[IP] The second sincerest form of flattery (fwd from dave@farber.net)
- Forwarded message from David Farber [EMAIL PROTECTED] - From: David Farber [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Thu, 20 Jan 2005 06:02:23 -0500 To: Ip ip@v2.listbox.com Subject: [IP] The second sincerest form of flattery User-Agent: Microsoft-Entourage/11.1.0.040913 Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- Forwarded Message From: Matt Blaze [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Wed, 19 Jan 2005 20:53:58 -0500 To: David Farber [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: The second sincerest form of flattery One of my research interests is applying the principles of human-scale security (such as mechanical locks and alarm systems) to computer science. Although human-scale systems are almost always imperfect, their failure mechanisms are often much more gradual and more predictable than their information systems counterparts, and I believe that by better understanding why this is we might be able to build computer systems that behave in similar ways. Several particularly interesting illustrations of the phenomenon of gradual and predictable security failure can be found in safes and vaults. I'm working on a survey paper, tentatively entitled Safecracking for the computer scientist, that I hope will stimulate other researchers to think along similar lines. Last month I finished a first draft and put it on my web site. (For those who've not seen it, it's at http://www.crypto.com/papers/safelocks.pdf ) Although the paper is only of rather narrow interest, a couple of weeks ago the wildly popular Slashdot news site discovered and linked to the draft; somewhere around 50,000 people downloaded the (large) pdf file that weekend. My web server survived Slashdot's attention, but I was somewhat taken aback by what happened next. A couple of years ago I wrote a paper about weaknesses in the keyspaces of master-keyed mechanical locks (it marked the beginning of my understanding of the similarities between information and physical security). Some locksmiths were outraged that I would publish a paper revealing security vulnerabilities in what they believed to be a closed field. See http://www.crypto.com/papers/kiss.html for details, but to make a long story short, some locksmiths do not approve of disclosing vulnerabilities in locks to the general public, on the grounds that open discussion aids the bad guys more than it helps the good guys. (I don't agree -- and the scientific method's requirement for open scrutiny and debate does not provide an exemption when the subject involves security -- but that's another story for another time.) Perhaps predictably, there has been a similar reaction to my recent draft on safe locks. Shortly after Slashdot linked to the paper, one or more locksmithing trade groups discovered it as well . The response of some locksmiths to the draft has been at least as negative as it was to my master keying paper. I've received quite a bit of uncomplimentary email from locksmiths, and I'm told that locksmithing message boards have recently been abuzz with messages about what a scoundrel I must be to again have written such an unethical and irresponsible paper. Ironically, the theme of my safecracking survey is that while safes aren't perfect, they largely meet their requirements, and indeed, computer security would do well to emulate their security principles. Nothing in my paper (and indeed, no techniques of which I'm aware) allow one to quickly open decent quality safes. The paper's conclusion is that even if one is fluent in the (not very) secrets of the safecracking trade, the measurable security of even relatively modest safes allows them to be used quite effectively for their intended applications (especially as part of larger security system that complement the safes' limitations). I certainly don't think it would have been unethical to have published an analysis that reached a different conclusion, of course, but my paper as written could hardly be considered an attack against the safe industry or its products. As with the reaction to my master keying paper, many of the complaints I've received are self-contradictory and emotionally charged, often invoking homeland security in unspecified but ominous ways. I've developed a thick skin against this sort of thing, and I try not to take it personally (although it's a bit disturbing to have so many people so angry with me over my work). It's rather like being accused of witchcraft; many of the complainers don't seem to be seeking a reasoned debate but are instead venting a broder range of unspoken frustrations that go well beyond either me or my papers. There is simply no effective way to debate on these terms against an angry mob. In any case, some locksmiths are apparently trying to organize a letter writing campaign aimed at various officials at my university, and I'm told that my department chair, my dean, the provost, and the head of campus security have each received (a handful of) letters complaining about me. While Penn's support for the basic
Scientific American on Quantum Encryption
