMAIL PROTECTED] Message-Id: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/report; report-type=delivery-status; boundary=SAA30729.1025653687/einstein.ssz.com Subject: Returned mail: User unknown Auto-Submitted: auto-generated (failure) This is a MIME-encapsulated message --SAA30729.1025653687/einstein.ssz.com The original message was received at Tue, 2 Jul 2002 18:47:41 -0500 from cpunks@localhost - The following addresses had permanent fatal errors - [EMAIL PROTECTED] - Transcript of session follows - ... while talking to domains.invweb.net.: MAIL From:[EMAIL PROTECTED] SIZE=24725 451 4.7.1 Please try again later ... while talking to router.invlogic.com.: RCPT To:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 550 5.7.1 [EMAIL PROTECTED]... Relaying denied. IP name lookup failed [207.200.56.4] 550 [EMAIL PROTECTED] User unknown --SAA30729.1025653687/einstein.ssz.com Content-Type: message/delivery-status Reporting-MTA: dns; einstein.ssz.com Arrival-Date: Tue, 2 Jul 2002 18:47:41 -0500 Final-Recipient: RFC822; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Action: failed Status: 5.1.1 Remote-MTA: DNS; router.invlogic.com Diagnostic-Code: SMTP; 550 5.7.1 [EMAIL PROTECTED]... Relaying denied. IP name lookup failed [207.200.56.4] Last-Attempt-Date: Tue, 2 Jul 2002 18:48:06 -0500 --SAA30729.1025653687/einstein.ssz.com Content-Type: message/rfc822 Return-Path: cpunks Received: (from cpunks@localhost) by einstein.ssz.com (8.8.8/8.8.8) id SAA30686 for [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Tue, 2 Jul 2002 18:47:41 -0500 Received: from localhost (localhost) by einstein.ssz.com (8.8.8/8.8.8) with internal id SAA30574; Tue, 2 Jul 2002 18:46:54 -0500 Date: Tue, 2 Jul 2002 18:46:54 -0500 From: Mail Delivery Subsystem [EMAIL PROTECTED] Message-Id: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/report; report-type=delivery-status; boundary=SAA30574.1025653614/einstein.ssz.com Subject: Returned mail: User unknown Auto-Submitted: auto-generated (failure) This is a MIME-encapsulated message --SAA30574.1025653614/einstein.ssz.com The original message was received at Tue, 2 Jul 2002 18:46:19 -0500 from cpunks@localhost - The following addresses had permanent fatal errors - [EMAIL PROTECTED] - Transcript of session follows - ... while talking to domains.invweb.net.: MAIL From:[EMAIL PROTECTED] SIZE=22839 451 4.7.1 Please try again later ... while talking to router.invlogic.com.: RCPT To:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 550 5.7.1 [EMAIL PROTECTED]... Relaying denied. IP name lookup failed [207.200.56.4] 550 [EMAIL PROTECTED] User unknown --SAA30574.1025653614/einstein.ssz.com Content-Type: message/delivery-status Reporting-MTA: dns; einstein.ssz.com Arrival-Date: Tue, 2 Jul 2002 18:46:19 -0500 Final-Recipient: RFC822; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Action: failed Status: 5.1.1 Remote-MTA: DNS; router.invlogic.com Diagnostic-Code: SMTP; 550 5.7.1 [EMAIL PROTECTED]... Relaying denied. IP name lookup failed [207.200.56.4] Last-Attempt-Date: Tue, 2 Jul 2002 18:46:53 -0500 --SAA30574.1025653614/einstein.ssz.com Content-Type: message/rfc822 Return-Path: cpunks Received: (from cpunks@localhost) by einstein.ssz.com (8.8.8/8.8.8) id SAA30520 for [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Tue, 2 Jul 2002 18:46:19 -0500 Received: from