Scientific American has little clue, as usual (see their nanotechnology retraction). Link: http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=05/01/20/0358215 Posted by: samzenpus, on 2005-01-20 06:35:00 from the just-try-and-break-it dept. [1]prostoalex writes Scientific American claims that [2]advances in commercially available quantum encryption might obsolete the existing factorization-based solutions: The National Security Agency or one of the Federal Reserve banks can now buy a quantum-cryptographic system from two small companies - and more products are on the way. This new method of encryption represents the first major commercial implementation for what has become known as quantum information science, which blends quantum mechanics and information theory. The ultimate technology to emerge from the field may be a quantum computer so powerful that the only way to protect against its prodigious code-breaking capability may be to deploy quantum-cryptographic techniques. IFRAME: [3]pos6 References 1. http://www.everythingfirebird.com/ 2. http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?chanID=sa006articleID=000479CD-F58C-11BE-AD0683414B7Fref=rdf - End forwarded message - December 20, 2004 Best-Kept Secrets Quantum cryptography has marched from theory to laboratory to real products By Gary Stix At the IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Laboratory, Charles Bennett is known as a brilliant theoretician--one of the fathers of the emerging field of quantum computing. Like many theorists, he has not logged much experience in the laboratory. His absentmindedness in relation to the physical world once transformed the color of a teapot from green to red when he left it on a double boiler too long. But in 1989 Bennett and colleagues John A. Smolin and Gilles Brassard cast caution aside and undertook a groundbreaking experiment that would demonstrate a new cryptography based on the principles of quantum mechanics. The team put together an experiment in which photons moved down a 30-centimeter channel in a light-tight box called Aunt Martha's coffin. The direction in which the photons oscillated, their polarization, represented the 0s or 1s of a series of quantum bits, or qubits. The qubits constituted a cryptographic key that could be used to encrypt or decipher a message. What kept the key from prying eavesdroppers was Heisenberg's uncertainty principle--a foundation of quantum physics that dictates that the measurement of one property in a quantum state will perturb another. In a quantum cryptographic system, any interloper tapping into the stream of photons will alter them in a way that is detectable to the sender and the receiver. In principle, the technique provides the makings of an unbreakable cryptographic key. Today quantum cryptography has come a long way from the jury-rigged project assembled on a table in Bennett's office. The National Security Agency or one of the Federal Reserve banks can now buy a quantum-cryptographic system from two small companies--and more products are on the way. This new method of encryption represents the first major commercial implementation for what has become known as quantum information science, which blends quantum mechanics and information theory. The ultimate technology to emerge from the field may be a quantum computer so powerful that the only way to protect against its prodigious code-breaking capability may be to deploy quantum-cryptographic techniques. The arrival of the quantum computer may portend the eventual demise of ciphers based on factorization. The challenge modern cryptographers face is for sender and receiver to share a key while ensuring that no one has filched a copy. A method called public-key cryptography is often used to distribute the secret keys for encryption and decoding of a full-length message. The security of public-key cryptography depends on factorization or other difficult mathematical problems. It is easy to compute the product of two large numbers but extremely hard to factor it back into the primes. The popular RSA cipher algorithm, widely deployed in public-key cryptography, relies on factorization. The secret key being transferred between sender and receiver is encrypted with a publicly available key, say, a large number such as 408,508,091 (in practice, the number would be much larger). It can be decrypted only with a private key owned by the recipient of the data, made up of two factors, in this case 18,313 and 22,307. The difficulty of overcoming a public-key cipher may hold secret keys secure for a decade or more. But the advent of the quantum information era--and, in particular, the capability of quantum computers to rapidly perform monstrously challenging factorizations--may portend the eventual demise of RSA and other cryptographic schemes. If quantum computers become a reality, the whole game changes, says John Rarity, a
Re: Scientific American on Quantum Encryption
On 2005-01-20T12:16:34+0100, Eugen Leitl wrote: Scientific American has little clue, as usual (see their nanotechnology retraction). How could they possibly get clue? Scientists don't want to write pop-sci articles for a living. It's impossible to condense most current research down to digestible kernels that the masses can understand. SciAm should close down, requiring those who care about science to learn enough about it to read science journals. Professors who can teach a QM course well in a semester are rare enough. I doubt any one of them could write a 5000 word article on quantum entanglement that would be intelligible to the average cretinous American who wants to seem smart by reading Sci-Am. If they want to be smart, they can start by picking up an undergrad-level book on QM. But that requires much effort to read, unlike a glossy 5000 word article. Journalism should not be a college major. Journalists in the main know little about how to write and interview, and less about the topics they write on. They don't understand that being able to write (and in many cases even that ability is in serious doubt) doesn't qualify them to write on any topic they choose. Many journalists aren't qualified to write on anything, not even journalism. -- War is the father and king of all, and some he shows as gods, others as men; some he makes slaves, others free. --Heraclitus (Kahn.83/D-K.53)
RE: Scientific American on Quantum Encryption
I've actually seen these devices in operation. The thing that impressed me most was that the path need not be a single fiber from end to end - you can maintain quantum state across a switchable fiber junction. This means you are no longer limited to a single pair of boxes talking to each other. True, the SciAm article doesn't address a lot of issues, but the fact remains that this technology is interesting and important. Peter Trei -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Behalf Of Eugen Leitl Sent: Thursday, January 20, 2005 6:17 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Scientific American on Quantum Encryption Scientific American has little clue, as usual (see their nanotechnology retraction). Link: http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=05/01/20/0358215 Posted by: samzenpus, on 2005-01-20 06:35:00 from the just-try-and-break-it dept. [1]prostoalex writes Scientific American claims that [2]advances in commercially available quantum encryption might obsolete the existing factorization-based solutions: The National Security Agency or one of the Federal Reserve banks can now buy a quantum-cryptographic system from two small companies - and more products are on the way. This new method of encryption represents the first major commercial implementation for what has become known as quantum information science, which blends quantum mechanics and information theory. The ultimate technology to emerge from the field may be a quantum computer so powerful that the only way to protect against its prodigious code-breaking capability may be to deploy quantum-cryptographic techniques.
Re: Scientific American on Quantum Encryption
On Thu, Jan 20, 2005 at 10:47:38AM -0500, Trei, Peter wrote: I've actually seen these devices in operation. The thing that impressed me most was that the path need not be a single fiber from end to end - you can maintain quantum state across a switchable fiber junction. This means Very impressive. If they manage to keep the entanglement all the way up to LEO by line of sight it would be even more impressive (anyone thinks this can be done at all?) you are no longer limited to a single pair of boxes talking to each other. What makes it very important is early beginnings of practical quantum computing. Will photonics and spintronics in solid state at RT play well with each other? Will error correction scale to large qubit register sizes? Will the algorithm space be large and rich enough to be practical? All very interesting questions Scientific American fails to raise. True, the SciAm article doesn't address a lot of issues, but the fact remains that this technology is interesting and important. I agree that this technology is interesting and important, but not for what it claims to be used for. Quantum encryption right now is a tool to milk the gullible, and hence very much crypto snake oil. For these distances one-time pads by trusted couriers would seem so much more practical and so much cheaper. -- Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgp16rmpRSXZx.pgp Description: PGP signature
RE: Scientific American on Quantum Encryption
Eugen Leitl wrote: On Thu, Jan 20, 2005 at 10:47:38AM -0500, Trei, Peter wrote: I've actually seen these devices in operation. The thing that impressed me most was that the path need not be a single fiber from end to end - you can maintain quantum state across a switchable fiber junction. This means Very impressive. If they manage to keep the entanglement all the way up to LEO by line of sight it would be even more impressive (anyone thinks this can be done at all?) you are no longer limited to a single pair of boxes talking to each other. At the moment, the practical limit in fiber is around 150 km Getting to LEO is a *lot* harder - remember, you're throwing and catching one photon at a time - a beam that spreads wider than your detector is usually going to miss the detector. Peter Trei
Re: Scientific American on Quantum Encryption
Well, I think you've been a little too harsh on Scientific American. In the past a lot of the best articles were written by the pioneers in their fields. In fact, it's where I believe Wittfield and Diffie wrote a great piece on their work. And don't expect anyone (not even a math major) to go grab a quantum mechanics textbook and be able to get anything out of it. One would really need to have done the classical coursework in order to understand it (or at least to know enough to be spurised by it). And if you don't have the math then forget about it. Meanwhile, it IS possible to write intelligently on quantum entanglement, EPR and Aharnov-Bohm, and it's been done by Sci-Am, Penrose, Kaku and plenty of others. -TD From: Justin [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Scientific American on Quantum Encryption Date: Thu, 20 Jan 2005 15:23:35 + On 2005-01-20T12:16:34+0100, Eugen Leitl wrote: Scientific American has little clue, as usual (see their nanotechnology retraction). How could they possibly get clue? Scientists don't want to write pop-sci articles for a living. It's impossible to condense most current research down to