localhost (localhost) by einstein.ssz.com (8.8.8/8.8.8) with internal id SAA30410; Tue, 2 Jul 2002 18:45:28 -0500 Date: Tue, 2 Jul 2002 18:45:28 -0500 From: Mail Delivery Subsystem [EMAIL PROTECTED] Message-Id: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/report; report-type=delivery-status; boundary=SAA30410.1025653529/einstein.ssz.com Subject: Returned mail: User unknown Auto-Submitted: auto-generated (failure) This is a MIME-encapsulated message --SAA30410.1025653529/einstein.ssz.com The original message was received at Tue, 2 Jul 2002 18:45:06 -0500 from cpunks@localhost - The following addresses had permanent fatal errors - [EMAIL PROTECTED] - Transcript of session follows - ... while talking to domains.invweb.net.: MAIL From:[EMAIL PROTECTED] SIZE=20953 451 4.7.1 Please try again later ... while talking to router.invlogic.com.: RCPT To:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 550 5.7.1 [EMAIL PROTECTED]... Relaying denied. IP name lookup failed [207.200.56.4] 550 [EMAIL PROTECTED] User unknown
Re: Kennenlernen wollt
I assume since I didn't post this, it's a sign that those who post anonymously messages and use spray.net as their ISP shouldn't run windows worm-vulnerable MUAs? :) Quoting Ryan Lackey [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Content-Type: application/octet-stream; name=s35itreiber[1].html Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-ID: G2S44792R030G PEhUTUw+CjxIRUFEPgo8dGl0bGU+U3VjaGUgbmFjaCBzMzVpdHJlaWJlciAmbWlkZG90O3wm bWlkZG90OyBhc3RhbGF2aXN0YSFkZSAmbWlkZG90O3wmbWlkZG90OyBzdWNoZSB1bmQgZmlu ZGUgQ3JhY2t6LCBTZXJpYWx6LCBTZWN1cml0eSwgV2FyZXosIENyYWNrczwvdGl0bGU+Cjxt ZXRhIGh0dHAtZXF1aXY9IkNvbnRlbnQtVHlwZSIgY29udGVudD0idGV4dC9odG1sOyBjaGFy c2V0PWlzby04ODU5LTEiPgo8bWV0YSBodHRwLWVxdWl2PSJDb250ZW50LVR5cGUiIGNvbnRl bnQ9InRleHQvaHRtbDsgY2hhcnNldD13aW5kb3dzLTEyNTIiPgo8bWV0YSBuYW1lPSJkZXNj cmlwdGlvbiIgY29udGVudD0iYXN0YWxhdmlzdGEhZGUgaXN0IERJRSBVbmRlcmdyb3VuZCBT dWNobWFzY2hpbmUgZvxyIENvbXB1dGVyc2ljaGVyaGVpdCwgQ3JhY2tzLCBTZXJpYWx6IHVu ZCB2aWVsZXMgbWVociEiPgo8bWV0YSBuYW1lPSJrZXl3b3JkcyIgY29udGVudD0iYXN0YWxh dmlzdGEsIGFzdGFsYXZpc3RhIWRlLCBhc3RhbGF2aXN0YS5kZSwgc3VjaG1hc2NoaW5lLCBj cmFja3MsIGNyYWNreiwgc2VyaWFseiwgY3JhY2tpbmcgc29mdHdhcmUsIGhhY2tlciwgc2Vj dXJpdHksIGlwLCBzZXJpYWxzLCB3YXJleiwgZnJlZXdhcmUsIHZpcnVzLCBhbnRpdmlydXMs IGFudGktdmlydXMsIj4KPHN0eWxlIHR5cGU9InRleHQvY3NzIj4KQk9EWSB7CkZPTlQtU0la RTogMTJweDsKCUZPTlQtRkFNSUxZOiBWZXJkYW5hLEFyaWFsLEhlbHZldGljYSxzYW5zLXNl cmlmOwp9PC9zdHlsZT4KPHNjcmlwdCB0eXBlPSJ0ZXh0L2phdmFzY3JpcHQiIGxhbmd1YWdl PSJqYXZhc2NyaXB0IiBzcmM9Imh0dHA6Ly93d3cuYXN0YWxhdmlzdGEuZGUvanMuanMiPgo8 L3NjcmlwdD4KPC9oZWFkPgoKCjxib2R5IGJnY29sb3I9IiMwMDAwMDAiIHRleHQ9IiNGRkZG RkYiIGxpbms9IiNGRkZGRkYiIHZsaW5rPSIjRkZGRkZGIiBhbGluaz0iI0ZGRkZGRiIgdG9w bWFyZ2luPSIwIiBsZWZ0bWFyZ2luPSIwIiBtYXJnaW53aWR0aD0iMCIgbWFyZ2luaGVpZ2h0 PSIwIj4KCjxjZW50ZXI+CiAgPHRhYmxlIHdpZHRoPTEwMCUgY2VsbHBhZGRpbmc9MiBjZWxs c3BhY2luZz0wIGJvcmRlcj0wPgogICAgPHRyPiAKICAgICAgPHRkIGJnY29sb3I9IzAwYTAw MD48Zm9udCBmYWNlPWFyaWFsLGhlbHZldGljYSBzaXplPS0xIGNvbG9yPXdoaXRlPiAKICAg ICAgICA8dGFibGUgd2lkdGg9MTAwJSBjZWxscGFkZGluZz0zIGNlbGxzcGFjaW5nPTAgYm9y ZGVyPTA+CiAgICAgICAgICA8dHI+IAogICAgICAgICAgICA8dGQgYmdjb2xvcj0jMDA0MDAw Pjxmb250IGZhY2U9YXJpYWwsaGVsdmV0aWNhIHNpemU9LTEgY29sb3I9d2hpdGU+IAogICAg ICAgICAgICAgIDxhIGhyZWY9Imh0dHA6Ly93d3cuYXN0YWxhdmlzdGEuZGUiPjxiPmFzdGFs YXZpc3RhIWRlPC9iPjwvYT4gOiAKICAgICAgICAgICAgICBbIDxhIGhyZWY9Imh0dHA6Ly90 b3BsaXN0Lmd1bGxpLmNvbS9jZ2kvZ3VsbGkucGNnaT9pZD1hdmlzdGEiPlRvcGxpc3Q8L2E+ IAogICAgICAgICAgICAgIHwgCiAgICAgICAgICAgICAgPHNjcmlwdCB0eXBlPSJ0ZXh0L2ph dmFzY3JpcHQiPgp2YXIgSUUgPSAid2luZG93LmV4dGVybmFsLkFkZEZhdm9yaXRlKCdodHRw Oi8vd3d3LmFzdGFsYXZpc3RhLmRlJywgJ2FzdGFsYXZpc3RhIWRlIC0gZGllIGJlc3RlIFVu ZGVyZ3JvdW5kc3VjaG1hc2NoaW5lIScpIjsKdmFyIE5TID0gImFsZXJ0KCdEcvxja2UgZGll IFRhc3RlbmtvbWJpbmF0aW9uIFNUUkcgKyBEIHVtIGVpbmVuIEJvb2ttYXJrIHp1IHNldHpl biEnKSI7CnZhciBjbG9zZUxpbmsgPSAiO1wiIHRhcmdldD1cIl90b3BcIj5Cb29rbWFyazwv QT4gfCAiOwooZG9jdW1lbnQuYWxsKSA/IGRvY3VtZW50LndyaXRlKCI8QSBIUkVGPVwiamF2 YXNjcmlwdDogIiArIElFICsgY2xvc2VMaW5rKSA6IGRvY3VtZW50LndyaXRlKCI8QSBIUkVG PVwiamF2YXNjcmlwdDogIiArIE5TICsgY2xvc2VMaW5rKTs8L3NjcmlwdD4KICAgICAgICAg ICAgICA8YSBocmVmPSJodHRwOi8vd3d3LnNleGhhbW1lci5jb20vYXN0YWxhdmlzdGEvIj5T ZXhzaG93czwvYT4gfCA8YSBocmVmPSJodHRwOi8vd3d3LmFzdGFsYXZpc3RhLmRlL2FkL3Rv ZW5lIj5LbGluZ2VsdPZuZTwvYT4gCiAgICAgICAgICAgICAgfCA8YSBocmVmPSJodHRwOi8v d3d3LmFzdGFsYXZpc3RhLmRlL2FkL2xvZ29zIj5IYW5keWxvZ29zPC9hPiB8IAogICAgICAg ICAgICAgIDxhIGhyZWY9Imh0dHA6Ly93d3cuYXN0YWxhdmlzdGEuZGUvYWQvbW9kIj5CbHVl bGlnaHRzPC9hPiB8IDxhIGhyZWY9Imh0dHA6Ly93d3cuYXN0YWxhdmlzdGEuZGUvYWQvbG92 ZXRvcCI+UGFydG5lcnZlcm1pdHRsdW5nPC9hPiAKICAgICAgICAgICAgICB8IDxhIGhyZWY9 Imh0dHA6Ly93d3cuYXN0YWxhdmlzdGEuZGUvYWQvaGJ0b3AiPkhhY2tlbiBsZXJuZW48L2E+ IAogICAgICAgICAgICAgIHwgPGEgaHJlZj0iamF2YXNjcmlwdDppbVByZXNzKCkiIHRhcmdl dD0iX3NlbGYiPkltcHJlc3N1bTwvYT4gXTwvZm9udD4gCiAgICAgICAgICAgIDwvdGQ+CiAg ICAgICAgICA8L3RyPgogICAgICAgIDwvdGFibGU+CiAgICAgICAgPC9mb250PiA8L3RkPgog ICAgPC90cj4KICA8L3RhYmxlPgogIDxoMSBhbGlnbj0iY2VudGVyIj48Zm9udCBmYWNlPSJB cmlhbCI+YXN0YWxhdmlzdGE8Zm9udCBjb2xvcj0iIzAwQTAwMCI+ITwvZm9udD5kZTwvZm9u dD48L2gxPgogIDxoNCBhbGlnbj0iY2VudGVyIj48Zm9udCBmYWNlPSJBcmlhbCI+PGEgaHJl Zj0iaHR0cDovL3d3dy5hc3RhbGF2aXN0YS5kZS9hZC9oYmJhbjEiPjxpbWcgYm9yZGVyPSIw IiBzcmM9Imh0dHA6Ly9pbWcuYXN0YWxhdmlzdGEuZGUvYi9iYW5uZXIzNi5naWYiIGFsdD0i SGFja2VuIGxlcm5lbiEiIHdpZHRoPSI0NjgiIGhlaWdodD0iNjAiPjwvYT48L2ZvbnQ+PC9o ND4KICA8L2NlbnRlcj4KCjxjZW50ZXI+CjxGT1JNIE1FVEhPRD1HRVQgQUNUSU9OPSJIVFRQ Oi8vc2VhcmNoLmFzdGFsYXZpc3RhLmRlLyIgbmFtZT1mIHRhcmdldD0iX3NlbGYiPgo8dGFi bGUgYmdjb2xvcj0jMDAwMDAwIGJvcmRlcj0wIHdpZHRoPTEwMCU+Cjx0cj48dGQgYWxpZ249 ImNlbnRlciI+CjxCUj4KU3VjaGUgbmFjaDogPElOUFVUIFRZUEU9InRleHQiIE5BTUU9InEi IFNJWkU9NTAgVkFMVUU9InMzNWl0cmVpYmVyIiBzdHlsZT0iZm9udC1zaXplOiAxM3B4OyAg Y29sb3I6IzAwMDAwMDsgZm9udC1mYW1pbHk6IHZlcmRhbmE7IGJvcmRlcjogMSBzb2xpZCAj OTk5OTk5OyAgYmFja2dyb3VuZDojMDBBMDAwIj4KPElOUFVUIFRZUEU9InN1Ym1pdCIgVkFM VUU9ImFzdGFsYXZpc3RhIWRlIiBzdHlsZT0iZm9udC1zaXplOiAxM3B4OyAgY29sb3I6IzAw
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Inscription réussie! La liliste de Yann L Merci!
Vous êtes dès à présent membre de la très prisée La liliste de Yann L! Vous recevrez désormais des nouvelles de Yann L.com, avant même de lire les manchettes des journaux. Merci et à bientôt. YannL.com . Si vous avez souscrit à La liliste de Yann L par accident ou que quelqu'un vous a inscrit sans votre permission (le vilain), ou que vous désirez (certainement pas) annuler votre inscription à La liliste de Yann L Cliquez simplement sur ce lien http://www.yannl.com/cgi-bin/easylist.pl?action=unsubscribe[EMAIL PROTECTED] et hop, plus de nouvelles de Yann L . com (réféchissez bien, hein :-). Merci, YannL.com
Re: CDR: What's up with openpgp.net?