digestible kernels that the masses can understand. SciAm should close down, requiring those who care about science to learn enough about it to read science journals. Professors who can teach a QM course well in a semester are rare enough. I doubt any one of them could write a 5000 word article on quantum entanglement that would be intelligible to the average cretinous American who wants to seem smart by reading Sci-Am. If they want to be smart, they can start by picking up an undergrad-level book on QM. But that requires much effort to read, unlike a glossy 5000 word article. Journalism should not be a college major. Journalists in the main know little about how to write and interview, and less about the topics they write on. They don't understand that being able to write (and in many cases even that ability is in serious doubt) doesn't qualify them to write on any topic they choose. Many journalists aren't qualified to write on anything, not even journalism. -- War is the father and king of all, and some he shows as gods, others as men; some he makes slaves, others free. --Heraclitus (Kahn.83/D-K.53)
RE: Scientific American on Quantum Encryption
What do you mean? By a physical fiber switch? That's certainly possible, though you'd need a very good condition switch to be able to do it. I'd bet if that switch switched a lot, the QCrypto channel would eventually be unusable. If you're talking about a WDM element or passive splitter or other purely optical component, then you'd need some kind of error correction (in the digital domain) in order to overcome the fact that many of the photons will not choose to go in the direction you want. In the long run I think we'll see some small proliferation, but given the level of integration and how well current coding schemes work, I'd guess this will remain a niche unless there's a major breakthrough in factoring. -TD From: Trei, Peter [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Eugen Leitl [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED] CC: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: RE: Scientific American on Quantum Encryption Date: Thu, 20 Jan 2005 10:47:38 -0500 I've actually seen these devices in operation. The thing that impressed me most was that the path need not be a single fiber from end to end - you can maintain quantum state across a switchable fiber junction. This means you are no longer limited to a single pair of boxes talking to each other. True, the SciAm article doesn't address a lot of issues, but the fact remains that this technology is interesting and important. Peter Trei -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Behalf Of Eugen Leitl Sent: Thursday, January 20, 2005 6:17 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Scientific American on Quantum Encryption Scientific American has little clue, as usual (see their nanotechnology retraction). Link: http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=05/01/20/0358215 Posted by: samzenpus, on 2005-01-20 06:35:00 from the just-try-and-break-it dept. [1]prostoalex writes Scientific American claims that [2]advances in commercially available quantum encryption might obsolete the existing factorization-based solutions: The National Security Agency or one of the Federal Reserve banks can now buy a quantum-cryptographic system from two small companies - and more products are on the way. This new method of encryption represents the first major commercial implementation for what has become known as quantum information science, which blends quantum mechanics and information theory. The ultimate technology to emerge from the field may be a quantum computer so powerful that the only way to protect against its prodigious code-breaking capability may be to deploy quantum-cryptographic techniques.
Amazon Gift Certificate/MPAK IP-SAN Solutions
Title: IP-SAN Suites-Amazon Promotion
RE: Scientific American on Quantum Encryption
I've actually seen these devices in operation. The thing that impressed me most was that the path need not be a single fiber from end to end - you can maintain quantum state across a switchable fiber junction. This means you are no longer limited to a single pair of boxes talking to each other. True, the SciAm article doesn't address a lot of issues, but the fact remains that this technology is interesting and important. Peter Trei -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Behalf Of Eugen Leitl Sent: Thursday, January 20, 2005 6:17 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Scientific American on Quantum Encryption Scientific American has little clue, as usual (see their nanotechnology retraction). Link: http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=05/01/20/0358215 Posted by: samzenpus, on 2005-01-20 06:35:00 from the just-try-and-break-it dept. [1]prostoalex writes Scientific American claims that [2]advances in commercially available quantum encryption might obsolete the existing factorization-based solutions: The National Security Agency or one of the Federal Reserve banks can now buy a quantum-cryptographic system from two small companies - and more products are on the way. This new method of encryption represents the first major commercial implementation for what has become known as quantum information science, which blends quantum mechanics and information theory. The ultimate technology to emerge from the field may be a quantum computer so powerful that the only way to protect against its prodigious code-breaking capability may be to deploy quantum-cryptographic techniques.