Looks like your DNS is b0rked: (measl)greeves:/home/measl $ nslookup 207.200.56.4 Server: ns1.mfn.org Address: 204.238.179.2 *** ns1.mfn.org can't find 207.200.56.4: Non-existent host/domain (measl)greeves:/home/measl $ whois 207.200.56.4 Whois Server Version 1.3 Domain names in the .com, .net, and .org domains can now be registered with many different competing registrars. Go to http://www.internic.net for detailed information. Server Name: EINSTEIN.SSZ.COM IP Address: 207.200.56.4 Registrar: NETWORK SOLUTIONS, INC. Whois Server: whois.networksolutions.com Referral URL: http://www.networksolutions.com Last update of whois database: Fri, 5 Jul 2002 04:50:05 EDT The Registry database contains ONLY .COM, .NET, .ORG, .EDU domains and Registrars. On Tue, 2 Jul 2002, Jim Choate wrote: Date: Tue, 2 Jul 2002 19:58:28 -0500 (CDT) From: Jim Choate [EMAIL PROTECTED] Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: CDR: What's up with openpgp.net? -- Forwarded message -- Date: Tue, 2 Jul 2002 18:51:17 -0500 From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: From [EMAIL PROTECTED] Tue Jul 2 18:50:39 2002 Received: (from cpunks@localhost) by einstein.ssz.com (8.8.8/8.8.8) id SAA31038 for [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Tue, 2 Jul 2002 18:50:17 -0500 Received: from localhost (localhost) by einstein.ssz.com (8.8.8/8.8.8) with internal id SAA30729; Tue, 2 Jul 2002 18:48:07 -0500 Date: Tue, 2 Jul 2002 18:48:07 -0500 From: Mail Delivery Subsystem [EMAIL PROTECTED] Message-Id: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/report; report-type=delivery-status; boundary=SAA30729.1025653687/einstein.ssz.com Subject: Returned mail: User unknown Auto-Submitted: auto-generated (failure) This is a MIME-encapsulated message --SAA30729.1025653687/einstein.ssz.com The original message was received at Tue, 2 Jul 2002 18:47:41 -0500 from cpunks@localhost - The following addresses had permanent fatal errors - [EMAIL PROTECTED] - Transcript of session follows - ... while talking to domains.invweb.net.: MAIL From:[EMAIL PROTECTED] SIZE=24725 451 4.7.1 Please try again later ... while talking to router.invlogic.com.: RCPT To:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 550 5.7.1 [EMAIL PROTECTED]... Relaying denied. IP name lookup failed [207.200.56.4] 550 [EMAIL PROTECTED] User unknown --SAA30729.1025653687/einstein.ssz.com Content-Type: message/delivery-status Reporting-MTA: dns; einstein.ssz.com Arrival-Date: Tue, 2 Jul 2002 18:47:41 -0500 Final-Recipient: RFC822; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Action: failed Status: 5.1.1 Remote-MTA: DNS; router.invlogic.com Diagnostic-Code: SMTP; 550 5.7.1 [EMAIL PROTECTED]... Relaying denied. IP name lookup failed [207.200.56.4] Last-Attempt-Date: Tue, 2 Jul 2002 18:48:06 -0500 --SAA30729.1025653687/einstein.ssz.com Content-Type: message/rfc822 Return-Path: cpunks Received: (from cpunks@localhost) by einstein.ssz.com (8.8.8/8.8.8) id SAA30686 for [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Tue, 2 Jul 2002 18:47:41 -0500 Received: from localhost (localhost) by einstein.ssz.com (8.8.8/8.8.8) with internal id SAA30574; Tue, 2 Jul 2002 18:46:54 -0500 Date: Tue, 2 Jul 2002 18:46:54 -0500 From: Mail Delivery Subsystem [EMAIL PROTECTED] Message-Id: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/report; report-type=delivery-status; boundary=SAA30574.1025653614/einstein.ssz.com Subject: Returned mail: User unknown Auto-Submitted: auto-generated (failure) This is a MIME-encapsulated message --SAA30574.1025653614/einstein.ssz.com The original message was received at Tue, 2 Jul 2002 18:46:19 -0500 from cpunks@localhost - The following addresses had permanent fatal errors - [EMAIL PROTECTED] - Transcript of session follows - ... while talking to domains.invweb.net.: MAIL From:[EMAIL PROTECTED] SIZE=22839 451 4.7.1 Please try again later ... while talking to router.invlogic.com.: RCPT To:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 550 5.7.1 [EMAIL PROTECTED]... Relaying denied. IP name lookup failed [207.200.56.4] 550 [EMAIL PROTECTED] User unknown --SAA30574.1025653614/einstein.ssz.com Content-Type: message/delivery-status Reporting-MTA: dns; einstein.ssz.com Arrival-Date: Tue, 2 Jul 2002 18:46:19 -0500 Final-Recipient: RFC822; [EMAIL PROTECTED] Action: failed Status: 5.1.1 Remote-MTA: DNS; router.invlogic.com Diagnostic-Code: SMTP; 550 5.7.1 [EMAIL PROTECTED]... Relaying denied. IP name lookup failed [207.200.56.4] Last-Attempt-Date: Tue, 2 Jul 2002 18:46:53 -0500 --SAA30574.1025653614/einstein.ssz.com Content-Type: message/rfc822 Return-Path: cpunks Received: (from cpunks@localhost) by einstein.ssz.com (8.8.8/8.8.8) id SAA30520 for [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Tue, 2 Jul 2002 18:46:19 -0500 Received: from localhost
Need great leads? 2574oDMP6--9
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Leads Special 8274zWAG9-218GnDk9926FUyN0--25
This email message is sent in compliance with the 106th Congress E-Mail User Protection Act (H.R. 1910) and the Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail Act of 2000 (H.R. 3113). To be removed, scroll down. *July Fire Cracker Lead Special* Have you been unsatisfied with your present leads? Have you been looking for quality, guaranteed leads? Have your run out of good leads? Do you need top-quality leads for your downline? Our leads have been created from online web sites as well as off line direct mail sources. Each lead has been telephone-verified and each one has given permission to be contacted by phone or email. You can buy these leads for a fraction of the market price... for as low as .60 per lead! Hurry, this offers ends on Thursday July 11 at midnight! OUR GUARANTEE Each lead is guaranteed for contact authenticity. If any lead does not have a valid email or phone number, it will be cheerfully replaced FREE of charge, just supply the lead contact info. For downline purchasers: If you place your order before midnight, Thursday, July 11, you can purchase leads for as little as .60. After that the price will go back up to $2.00 per lead. Fire Cracker Special* 250 @ 90 per lead 500 @ 80 per lead 800 @ 70 per lead 1,000 @ 60 per lead To place your order email us or call or order desk at 1-877-248-1145 or email us with your phone number and someone will return your call. To be removed click here *This offer cannot be combined with any offer and does not replace any previous offer. 9541mHIy5-763iAsn6373nsgA1-194GYiM2l33
Re: Need voluntary/optional TCPA/Palladium quote
[2nd Repost] Lucky asks: I am looking for a quote by a TCPA or Palladium principal that states that TCPA and/or Palladium will be voluntary or optional. Google was not helpful. Did anybody on here run across such a quote in one of the interviews recently published? Please include the URL/citation. The TCPA FAQ at http://www.trustedcomputing.org/docs/Website_TCPA_FAQ_ver1.1.pdf includes the following: : 13. What has the TCPA done to preserve privacy? : : The TCPA believes that privacy is a necessary element of a trusted system. : The TCPA Specification has taken specific steps to enhance trust while : preserving privacy. The system owner has ultimate control and permissions : over private information and must opt-in to utilize the TCPA subsystem. : Integrity metrics can be reported by the TCPA platform, but do not : restrict the choice and options of the owner preserving openness. This describes the system as opt-in and that says that it will not restrict the choice and options of the owner. That is, users can enable the TCPA system and get their integrity metrics reported (these are basically hashes of the BIOS, OS boot loader, etc.), which will allow third parties to know that they booted into an unmodified, trusted system. But they always have the choice to boot into a modified, patched or untrusted system, and in that case either the TCPA chip will report it, or they can forego the use of the TCPA subsystem entirely.