OpenVPN
If you haven't checked it out yet, you should. Really easy to set up (two Windows XP machines through a NAT on DSL, ping ~50 ms, preshared key, single port open; right now). Looking forward to see how C3-accelerated AES (OpenSSL next stable will support it out of the box) will do, across multiple platforms. Le IPsec c'est mort, vive le OpenVPN. -- Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpj4YzslDNi2.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Scientific American on Quantum Encryption
On 2005-01-20T12:16:34+0100, Eugen Leitl wrote: Scientific American has little clue, as usual (see their nanotechnology retraction). How could they possibly get clue? Scientists don't want to write pop-sci articles for a living. It's impossible to condense most current research down to digestible kernels that the masses can understand. SciAm should close down, requiring those who care about science to learn enough about it to read science journals. Professors who can teach a QM course well in a semester are rare enough. I doubt any one of them could write a 5000 word article on quantum entanglement that would be intelligible to the average cretinous American who wants to seem smart by reading Sci-Am. If they want to be smart, they can start by picking up an undergrad-level book on QM. But that requires much effort to read, unlike a glossy 5000 word article. Journalism should not be a college major. Journalists in the main know little about how to write and interview, and less about the topics they write on. They don't understand that being able to write (and in many cases even that ability is in serious doubt) doesn't qualify them to write on any topic they choose. Many journalists aren't qualified to write on anything, not even journalism. -- War is the father and king of all, and some he shows as gods, others as men; some he makes slaves, others free. --Heraclitus (Kahn.83/D-K.53)
Re: Scientific American on Quantum Encryption
On Thu, Jan 20, 2005 at 10:47:38AM -0500, Trei, Peter wrote: I've actually seen these devices in operation. The thing that impressed me most was that the path need not be a single fiber from end to end - you can maintain quantum state across a switchable fiber junction. This means Very impressive. If they manage to keep the entanglement all the way up to LEO by line of sight it would be even more impressive (anyone thinks this can be done at all?) you are no longer limited to a single pair of boxes talking to each other. What makes it very important is early beginnings of practical quantum computing. Will photonics and spintronics in solid state at RT play well with each other? Will error correction scale to large qubit register sizes? Will the algorithm space be large and rich enough to be practical? All very interesting questions Scientific American fails to raise. True, the SciAm article doesn't address a lot of issues, but the fact remains that this technology is interesting and important. I agree that this technology is interesting and important, but not for what it claims to be used for. Quantum encryption right now is a tool to milk the gullible, and hence very much crypto snake oil. For these distances one-time pads by trusted couriers would seem so much more practical and so much cheaper. -- Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a __ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net pgpIzevOdZDJw.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: OpenVPN
On Wed, 19 Jan 2005, Eugen Leitl wrote: If you haven't checked it out yet, you should. Really easy to set up (two Windows XP machines through a NAT on DSL, ping ~50 ms, preshared key, single port open; right now). Looking forward to see how C3-accelerated AES (OpenSSL next stable will support it out of the box) will do, across multiple platforms. Le IPsec c'est mort, vive le OpenVPN. On peut le dire ;-) The author of OpenVPN is very open to discussion for fixing bugs and adding new functionalities. OpenVPN is also working quite well over satellite and high-latency links... -- -- Alexandre Dulaunoy (adulau) -- http://www.foo.be/ -- http://pgp.ael.be:11371/pks/lookup?op=getsearch=0x44E6CBCD -- Knowledge can create problems, it is not through ignorance --that we can solve them Isaac Asimov
RE: Scientific American on Quantum Encryption
Eugen Leitl wrote: On Thu, Jan 20, 2005 at 10:47:38AM -0500, Trei, Peter wrote: I've actually seen these devices in operation. The thing that impressed me most was that the path need not be a single fiber from end to end - you can maintain quantum state across a switchable fiber junction. This means Very impressive. If they manage to keep the entanglement all the way up to LEO by line of sight it would be even more impressive (anyone thinks this can be done at all?) you are no longer limited to a single pair of boxes talking to each other. At the moment, the practical limit in fiber is around 150 km Getting to LEO is a *lot* harder - remember, you're throwing and catching one photon at a time - a beam that spreads wider than your detector is usually going to miss the detector. Peter Trei