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First, get it built into all CPU chips...only _then_ make it mandatory.
On Friday, July 5, 2002, at 02:50 PM, Nomen Nescio wrote: This describes the system as opt-in and that says that it will not restrict the choice and options of the owner. That is, users can enable the TCPA system and get their integrity metrics reported (these are basically hashes of the BIOS, OS boot loader, etc.), which will allow third parties to know that they booted into an unmodified, trusted system. But they always have the choice to boot into a modified, patched or untrusted system, and in that case either the TCPA chip will report it, or they can forego the use of the TCPA subsystem entirely. As my title suggests, the strategy is clearly First, get it built into all chips...only _then_ make it mandatory. Getting TCPA/DRM enforcement circuitry built in to all major CPUs, network appliances, and entertainment systems is the first stage. Obviously they'll talk about it all being voluntary, user-selectable, etc. Then, perhaps after some major war or terror incident or other trigger, major OSes will require the TCPA/DRM features to be running at all times. Sure, maybe some little Perl or Java program Joe Sixpack writes won't need it, but anything not on the margins will require it. This is for newer OS versions from Trustworthy Players, not for older OSes and older machines. Personally, I expect a lot of people may have several machines: the newest entertainment boxes which run TCPA/DRM, moderately recent business-type machines which may or may not run it, and older machines, which won't. I know someone (Peter Trei, I think) was saying that the three-generations-hence 30 GHz processor running streaming holograms will certainly have TCPA running and no one will want to use their ancient 5 GHz Pentium 6 machines, but I disagree. I've been running my 400 MHz G4-based Mac happily for almost three years. It keeps up with everything I can plausibly expect it to do with the current generation of apps: edit DV movies from my camcorder, run Microsoft Office and Mathematica and all the rest at very good speeds, display excellent graphics on my LCD screen, and so on. I could upgrade even today to a dual 1 GHz G4 tower (2 GHz of G4 being probably about the equivalent of a 3 Ghz Pentium 4, based on most benchmarks) and be good for several more years. (Though I expect I'll upgrade to Plus, the trend to have more and more transistors devoted to graphics is a critical one: Most compute-intensive tasks will be graphics, running on a graphics subsystem. It seems likely that the user of 5-8 years from now will have several levels of CPUs: some running security and network access programs, some running other appliances and systems, and some running at the highest speeds and numbers of transistors, for graphics. Such heterogeneous systems make TCPA tough to mandate. (Like a lot of us, I'm sure, I run several generations of machines. The more recent the generation, and hence the lower the noise level and the more user-friendly, the longer I am likely to keep them running. No way will I junk all these great machines just because TCPA isn't running on them. And, by the way, this applies in _spades_ to the millions of DVD players, Xboxes with DVDs, PlayStations with DVDs, laptops with DVDs, and computers with DVDs. This huge base of DVDs being sold, this huge base of systems able to play these DVDs, and the lack of real interest in HDTV points to a much longer lifetime for DVDs than some would have hoped. I see virtually zero interest in HDTV, qua HDTV. What I do see are more people using line doublers and Radeon 8500XP-type systems to boost the resolutions of already-good-enough DVDs to get rid of any trace of pixellation or lines. Your mileage may vary, but this is what I see. And out across America, I see virtually nil interest in whatever is supposed to be coming after DVD.) --Tim May That government is best which governs not at all. --Henry David Thoreau
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Re: Ross's TCPA paper
Seth Schoen writes: The Palladium security model and features are different from Unix, but you can imagine by rough analogy a Unix implementation on a system with protected memory. Every process can have its own virtual memory space, read and write files, interact with the user, etc. But normally a program can't read another program's memory without the other program's permission. The analogy starts to break down, though: in Unix a process running as the superuser or code running in kernel mode may be able to ignore memory protection and monitor or control an arbitrary process. In Palladium, if a system is started in a trusted mode, not even the OS kernel will have access to all system resources. Wouldn't it be more accurate to say that a trusted OS will not peek at system resources that it is not supposed to? After all, since the OS loads the application, it has full power to molest that application in any way. Any embedded keys or certs in the app could be changed by the OS. There is no way for an application to protect itself against the OS. And there is no need; a trusted OS by definition does not interfere with the application's use of confidential data. It does not allow other applications to get access to that data. And it provides no back doors for root or the system owner or device drivers to get access to the application data, either. At http://vitanuova.loyalty.org/2002-07-03.html you provide more information about your meeting with Microsoft. It's an interesting writeup, but the part about the system somehow protecting the app from the OS can't be right. Apps don't have that kind of structural integrity. A chip in the system cannot protect them from an OS virtualizing that chip. What the chip does do is to let *remote* applications verify that the OS is running in trusted mode. But local apps can never achieve that degree of certainty, they are at the mercy of the OS which can twiddle their bits at will and make them believe anything it wants. Of course a trusted OS would never behave in such an uncouth manner. That limitation doesn't stop you from writing your own application software or scripts. Absolutely. The fantasies which have been floating here of filters preventing people from typing virus-triggering command lines are utterly absurd. What are people trying to prove by raising such nonsensical propositions? Palladium needs no such capability. Interestingly, Palladium and TCPA both allow you to modify any part of the software installed on your system (though not your hardware). The worst thing which can happen to you as a result is that the system will know that it is no longer trusted, or will otherwise be able to recognize or take account of the changes you made. In principle, there's nothing wrong with running untrusted; particular applications or services which relied on a trusted feature, including sealed storage (see below), may fail to operate. Right, and you can boot untrusted OS's as well. Recently there was discussion here of HP making a trusted form of Linux that would work with the TCPA hardware. So you will have options in both the closed source and open source worlds to boot trusted OS's, or you can boot untrusted ones, like old versions of Windows. The user will have more choice, not less. Palladium