Re: Scientific American on Quantum Encryption
Well, I think you've been a little too harsh on Scientific American. In the past a lot of the best articles were written by the pioneers in their fields. In fact, it's where I believe Wittfield and Diffie wrote a great piece on their work. And don't expect anyone (not even a math major) to go grab a quantum mechanics textbook and be able to get anything out of it. One would really need to have done the classical coursework in order to understand it (or at least to know enough to be spurised by it). And if you don't have the math then forget about it. Meanwhile, it IS possible to write intelligently on quantum entanglement, EPR and Aharnov-Bohm, and it's been done by Sci-Am, Penrose, Kaku and plenty of others. -TD From: Justin [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Scientific American on Quantum Encryption Date: Thu, 20 Jan 2005 15:23:35 + On 2005-01-20T12:16:34+0100, Eugen Leitl wrote: Scientific American has little clue, as usual (see their nanotechnology retraction). How could they possibly get clue? Scientists don't want to write pop-sci articles for a living. It's impossible to condense most current research down to digestible kernels that the masses can understand. SciAm should close down, requiring those who care about science to learn enough about it to read science journals. Professors who can teach a QM course well in a semester are rare enough. I doubt any one of them could write a 5000 word article on quantum entanglement that would be intelligible to the average cretinous American who wants to seem smart by reading Sci-Am. If they want to be smart, they can start by picking up an undergrad-level book on QM. But that requires much effort to read, unlike a glossy 5000 word article. Journalism should not be a college major. Journalists in the main know little about how to write and interview, and less about the topics they write on. They don't understand that being able to write (and in many cases even that ability is in serious doubt) doesn't qualify them to write on any topic they choose. Many journalists aren't qualified to write on anything, not even journalism. -- War is the father and king of all, and some he shows as gods, others as men; some he makes slaves, others free. --Heraclitus (Kahn.83/D-K.53)
RE: Scientific American on Quantum Encryption
What do you mean? By a physical fiber switch? That's certainly possible, though you'd need a very good condition switch to be able to do it. I'd bet if that switch switched a lot, the QCrypto channel would eventually be unusable. If you're talking about a WDM element or passive splitter or other purely optical component, then you'd need some kind of error correction (in the digital domain) in order to overcome the fact that many of the photons will not choose to go in the direction you want. In the long run I think we'll see some small proliferation, but given the level of integration and how well current coding schemes work, I'd guess this will remain a niche unless there's a major breakthrough in factoring. -TD From: Trei, Peter [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Eugen Leitl [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED] CC: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: RE: Scientific American on Quantum Encryption Date: Thu, 20 Jan 2005 10:47:38 -0500 I've actually seen these devices in operation. The thing that impressed me most was that the path need not be a single fiber from end to end - you can maintain quantum state across a switchable fiber junction. This means you are no longer limited to a single pair of boxes talking to each other. True, the SciAm article doesn't address a lot of issues, but the fact remains that this technology is interesting and important. Peter Trei -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Behalf Of Eugen Leitl Sent: Thursday, January 20, 2005 6:17 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Scientific American on Quantum Encryption Scientific American has little clue, as usual (see their nanotechnology retraction). Link: http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=05/01/20/0358215 Posted by: samzenpus, on 2005-01-20 06:35:00 from the just-try-and-break-it dept. [1]prostoalex writes Scientific American claims that [2]advances in commercially available quantum encryption might obsolete the existing factorization-based solutions: The National Security Agency or one of the Federal Reserve banks can now buy a quantum-cryptographic system from two small companies - and more products are on the way. This new method of encryption represents the first major commercial implementation for what has become known as quantum information science, which blends quantum mechanics and information theory. The ultimate technology to emerge from the field may be a quantum computer so powerful that the only way to protect against its prodigious code-breaking capability may be to deploy quantum-cryptographic techniques.