and TCPA both allow an application to make use of hardware-based encryption and decryption in a scheme called sealed storage which uses a hash of the running system's software as part of the key. One result of this is that, if you change relevant parts of the software, the hardware will no longer be able to perform the decryption step. To oversimplify slightly, you could imagine that the hardware uses the currently-running OS kernel's hash as part of this key. Then, if you change the kernel in any way (which you're permitted to do), applications running under it will find that they're no longer able to decrypt sealed files which were created under the original kernel. Rebooting with the original kernel will restore the ability to decrypt, because the hash will again match the original kernel's hash. Yes, your web page goes into somewhat more detail about how this would work. This way a program can run under a secure OS and store sensitive data on the disk, such that booting into another OS will then make it impossible to decrypt that data. Some concerns have been raised here about upgrades. Did Microsoft discuss how that was planned to work, migrating from one version of a secure OS to another? Presumably they have different hashes, but it is necessary for the new one to be able to unseal data sealed by the old one. One obvious solution would be for the new OS to present a cert to the chip which basically said that its OS hash should be treated as an alias of the older OS's hash. So the chip would unseal using the old OS hash even when the new OS was running, based on the fact that this cert was
Re: Piracy is wrong
On Thu, 4 Jul 2002 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Let us make a more realistic supposition: Let us suppose instead he organized an entertainment where a lightly clad singer sang and danced, and showed that video on television interspersed with advertisments, and I then captured that video on my hard disk, deleted the ads, and put it on the internet. In that case, where is my promise? Doubtless I must have made it in the same moment of forgetfulness as I signed the social contract. Nowadays, nowhere. And that is mostly because of copyrights. If there were no copyright laws, I bet you would have to sign all sort of things to get tv channels home. And yes, it would be quite a pain in the ass to do this way 'afterwords' when people already have tv's and expect them to work without doing anything. -- MikkoOne Ring to rule them all, One Ring to find them, One Ring to bring them all And in the Darkness bind them.
Re: Piracy is wrong
-- On 5 Jul 2002 at 3:10, Nomen Nescio wrote: Suppose you know someone who has been working for years on a novel. But he lacks confidence in his work and he's never shown it to anyone. Finally you persuade him to let you look at a copy of his manuscript, but he makes you promise not to show any of it to anyone else. Hopefully it is clear in this situation that no one is doing anything evil. Even though he is giving you the document with conditions beyond those specified in the current regime of copyright, he is not taking advantage of you. Even though you hold the bits to his manuscript and he has put limitations on what you can do with them, he is not coercing you. You voluntarily accepted those conditions as part of the agreement under which you received the document. It should also be clear that it would be ethically wrong for you to take the manuscript and show it to other people. Even if you take an excerpt, as allowed under fair use exemptions to copyright protection, and include it in a document for commentary or review purposes, that would be a violation of your promise. This example demonstrates that when two people reach a mutual agreement about how they will handle some information, they are ethically bound by it even beyond the regulations of copyright law. Let us make a more realistic supposition: Let us suppose instead he organized an entertainment where a lightly clad singer sang and danced, and showed that video on television interspersed with advertisments, and I then captured that video on my hard disk, deleted the ads, and put it on the internet. In that case, where is my promise? Doubtless I must have made it in the same moment of forgetfulness as I signed the social contract. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG bAhnMLd4HxDL/1pvlkk6Ga1VpR1eMM5jp1ff+rbD 2k/NTfC76YawZx8bnVYHGPHiRnNt5axoRlaDUDJP8
Re: Diffie-Hellman and MITM
Consider setting up a secure video call with somebody, and each of you reading the hash of your DH parameter to the other. It's really hard for a MITM to fake that - but if you don't know what the other person looks or sounds like, do you know it's really them, or did you just have an unbreakably secure call with the wrong person? Whatever you deploy to define somebody should be used as authentication channel. You are exactly as secure as as you can define somebody. Your al quaeda coworker probably has your never published public key. Your online-found busty and wet blonde is probably named Gordon. = end (of original message) Y-a*h*o-o (yes, they scan for this) spam follows: Sign up for SBC Yahoo! Dial - First Month Free http://sbc.yahoo.com
Re: Ross's TCPA paper
-- On 5 Jul 2002 at 14:45, AARG! Anonymous wrote: Right, and you can boot untrusted OS's as well. Recently there was discussion here of HP making a trusted form of Linux that would work with the TCPA hardware. So you will have options in both the closed source and open source worlds to boot trusted OS's, or you can boot untrusted ones, like old versions of Windows. The user will have more choice, not less. Yes he will, but the big expansion of choice is for the the seller of content and software, who will have more choices as to how he can cripple what he sells you. For example he can sell you music that will only play on a particular music player on your particular machine. But that is not enough to give the content industry what it wants, for someone can still break it on one machine, perhaps by intercepting the bitstream to the the DA, and having broken it on one machine, can run it on all machines all over the internet. Break once, run everywhere. Microsoft has also been talking out of both sides of its mouth, by saying that this will also protect against break once, run everywhere. The only way that this can protect against break-once-run-everywhere is to reduce user choice, to make it mandatory that the user can only run government trusted software, and to reduce seller choice, prohibit sellers from providing unacceptable software, such as napster like software. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG XQJ33SB0W84Cm4Mw0+3lnN4nsUtaB4B6cIa1dP/2 2s67UXEL+Y5FHrr52MYArwzRuptDlBNVQIJOj/n/8
copyright restrictions are coercive and immoral (Re: Piracy is wrong)
On Fri, Jul 05, 2002 at 03:10:07AM +0200, Nomen Nescio wrote: Suppose you know someone who has been working for years on a novel. But he lacks confidence in his work and he's never shown it to anyone. Finally you persuade him to let you look at a copy of his manuscript, but he makes you promise not to show any of it to anyone else. [...] I agree with the Anonymous posters analysis. I would further elaborate with regard to current copyright related laws: - parties are free to enter into NDA or complex distribution and use contracts surrounding exchange of content or information generally as anonymous describes, and this is good and non-coercive - but that private contract places no burden on other parties if that agreement is broken and the content distributed anyway. This is exactly analogous to the trade secret scenario where once the trade secret is out, it's tough luck for the previous trade secret owner -- clearly it's no longer a secret. - where I find current copyright laws at odds with a coercion free society is in placing restrictions on people who did not agree to any NDA contract. ie. There are laws which forbid copying or use of information by people who never entered into any agreement with the copyright holder, but obtained their copy from a third party. - in a free society (one without a force monopoly central government) I don't think copyright would exist -- voluntary agreements -- NDAs of the form anonymous describes -- would be the only type of contract. - the only form of generally sanctioned force would be in response to violence initiated upon oneself. - if the media cartels chose to hire their own thugs to threaten violence to people who did not follow the cartels ideas about binding people to default contracts they did not voluntarily enter into, that would be quite analogous to the current situation where the media cartels are lobbying government to increase the level of the threats of violence, and make more onerous the terms of the non-voluntary contracts. (Also in a free society individuals would be able to employ the services of security firms protection services to defend themselves from the media cartels thugs, as the media cartels would not have the benefit of a force monopoly they have the lobbying power to bribe to obtain enforcement subsidies). Adam
Re: Ross's TCPA paper
Hadmut Danisch writes: You won't be able to enter a simple shell script through the keyboard. If so, you could simple print protected files as a hexdump or use the screen (or maybe the sound device or any LED) as a serial interface. Since you could use the keyboard to enter a non-certified program, the keyboard is to be considered as a nontrusted device. This means that you either * have to use a certified keyboard which doesn't let you enter bad programs * don't have a keyboard at all * or are not able to use shell scripts (at least not in trusted context). This means a strict separation between certified software and data. The latter is closest to what's intended in Palladium. Individual programs using Palladium features are able to prevent one another from reading their executing or stored state. You can write your own programs, but somebody else can also write programs which can process data in a way that your programs can't interact with. The Palladium security model and features are different from Unix, but you can imagine by rough analogy a Unix implementation on a system with protected memory. Every process can have its own virtual memory space, read and write files, interact with the user, etc. But normally a program can't read another program's memory without the other program's permission. The analogy starts to break down, though: in Unix a process running as the superuser or code running in kernel mode may be able to ignore memory protection and monitor or control an arbitrary process. In Palladium, if a system is started in a trusted mode, not even the OS kernel will have access to all system resources. That limitation doesn't stop you from writing your own application software or scripts. Interestingly, Palladium and TCPA both allow you to modify any part of the software installed on your system (though not your hardware). The worst thing which can happen to you as a result is that the system will know that it is no longer trusted, or will otherwise be able to recognize or take account of the changes you made. In principle, there's nothing wrong with running untrusted; particular applications or services which relied on a trusted feature, including sealed storage (see below), may fail to operate. Palladium and TCPA both allow an application to make use of hardware-based encryption and decryption in a scheme called sealed storage which uses a hash of the running system's software as part of the key. One result of this is that, if you change relevant parts of the software, the hardware will no longer be able to perform the decryption step. To oversimplify slightly, you could imagine that the hardware uses the currently-running OS kernel's hash as part of this key. Then, if you change the kernel in any way (which you're permitted to do), applications running under it will find that they're no longer able to decrypt sealed files which were created under the original kernel. Rebooting with the original kernel will restore the ability to decrypt, because the hash will again match the original kernel's hash. (I've been reading TCPA specs and recently met with some Microsoft Palladium team members. But I'm still learning about both systems and may well have made some mistakes in my description.) -- Seth Schoen Staff Technologist[EMAIL PROTECTED] Electronic Frontier Foundationhttp://www.eff.org/ 454 Shotwell Street, San Francisco, CA 94110 1 415 436 9333 x107
RE: Ross's TCPA paper
Hadmut Danisch wrote: On Wed, Jul 03, 2002 at 10:54:43PM -0700, Bill Stewart wrote: At 12:59 AM 06/27/2002 -0700, Lucky Green wrote: I fully agree that the TCPA's efforts offer potentially beneficial effects. Assuming the TPM has not been compromised, the TPM should enable to detect if interested parties have replaced you NIC with the rarer, but not unheard of, variant that ships out the contents of your operating RAM via DMA and IP padding outside the abilities of your OS to detect. It can? I thought that DMA was there to let you avoid bothering the CPU. The Alternate NIC card would need to have a CPU of its own to do a good job of this, but that's not hard. I don't think so. As far as I understood, the bus system (PCI,...) will be encrypted as well. You'll have to use a NIC which is certified and can decrypt the information on the bus. Obviously, you won't get a certification for such an network card. You won't and Bill won't. But those who employ such NIC's will have no difficulty obtaining certification. But this implies other problems: You won't be able to enter a simple shell script through the keyboard. If so, you could simple print protected files as a hexdump or use the screen (or maybe the sound device or any LED) as a serial interface. Since you could use the keyboard to enter a non-certified program, the keyboard is to be considered as a nontrusted device. This means that you either * have to use a certified keyboard which doesn't let you enter bad programs * don't have a keyboard at all * or are not able to use shell scripts (at least not in trusted context). This means a strict separation between certified software and data. Sure you can use shell scripts. Though I don't understand how a shell script will help you in obtaining a dump of the protected data since your script has insufficient privileges to read the data. Nor can you give the shell script those privileges since you don't have supervisor mode access to the CPU. How does your shell script plan to get past the memory protection? What am I missing? --Lucky
Re: Ross's TCPA paper
On Thu, Jul 04, 2002 at 10:54:34PM -0700, Lucky Green wrote: Sure you can use shell scripts. Though I don't understand how a shell script will help you in obtaining a dump of the protected data since your script has insufficient privileges to read the data. Nor can you give the shell script those privileges since you don't have supervisor mode access to the CPU. How does your shell script plan to get past the memory protection? That's why I was talking about a shell script (or take any other program to be interpreted). What does need to be certified: The shell or the shell script? The CPU doesn't recognize the shell script as a program, this is just some plain data entered through the keyboard like writing a letter. A shell script is not a program, it is data entered at a program's runtime. This moves one step forward: The hardware (palladium chip, memory management, etc.) can check the binary program to be loaded. So you won'te be able to run a compiled program and to access protected information. But once a certified software is running, it takes input (reading mouse, keyboard, files, asking DNS, connecting servers,...). This input might cause (by interpretation, by bug or however) the certified software to do certain things which do not comply with DRM requirements. At this stage, the running binary software itself is the instance to provide the DRM security, not the palladium memory management anymore. I agree that this is not yet an open sesame, but it shows that the game does not play on the binary/memory management layer only. But who controls runtime input? History shows, that M$ software is anything but able to deal with malicious input. That's why the world is using virus filters. That's nothing else than an external filter to keep malicious input from an attacker away from the running software. By analogy, Palladium might require the same: an input filter between attacker and running software. Since the attacker is sitting in front of the computer this time, this filter has to be applied to the user interface, keyboard and mouse. Maybe they'll install a filter between the keyboard and the software, thus building a certified keyboard, which filters out any malicious key sequences. And maybe you can use your keyboard only, if you have downloaded the latest patterns (like your daily virus filter update). I agree that this depends on the assumption that the certified software is not perfect and can't deal with arbitrary input. But that's reality. Hadmut
Re: Ross's TCPA paper
Seth Schoen writes: The Palladium security model and features are different from Unix, but you can imagine by rough analogy a Unix implementation on a system with protected memory. Every process can have its own virtual memory space, read and write files, interact with the user, etc. But normally a program can't read another program's memory without the other program's permission. The analogy starts to break down, though: in Unix a process running as the superuser or code running in kernel mode may be able to ignore memory protection and monitor or control an arbitrary process. In Palladium, if a system is started in a trusted mode, not even the OS kernel will have access to all system resources. Wouldn't it be more accurate to say that a trusted OS will not peek at system resources that it is not supposed to? After all, since the OS loads the application, it has full power to molest that application in any way. Any embedded keys or certs in the app could be changed by the OS. There is no way for an application to protect itself against the OS. And there is no need; a trusted OS by definition does not interfere with the application's use of confidential data. It does not allow other applications to get access to that data. And it provides no back doors for root or the system owner or device drivers to get access to the application data, either. At http://vitanuova.loyalty.org/2002-07-03.html you provide more information about your meeting with Microsoft. It's an interesting writeup, but the part about the system somehow protecting the app from the OS can't be right. Apps don't have that kind of structural integrity. A chip in the system cannot protect them from an OS virtualizing that chip. What the chip does do is to let *remote* applications verify that the OS is running in trusted mode. But local apps can never achieve that degree of certainty, they are at the mercy of the OS which can twiddle their bits at will and make them believe anything it wants. Of course a trusted OS would never behave in such an uncouth manner. That limitation doesn't stop you from writing your own application software or scripts. Absolutely. The fantasies which have been floating here of filters preventing people from typing virus-triggering command lines are utterly absurd. What are people trying to prove by raising such nonsensical propositions? Palladium needs no such capability. Interestingly, Palladium and TCPA both allow you to modify any part of the software installed on your system (though not your hardware). The worst thing which can happen to you as a result is that the system will know that it is no longer trusted, or will otherwise be able to recognize or take account of the changes you made. In principle, there's nothing wrong with running untrusted; particular applications or services which relied on a trusted feature, including sealed storage (see below), may fail to operate. Right, and you can boot untrusted OS's as well. Recently there was discussion here of HP making a trusted form of Linux that would work with the TCPA hardware. So you will have options in both the closed source and open source worlds to boot trusted OS's, or you can boot untrusted ones, like old versions of Windows. The user will have more choice, not less. Palladium and TCPA both allow an application to make use of hardware-based encryption and decryption in a scheme called sealed storage which uses a hash of the running system's software as part of the key. One result of this is that, if you change relevant parts of the software, the hardware will no longer be able to perform the decryption step. To oversimplify slightly, you could imagine that the hardware uses the currently-running OS kernel's hash as part of this key. Then, if you change the kernel in any way (which you're permitted to do), applications running under it will find that they're no longer able to decrypt sealed files which were created under the original kernel. Rebooting with the original kernel will restore the ability to decrypt, because the hash will again match the original kernel's hash. Yes, your web page goes into somewhat more detail about how this would work. This way a program can run under a secure OS and store sensitive data on the disk, such that booting into another OS will then make it impossible to decrypt that data. Some concerns have been raised here about upgrades. Did Microsoft discuss how that was planned to work, migrating from one version of a secure OS to another? Presumably they have different hashes, but it is necessary for the new one to be able to unseal data sealed by the old one. One obvious solution would be for the new OS to present a cert to the chip which basically said that its OS hash should be treated as an alias of the older OS's hash. So the chip would unseal using the old OS hash even when the new OS was running, based on the fact that this cert was
